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Introduction1 
The Dutch overall economic performance in recent years has 
been satisfactory compared to most other Member States. 
Economic growth was faster than the European average, mainly 
because of the good export performance, which was related to 
the composition of the Dutch export package and underpinned 
by a moderate wage and cost evolution. The exchange-rate link 
between the Dutch guilder and the German mark withstood the 
1992 and 1993 ERM crises well, and inflation and the interest 
rate level remained among the lowest in Europe and continued 
to comply with their respective EMU requirements. 
Despite these favourable economic developments, the public 
finance situation and the labour market still require attention. 
The low participation rate in the labour market and the public 
deficit and debt levels were already the central themes of the 
Commission's previous country study on the Netherlands 
(1992). Although Dutch economic policy in the three years 
since the publication of the country study was clearly aimed at 
promoting employment and reducing the public deficit, a 
significant improvement in the situation proved to be difficult, 
mainly because of the economic recession in Europe. Although 
employment expanded by 3% in the period 1992-95, 
unemployment increased from 5,6% to around 7,0% of the 
active labour force. Despite its reduction, the deficit ratio 
remained above the 3% of GDP EMU benchmark, and the debt 
ratio, although showing some modest decline, continued to 
hover around 80% of GDP. Consequently, the diagnosis of the 
problems of the Dutch economy - as made in the previous 
country study - remains roughly valid and will not be 
repeated in detail in the present country study. 
Instead, the study concentrates on the policy answers to the 
predominant problem areas: the necessity to curb the public 
finance situation to comply with the EMU convergence criteria, 
the need to create additional employment to fight the high 
inactivity rate in the labour market, and the insufficient degree 
of competitive behaviour in the product markets. 
The previous government (1989-94) continued its deficit 
reduction policy, as presented in the first convergence 
programme, successfully in 1992 and 1993, despite the 
economic downturn. However, the economic policy stance 
changed gradually in 1994, and the focus shifted partly from 
deficit reduction to employment creation. Hence, the 
government decided to loosen the fiscal consolidation path to 
promote employment, by lowering the high social security 
The cut-off for this report was early July 1995. 
contributions. As a consequence, the expected outcome of the 
first convergence programme for the general government deficit 
was not realized in 1994; the deficit remained higher than 3% 
of GDP. In the new convergence programme, which covers the 
period 1995-98, employment creation is also a policy objective, 
next to improving the public finance situation. Consequently, 
important cuts in social security contributions and some tax 
reductions are scheduled for 1995 and 1996, financed by 
expenditure cuts in the social security sector. The even-handed 
approach of simultaneous tax and deficit reductions is fully 
compatible with the pursuit of the fulfilment of the EMU deficit 
criterion in 1996. However, the exact evolution of the 
government deficit and debt ratios will depend on whether there 
is more economic growth than assumed in the cautious growth 
scenario, on which the new convergence programme is based. 
The debt ratio will only diminish sufficiently to comply with 
the EMU ·debt criterion, if the additional budgetary room 
resulting from higher than expected economic growth is used 
for a significant part to reduce the deficit. A reduction of the 
debt ratio is also essential to ensure the ability to cover for 
future pension obligations. 
The use of fiscal policy to promote employment is an important 
part of the labour market policy of the Dutch Government. 
However, it is only an element in the overall policy that tries to 
find an equilibrium between measures to promote labour 
demand and labour supply and between general measures and 
specific measures geared towards the lower end of the labour 
market. Reforms of the elaborate social security system 
constitute also a substantial component of labour market policy. 
Making the social security system less costly enables a 
reduction in the social security contributions, which should 
increase labour demand; increasing the gap between social 
security benefits and the lowest wage levels should increase 
incentives for benefit receivers to re-enter the labour market. 
Employment in the Netherlands is also often hampered by a 
number of regulations on 'hiring and firing' employees. The 
level of regulating is not only high in the labour market, but 
also in goods and services markets, especially in those sectors 
that work mainly for the domestic market. The ensuing lack of 
competition reduces the dynamism for the economy, which has 
negative consequences for the economic growth potential and 
limits employment possibilities. Although, in general, the 
macroeconomic performance of the Netherlands has been 
satisfactory, more attention to the microeconomic functioning 
of markets could have improved the image even further. 
However, increasing the level of competition and reducing 
excessive regulations is not only a possibility to promote 
growth and employment, it will, above all, increase the quality 
of products and services, by offering more choice and 
flexibility. 
Part I of the study describes recent developments during the 
economic downturn and prospects for the current recovery. The 
1 
public finance and labour market problems are also briefly 
presented. Part II consequently discusses the policy answers to 
these two main problem areas, and also describes recent 
changes in competition policy and initiatives to reduce the 
regulation of product markets. Annex 1 covers the lack of 
competition and the web of regulations that limit the dynamism 
2 
of the Dutch economy. Annex 2 investigates the German 
influence on the term structure and level of interest rates, and 
studies the passing trough of real shocks. Finally, Annex 3 
reviews recent reforms of the financial markets, aimed at 
securing competitiveness against bigger and more liquid 
markets in other Member States. 
Part I - Recent developments 
and prospects 
3 

Chapter 1: Macroeconomic performance and 
prospects 
The Netherlands did not escape from the general economic 
downturn in the European Union in the early 1990s. Still, the 
recession was less severe than in most of the other Member 
States, and the Netherlands even recorded a small positive 
eco nomic growth in 1993. Driven by external demand, 
economic development picked up very rapidly in 1994. With 
the additiona l support of investment, growth is expected to 
continue in 1995, but will probably decelerate in 1996 because 
of Jack of consumer demand. 
1.1. Mild economic downturn 
Economic growth in the Netherlands has been gradually 
slowing down since 1989 and almost stagnated in 1993. 
However, because of specific circumstances, real GDP growth 
in the Netherlands was less affected by the recession than in 
GRAPH 1: GDP at constant market prices 
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most of the other Member States. Contrary to previous periods, 
the Dutch economic cycle also seemed to be less connected to 
the German one. Before 1990, the Nether lands and West 
Germany had an almost parallel economic growth evolution, as 
is demonstrated by a correlation coefficient between the real 
GDP growth rates of the two countries that was as high as 94% 
in the period 1980-89. In 1990, economic growth was then 
stimulated by the unification process in West Germany, while it 
started decelerating already in the Netherlands. The opposite 
was true in the trough of the recession in 1993, when the 
Netherlands were able to avoid a contraction of the economy, 
while West Germany faced a negative growth of-1,7%. 
The trade specialization pattern has been a determining factor 
for the relatively mild character of the recent European 
recession in the Netherlands. In contrast to most other Member 
States, the Netherlands have an export structure which is 
concentrated Gn agricultural, food and chemical products, while 
European competitors are specialized mainly in machines, cars 
and other durable goods. The Netherlands are also an important 
exporter of natural gas, which - because of the unfavourable 
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GRAPH 2: Composition of export package NL and EC, 1992 
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price evolution - has not been a significant supportive factor 
for exports in recent years. On the other hand, during the recent 
recess ion, the demand for food and agricultural products 
remained relatively stable, while durable goods, such as cars, 
suffered heavily , which explains the relatively good export 
performance of the Netherlands in 1993. 
Although the rea l economic growth performance in the 
Netherlands has been relatively satisfactory in recent years, the 
per capita income has not improved similarly. While up to the 
mid- l 970s the GDP per head was constantly some I 0% higher 
than the Union average, from then on it deteriorated gradually 
and finally stabili zed around the Union average from 1987 
onwards (see Graph 3). Consequently, the recent higher than 
average economic growth was merely sufficient to compensate 
for the higher than average population growth I and to stabilize 
the GDP per capita. 
1 See also Chapter 4. 
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In the period since 1989, private consumption also supported 
growth more than in other Member States. At first, 
consumption was accelerated by tax reforms that invo lved 
lower direct and indirect taxes. Although in 1989 and 1990 part 
of the resulting increase of disposable income was eroded by 
hi gher sav ings, real consumption did increase by 3,5 % and 
4,2% in these years. Afterwards, cons umpti on growth 
decelerate d together with the declining growth rate of the 
economy and the lower growth of labour income . However , 
because of the better profitability of en terprises , a sustai ned 
growth of non-labour income coming from dividend payments 
was recorded. Additionally, private consumption was sustained 
by rising transfer receipts and a decrease of the savings ratio to 
the pre-1989 level. The non-contractual savings ratio even fe ll 
to a hi storically low level of less than I% of di sposable income. 
Consequently, the contribution of private consumption during 
the recession was higher than the EU average. 
Given the conti nued need for fiscal consolidation , public 
consumption has not contributed sig nificantly to economic 
growth in recent years . Nevertheless, government investment 
remained at a re latively high level of almost 3% of GDP and 
thus sustai ned gross fixed capital formation of the total 
Part I - Recent developments and prospects 
GRAPH 3: Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population (PPS; EUR 15- = 100) 
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Table 1 
Disposable income, consumption and saving of households (at current prices) 
1993: As a% of Netherlands 
disposable income (% changes) 
Netherlands EURl5 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994• 1995• 
Compensation of employees 77, 1 73 ,0 2,8 5,8 6,0 5,7 2,8 1,9 3,0 
Non-labour income, net 35,9 37,2 9,2 7,9 6,3 4,1 2,4 6,3 6,0 
Current transfers received 41, I 31 ,3 2,8 10,5 5,7 6,0 3,4 2,6 0,9 
Direc t taxes and c urrent transfers paid 54, 1 41 ,4 0,6 -1,3 14, 1 18,0 -1 ,9 2,2 0,2 
Gross disposable income 100,0 100,0 6,2 8,3 2,6 6,0 2,0 3,6 4,8 
real 4,9 6,0 -0,6 2,9 -0,1 1,3 2,3 
Consumption 87,7 86,1 4,7 6,5 6,4 5,7 2,8 3,9 4,5 
real 3,5 4,2 3,1 2,6 0,7 1,6 2, 1 
Saving 12,3 14,0 15,7 18 ,7 -17,5 8, 1 -3,3 1,6 6,8 
Saving ratio, as a % of gross 
disposable income 14,4 15,8 12,7 13 ,0 12,3 12, 1 12,3 
• Forecast 
Source: Commission services. 
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GRAPH 4: Contributions to GDP increase 
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economy, which remained higher than the Community average. 
However, because of the recession, private investment receded, 
and the total investment/GDP ratio declined markedly from 
21,5% in 1989 to 19,4% in 1994, after a negative real 
investment growth rate of -2,2% in 1993. This investment 
contraction was mainly concentrated in construction by 
enterprises and investment in transport equipment. Investment 
in cars and trucks particularly suffered from an increase in the 
tax rate on their entry into service in January 1993 , which 
provoked anticipatory purchases in 1992 . Some other 
investment categories, such as investment in other equipment 
that was supported by some major projects in the energy sector, 
were less affected by the recess ion. From 1992 onwards, the 
declining trend of long-term interest rates, rising hou sing rents 
and continued reduction of the government rent subs idies 
sustained the construction of private dwellings . Overall , real 
gross fixed capital formation remained broadly stable between 
1989 and 1993. However, starting from 1991 , the contribution 
of investment to growth was higher than the average of the 
Union. 
The balance of current transactions with the rest of the world 
was constantly in surplu s since 198 I and ran up to 4,0% of 
8 
GDP in 1994. Given the importance of the ex ternal trade sector 
(the exports/GDP ratio was 50,6% in 1993 and the 
imports/GDP ratio 45,6% ), this constant surplus has brought an 
important support to GDP growth. Compared to the average of 
the Union, the contribution of exports to growth was more 
important than the (negative) contribution of imports, si nce 
imports have been relatively high as a consequence of the 
comparatively high consumption growth and the large import 
content of Dutch exports. 
Germany remained the main trading partner, representing 
28,5% of exports and 22, I % of imports in 1993 . Important 
trade relations also ex ist with ne ighbouring countri es 
Belgium/Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and France. As a 
consequence, the 12 Member States of the European Union 
accounted for 72,5% of exports and 57,7% of total imports. 
1.2. Faster than expected recovery 
As in most of the other Member States, the 1993 economic 
downturn was followed by a faster than expected recovery. 
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GRAPH 5: Gross fixed capital formation at current prices (as a % of GDP) 
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Economic growth accelerated from 0,4% in 1993 to 2,5% in 
1994 and is expected to be 3 t % in 1995. Exports clearly took 
the leading role in this recovery. Already in the second half of 
1993 exports started growing at a faster pace again. While 
ex port growth was initially concentrated on the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Eastern Europe and the Far East, soon 
ex ports to the traditional major trading partners also 
s trengthened. Con sidering that in the first phase of the 
recovery, demand for basic products , such as the basic 
chemicals that are produced mass ively in the Dutch chemical 
industry, is generally high , exports continued to grow at a 
favourable pace in 1994. However, as the recovery has come to 
a more mature phase in 1995, with high investment and more 
consumption of durable goods, Dutch exports may not be able 
to follow the average market growth rate because of the 
sectoral breakdowns of exports. As domestic demand remained 
subdued , import growth followed export growth only with a 
lag, creating a very large surplus on the current account. 
Higher exports led to higher capacity utilization and higher 
profits, which were both beneficial to the evolution of corporate 
investment. Consequently , from the second quarter of 1994 
onwards, investment also started contributing to growth again. 
While construction by enterprises and investment in machinery 
remained hesitant, public investment, residential construction 
and investment in transport equipment grew fast , resulting in a 
growth of total gross fixed capital formation of 2,4% in 1994. It 
is expected that investment will contribute significantly to 
growth in 1995, given the marked increase of the degree of 
capacity utilization in 1994, some very optimistic investment 
surveys - which indicate that industrial investment in the 
manufacturing sector might rise by as much as 20% in 1995 -
and major public investment projects in railways and river 
dikes. 
Al though in 1994 private consumption of durable goods 
(mainly cars) recovered from the artificially low level of 1993 
- which was caused by the already mentioned change in 
taxation - total consumption growth remained limited to 
1,5%. Con sumer surveys indicate that while consumers are 
sig nificantly more optimistic about the general economic 
s ituation, the improvement in their financial situation is less 
impressive. Moreover, it is likely that the savings ratio will 
recover somewhat from the low level it attained during the 
economic downturn. Therefore, it is expected that private 
consumption will not pick up notably before the labour market 
and the financial situation of the households improve. 
9 
The economic and financial situation in the Netherlands 
Chapter 2. Inflation, interest rates and 
exchange rate 
According to section 9 of the Bank Act, 1948, the monetary 
objective 1 of the monetary policy conducted by the 
Nederlandsche Bank is 'to regulate the value of the 
Netherlands' monetary unit in such a manner as will be most 
conducive to the nation's prosperity and welfare, and in so 
doing seek to keep the value as stable as possible'. In practice 
this means that notably inflation must be countered. Two 
monetary factors are of importance in this respect: growth of 
the money stock and the movements in the exchange rate of the 
Dutch guilder. 2 Furthermore the exchange rate should be 
regulated in such a way as to protect domestic prices against 
foreign inflation. Clearly, then, within such a framework for the 
conduct of monetary policy, the ultimate, long-run objective of 
monetary policy is price stability, while the exchange rate is 
conceived as an intermediate target of monetary policy. In fact, 
even if there were conflicts3 between objectives of monetary 
policy, domestic and external, the Netherlands seems to have 
given priority to a stable exchange rate, and growin~ly s?, 
during the last 10-15 years, to a stable value of the guilder 111 
terms of the German mark. The chief motivation for the 'DM-
peg' is the generally good performance of the dominant 
German economy, especially in terms of inflation. Hence, the 
peg seems to be motivated in terms of policy discipline, i.e. the 
peg fosters control of inflation in the Netherlands. 
So, in a sense, to 'judge' the performance of the Dutch 
monetary policy, one apparently only needs to take a look at 
the realized inflation rate over, say, the last I 0-15 years and at 
the value of the guilder vis-a-vis the German mark over the 
same period of time. To this end, Graph 6 presents (quarterly) 
time-series of Dutch and German 'long- and short-term' 
inflation rates (Graphs 6a, 6b) and HFL/DM exchange rate 
(Graph 6e) over an extended period from the beginning of the 
1970s to the end of 1994. Graphs on Dutch and German long-
and short-term interest rates are (Graphs 6c and 6d, 
respectively) added to see the behaviour of the term structure of 
interest rates in these countries over the same period. The 
'short-term' inflation rate in Graph 6d means 'four quarter 
inflation rate', i.e. change in consumer prices in any quarter 
from corresponding quarter a year earlier, whereas the 'Jong-
term' inflation rate is calculated by taking a 20- (5-year) quarter 
moving average of the 'short-term' inflation rate. 
10 
The term is from den Dunnen ( 1985). who draws a distinction between 
technical and monetary objectives of money market and exchange-rate 
market policies conducted by the Nederlandsche Bank. 
den Dunnen (1985). p. 9, underlining added. 
An example of a situation where domestic and external objectives of 
monetary policy in the Netherlands seemed to require different interest rate 
moves by the Nederlandsche Bank was in the mid-1970s; 'excessive' 
growth of domestic credit combined with the objective of not wanting to 
pursue an exchange-rate policy of too strong a guilder. 
According to the graphs, we can immediately say that, 
especially from the beginning of the 1980s, the convergence of 
the Dutch economy (to the German) in terms of nominal 
interest rates as well as inflation rate has gone remarkably far; 
after peaking at the beginning of the 1980s, the long-term 
interest rate differential between Germany and the Netherlands 
came consistently down, and since the mid-1980s the 
differential has practically vanished. Also, the short-term 
interest rate differential has been, for the last I O years, 
practically non-existent, except perhaps in the latter half of the 
1980s. Framed in terms of monetary policy in the Netherlands. 
non-existent short-term interest rate differentials is a reflection 
of the tight relationship between the Dutch and German 
monetary policies (led by the latter), whereas small, 
periodically non-existent long-term interest rate differentials 
suggest that the DM-peg is credible in the Jong run. 4 Results 
based on more formal econometric methods (Annex 2) also 
tend to support this conclusion. The (relative) purchasing 
power parity seems to hold between Germany and the 
Netherlands (as from 1979), and the shocks to the German 
inflation rate constitute a major source of shocks to the Dutch 
inflation rate. These result tend to indicate that the need for real 
exchange-rate adjustments in the Dutch economy vis-a-vis 
Germany are non-existent. As for the results from interest rate 
determination in the Netherlands, they tend to suggest that 
. . ~ long-term HFL/DM exchange-rate expectations are stat1onary,-
i.e. the DM-peg is 'Jong-term credible'. 
Further results in Annex 2 also suggest that real convergence in 
the Dutch economy has gone so far that the nominal 
convergence is well sustained or supported by real 
convergence. It may, of course, be also the other way round, 
i.e. realized real convergence may actually reflect the 
credibility of the policy of pegging to the German mark, from 
which it follows that the costs of such a policy in terms of e.g. 
interest-rate differentials have come down considerably. The 
That is, the Dutch long-term interest rate is within the limits suggested hy 
the simplest test for target-zone credibility from Svensson ( 1991 ); given 
uncovered interest parity and the ERM target zone. the annualized upper 
and lower limit for the 'rate-of-return' band (in quarter!? data) is, 
respectively. ( I + GL TIR1)(S11/S1)41T - I and ( I + GL TIR1)(S /S1) 41T - I, 
where s1 denotes the current spot HFUDM exchange rate, S• and S' arc the 
weak and strong edge of the HFL (ERM-) target zone (HFL 1.12673 per 
DM ± 2.25%), and Tdenotes the average maturity of the underlying Dutch 
securities. As from 1979 the yield on long-term guilder-denominated asset 
has not. strictly speaking, remained inside these narrow limits. for the 
whole time at least, but the discrepancies are very small and have to do 
more with. for instance. measurement errors than with long-term credibility 
problems of the Dutch economic policy as such. Furthermore. for the more 
recent data (5-10 years) the narrow band has been increasingly respected by 
the observed long-term yield in the Netherlands. 
It should be noted that the evidence in favour of stationary inflation rate 
differential is not all that robust to, for instance, the choice of the lag length 
of the V AR used to test for cointegration. The coefficient structure is fairly 
robust to such choices. but marginal significance levels vary. Furthermore. 
the ADF-test for a unit root in the inflation rate differential gives mixed 
results. 
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disciplinary function of the DM-peg, alluded to earlier, seems 
to have worked well, at least during the last 10 years or so. 
Also, if there had ever been a credibility problem in the Dutch 
monetary policy in the past, the tight DM-peg must have 
reduced the problem greatly through the mechanism of 
generating a 'credibility bonus' to the Dutch monetary policy. 
As for the more recent developments of the interest rates and 
HFL/DM exchange rate the stability of the latter remained 
uncontested during the European exchange market turmoil in 
1992 and 1993 (ERM crises). Clearly there have not been any 
signs suggesting that the tight link with the German mark 
would not remain the intermediate target of monetary policy 
and that the stability of the guilder against the German mark 
would be put at risk by efforts at, for instance, a more 
independent monetary policy. This is well embedded in the 
basic data on interest rates and exchanges rates; beginning from 
late 1992, the guilder has been up to 0, 7 percentage points 
above its central rate against the German mark. During the 
same time and up till mid-1994, Dutch short-term interest rates 
were below German ones. 1 The negative market rate 
differential disappeared in mid-1994, when markets judged that 
the easing of monetary policy in Germany had run its course. 
Since then, the intervention rates in the Netherlands and 
Germany have also been virtually identical. As a further 
indication of the very tight connection between monetary 
policies in the Netherlands and Germany, not only in terms of 
objectives, but also in terms of timing of monetary policy 
actions, the Nederlandsche Bank reduced the rate on secured 
loans by 0,3 percentage points to 4,5% and the rate on secured 
advances by 0,5 percentage points to 4,0% on 31 March 1995, 
well in line with actions taken by the Bundesbank the same 
day. On the other hand, in the period April-mid-June, the 
Nederlandsche Bank reduced the rate on secured loans in four 
equal steps from 4,5% to 4, 1 % and, in addition, the rate on 
secured advances by 25 basis points to 3,75% on 9 June. The 
main factor affecting the Nederlandsche Bank's decision to 
reduce the two rates was the strong position of the guilder vis-
a-vis the Deutschmark (in the ERM grid). Hence, though the 
DM-link is very tight indeed, the implications of this link 
should not be taken too far so as to suggest complete loss of 
control, by the Nederlandsche Bank, over domestic monetary 
policy-relevant interest rates. 
In summary, then, there seems to be a sufficient amount of 
evidence to suggest that the 'disciplinary mechanism' provided 
by guilder's DM-peg has worked reasonably well in the 
Netherlands in the sense that inflation and interest rate 
12 
During most of 1992 and 1993. i.e. when the Dutch short-term interest rates 
were below German ones and the guilder gain relative to the German mark, 
the special loan rate of the Nederlandsche Bank was reduced somewhat 
faster than the Bundesbank"s repo-rate. By all account, this cannot be 
judged as a significant difference in monetary policy action taken by the 
two banks. 
differentials relative to Germany are at present, and have been 
for an extended period of time, negligible. This suggests that 
Dutch monetary policy seems to have enjoyed a 'credibility 
bonus' from the DM-peg. Finally, given the presently high 
degree of commitment, in monetary as well as in economic 
policy in general, to the DM-peg - which seems to be well 
supported also by the real sector of the Dutch economy - any 
significant discrepancy either in the overall Dutch monetary 
policy vis-a-vis the German one or in the timing of monetary 
policy actions vis-a-vis Germany are (highly) unlikely in the 
periods ahead. Hence, given this perception of long-term 
continuity of the present monetary policy, Dutch inflation rate 
and long-term interest rates will be almost fully determined by 
the corresponding German rates. Also, short-term interest rates 
in the Netherlands - though much more tightly related to 
policy actions than long rates - will follow ever more closely 
the corresponding German rates, given the high degree of 
(explicit and implicit) monetary policy coordination between 
the central banks. 
Chapter 3. Public finance 
3.1. A long history of fiscal consolidation 
As a result of an ambitious social policy to build up the welfare 
state, which was initiated in the 1960s, general government in 
the Netherlands in the last two decades has grown to 
particularly large proportions compared with most other 
Community countries. Total government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP increased steadily from 33,6% in 1960 to 
61,5% in 1983, compared to an evolution from 32,7% to only 
50, I% in the other five original Member States. The burden of 
taxation also became heavier, but not to the same extent. 
Consequently, the general government deficit went on growing 
to reach 7, 1 % of GDP in 1982. 
Since this situation became unsustainable, fiscal policy was 
switched towards a medium-term adjustment with the aim of 
restricting the scale of public expenditure, reducing the burden 
of taxation and cutting the public deficit. When the Treaty on 
European Union was approved, this fiscal strategy, which dates 
back from 1983, proved to be fully compatible with the planned 
realization of an economic and monetary union. Consequently, 
the existing government policy, as it was laid out in the 1989 
coalition agreement, could be simply translated into the first 
Dutch convergence programme, which was submitted in 1992. 
The second convergence programme was presented at the end 
of last year, after the installation of the new government in 
August 1994; again, the programme was essentially a 
restatement of the new coalition agreement. 
The fiscal adjustment effort has brought down general 
government net borrowing from 7, I% of GDP in 1982 to 3,1 % 
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GRAPH 7a: General government: Total expenditure, current receipts and deficit (as a % of GDP) 
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in 1994. In the European Union, only Germany, Ireland and 
Luxembourg currentl y have a lowe r defi c it. Althou gh the 
deficit evolution showed a clear downward trend over the 
considered period, there were substanti al fluctu ations around 
this trend. These fluctuations can partly be explained by the fact 
that the main obj ective of the defi cit reduction policy in the 
Netherlands was, up to 1994, the net balance to be financed by 
the State , 1 and not general gove rnment net borrowing. A 
smooth evolution of the net balance to be financed can translate 
in a seemingly erratic behaviour of net borrowing because of 
differences in definition between the two concepts. 2 However, 
the failure to meet the pre-set target in some years, espec ially in 
the beginning of the period, al so created deviations from the 
downward trend. 
To o btain a more economica ll y releva nt concept . the net bal a nce to be 
financed by the State is corrected for some distortionary fac tors. Examples 
of such correcti ons are off-budget items. earl y redemption of loans to social 
building co rporaJi ons, stude nt loa ns , e tc. (see a lso Box I in Sec ti o n I . 
(Part 11 ) of this study) . 
The ma in differences are the di ve rge nJ acco unting o f cash-accru al 
differe nces and privati zation revenues . Ge neral government net borrowing 
also contains the de fi cits o f the soc ial securit y sector and local authorities. 
Although these sec tors are on average approximately in equi librium, 1hey 
can influence ne t borrow in g in some years (see also Box I in Sec tion I. 
(Part II) of this study). 
It is expected th at the higher economic growth in 1995 and 
1996 wi ll faci li tate the pl anned adju stment process , which 
could bring general government net borrowing below the EMU 
threshold of 3% in 1996. The necessary measures to reach this 
targe t are fu rther desc ribed in Chapter I of Part II. The 
reduction of the gove rnment defi ci t was rea li zed while total 
curre nt government rece ipts receded fro m 56,2 % of GDP in 
1983 to 52,2% in 1994, pass ing through a minimum of 49,9% 
in 1990.3 This implied a marked reducti on of total genera l 
government expenditure (including net capital expendi tures) 
from 61 ,5% of GDP in 1983 to 55,2% in 1994, wi th a lowest 
level of 54,8% in 1989. 
Although the leve l of ge nera l government expenditu re has 
fallen, it remains among the highest in the European Union.~ In 
general, the evolution of the expenditure ratio was opposed to 
the economic cycle. During the period 1983-89. when growth 
T he prev ious Dutch Gove rnment int ended to keep the burden of taxes and 
soc ial security cont ribut ions be low the 1990 level. However. to be ab le to 
attain the de fi cit objec ti ve. the tax objecti ve had to be relaxed. 
In I 994. the general government total expenditure ratio was 55.2% of GDP 
in the Netherl ands, compared to the EU average of 51.5%. Fruncc (55.4 %) 
and Belgium (55.6%) are approximately at the same leve l. whi le on ly the 
Scandi nav ian Member States Finl and (60.2 % ). De nmark (62.7 %) and 
Sweden (70.3%) have significantl y higher expenditure ratios . 
GRAPH 8a: Composition of general government total expenditure (as a % of GDP) 
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GRAPH 8b: Composition of general government current receipts (as a % of GDP) 
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accelerated, the ratio dec lined sharply , owing to a reduction of 
the government wage bill, current transfers to households and 
public investment. When growth slowed down after 1989, the 
restrictive expenditure policy was continued, but not to the 
ex tent to completely compensate for the negative cyclical effect 
and to prevent a slow ri se of the expenditure ratio. With the 
improvement of the economic cycle in 1994, the trend in the 
expenditure ratio turned downwards again, which is expected to 
continue in 1995 and 1996. Once more , the expenditure cuts 
are concentrated in current transfers and the compensation of 
government employees; low interest rates also generate lower 
interest payments as a percentage of GDP. 
Given that total Dutch government expenditure remains among 
the highest in the Union and the deficit is now among the 
lowest, government receipts had to remain relatively high.1 The 
evolution of total current receipts was clearly not the resu lt of 
an anti-cyclical policy: during the economic upswing in 1983-
Genera l government currenl receipt s attained 52, I % of GDP in the 
Ne1herlands in 1994. Only Finland (54.6%). Denmark (58.7%) and Sweden 
(59.9%) had higher current receip1s. 
I 
1985 1990 1995 
89 current receipts were lowered, they picked up again when 
growth decelerated and they finally started declining in 1994 
with the start of the recovery. The image of the evolution of the 
various components of total current receipts was seriously 
blurred by a number of tax reforms. A good example is the 
general income tax reform in 1990 (Oort reform), which shifted 
the financing of some social expenditure funds 2 from 
employers ' social contributions to direct taxation of 
households,3 which was reversed in 1994 by a shift from direct 
taxation to social contributions by employees. 
3.2. Resilient debt ratio 
Due to the worsening deficit performance between 1977 and 
1982, the debt ratio deteriorated considerably from 41,4 to 
63,7% of GDP. Despite the gradual improvement of the 
The concerned soc ial sec urity fund s were 1he AA W (Algemene 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet, General Di sability Law) and lhe A WW 
(Algemene Weduwen en Wezenwet, General Widows and Orphans Law). 
The income loss for employees was compensated by a higher gross wage. 
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GRAPH 9: General government gross debt and actual interest payments (as a % of GDP) 
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government deficit in the following years , the persisting low 
nominal GDP growth prevented any improvement in the debt 
ratio, which continued to increase, albeit on a slower pace , to 
reach 79 ,2% of GDP in 1988 . From then on , the ratio was 
approximately stabilized around 80% of GDP, although a slight 
upward tendency pushed it to its highest recorded level of 
81,4% in 1993. 
The rapid debt accumulation and the high nomjnal interest rates 
of the early 1980s increased the interest charges markedly from 
around 3% of GDP in the 1970s to around 6% in the early 
1990s. Since interest payments cannot be reduced easily by the 
government without disrupting the financial markets , primary 
expenditures had to be reduced even more to contain the 
government deficit. As a result, the primary deficit turned into a 
surplus again starting in 1985. 
In 1994, a reduction of the debt ratio was realized through 
important one-off operations, consisting of privatization 
receipts and the proceeds of the early redemption of 
government loans to the social building corporations. Given the 
expected continued downward trend of the deficit , the 
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economic recovery and the rece ipts from the pri vati zation of 
the second part of the postal and telecommunications service 
KPN , the debt ratio should normally also dec line in 1995 and 
1996. However, thi s decrease will be compe nsated in 1995 by 
the one-off effec t of an important financial operati on in 
thesocial building sec tor.' As a co nseq uence of thi s 
considerable debt increasing stock- flow adjustment (around I% 
of GDP) , th e debt ratio is not expected lO decline in 1995. 
However, over the three-year period 1993-96 it may decline by 
4,3 percentage points from 8 1,4% of GDP to 77, I%. 
In thi s operation the government pays. in 1995. lhc di scounted value of all 
future subsidies to the soc ial building corporations. whil e these corporations 
wi ll redeem all c urre ntl y o ut standing gove rn ment loa ns. Although. on 
average. thi s operati on should be approximate ly neutral fo r future deficits 
(on the one hand th e government will pay Jess subs idies. but on the o ther 
hand there wi ll be less interest rece ipt s on ou tstandin g loans), in the first 
years there m ight be a co ns iderable ga in of around :t % of GDP for the 
government . whi ch wil l be reve rsed aro und the yea r 2003 (Van Putten 
( 1994)). However. there is an important effec t on the evo lution of public 
debt in 1995 since the present value of the future subsidies is approx imately 
HFL 10 bn ( 1.7 % of GDP) hi gher than lhe out s tanding loans to public 
housing corpora tions. 
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GRAPH 10: Contributions to the change in general government gross debt (as a % of GDP) 
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Chapter 4. The labour market situation 
4.1. High population growth generates 
unemployment 
During the last 35 years , the population has been growing in 
the Netherlands at a yearly average rate of 0,9%, almost double 
the EU average of 0,5%. The growth rate slowed down 
gradually up to 1983, but accelerated again afterwards, which 
resulted in an accumulated population growth of 36,3% over 
the period 1960-95, the highest in the Union. Since the high 
birth rate and the immigration of mostly younger people are the 
main causes for this evolution, the population at working age 
( 15 to 64 years) has been growing even faster by 1,2% yearly 
on average, compared to an average for the Union of only 
0,6%. However, in contrast to total population growth, the 
increase of the population at working age is slowing down and 
approaching the EU average. 
Until the first oil-price shock, employment creation was strong 
enough to follow population growth and to keep unemployment 
at a low level. Afterwards, the rapid build-up of unemployment 
with each oil-price shock, and the insufficient generation of 
new jobs to reduce unemployment again between the two 
shocks, created a staircase-like pattern in the unemployment 
ratio, which increased from 1,0% in 1970 to 11,9% in 1982 
(harmonized Eurostat unemployment rate) . However, this 
pattern disappeared after 1983, when the unemployment rate 
started to fall again for the first time since the 1960s, and 
reached 5,6% in 1992. The recent economic slowdown put an 
end to this favourable evolution and unemployment started 
rising again to 7,0% in 1994. As shown in Graph l la, the main 
reason for the sharp unemployment increase in the Netherlands 
is not job destruction, which was the case in most other 
Member States, but insufficient employment creation to keep 
up with the continuing labour supply growth. 
As in most other Member States, unemployment is not evenly 
spread over the various groups of the population. Although the 
labour market participation rate of women remains 
considerably lower than the male participation rate (47,0%, 
compared to 75,5% for men), they take up about half of total 
unemployment. As a consequence, the female unemployment 
rate is almost double that of males. In looking at the age 
17 
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GRAPH 1 la: Population at working age (15-64 years) and employment 
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GRAPH llb: Unemployment (as a% of civilian labour force) 
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GRAPH 12: Composition of unemployment 
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GRAPH 12: (Continued) 
By education 
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Table 2 
Population of working age 
1987 1988 
Population of working age 10024 10 107 
Labour force 5 743 5 867 
Employed 5 257 5 378 
Unemployed 486 490 
Registered, actively looking for work 375 
Not registered 115 
Inactive population 4 281 4240 
Registered unemployed, not searching for work 
Retired early 
Disabled (for the record) 1 817 835 
1 Partly disabled may be worJcjng or unemployed. 
Source: CBS. 
structure of unemployment, one can observe that 
unemployment diminishes with age. This is particularly true in 
periods of lower employment creation when young people have 
problems to enter the already crowded labour market. 
However, compared to other Member States, youth 
unemployment is relatively low. The unemployment rate 
among older people also tends to be limited because they often 
leave the labour market through disability or early retirement 
systems. The lowly educated people are another group in the 
labour market with above average unemployment: while they 
take up less than a third of the working population, they 
represent almost half of the unemployed. Among people with 
only primary education, unemployment runs up to 15,6% 
(1993). Foreigners (especially Turks and Moroccans) also have 
more problems to find employment. With an unemployment 
rate of 18,5% (1993), approximately three times higher than the 
unemployment rate of Dutch nationals, they represent almost a 
quarter of the total unemployed population. 
The share of long-term unemployment increased rapidly in the 
1980s, but declined somewhat recently, which is merely the 
effect of the new higher inflow into the unemployment system 
because of the rising unemployment. If these newly 
unemployed do not manage to leave the unemployment system 
during the current recovery, the share of long-term unemployed 
can be expected to start rising again. Approximately half of the 
unemployed are now long-term unemployed, which is close to 
the European average. In contrast to the composition of overall 
unemployment, the long-term unemployed tend to be male and 
older. This illustrates that older people have more difficulties 
finding a new job once they become unemployed. Long-term 
unemployment is also concentrated with lowly educated people 
and people on an expected low wage. 1 This segment of the 
labour market is often referred to as the low end of the market. 
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Not only unemployment increased, but also other forms of 
inactivity and hidden unemployment, such as early retirement 
and disability, expanded. Especially the disability scheme, 
which contains an unreasonably high number of almost 
900 OOO people out of 10,5 million people of working age, has 
been used to lower the supply pressure on the labour market. 
The most significant decrease in labour market participation 
was registered for older men (60 to 64 years), whose 
participation rate dropped from about 75% in 1970 to only 20% 
now. The systematic policy to remove excess supply from the 
labour market by facilitating the entry into a number of social 
security schemes has contributed significantly to the high 
degree of inactivity in the labour market and the associated low 
participation rate. The persistence of this phenomenon is 
illustrated by the fact that a more complete discussion of the 
low participation rate in the labour market was already included 
in the Commission's previous country study on the 
Netherlands, which dates back to 1992. 
4.2. Wage moderation creates more employment 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a broad consensus 
between employers, unions and the government to moderate the 
nominal wage evolution, in order to create more employment. 
Since then, the nominal wage increase was consistently lower 
than in its major trading partners, although the difference was 
smaller in the 1990s. However, part of the competitive 
advantage of this favourable wage development was eroded by 
the appreciation of the Dutch guilder, which is illustrated in 
Graph 13b by the difference between the evolution of the 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (1994a). 
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GRAPH 13a: Nominal compensation per employee (annual percentage change, five-year moving average) 
II 
1970 1972 
NB: EUR 4 = B, DK, WD, F. 
Source: Commission services. 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 
I-NL - BUR4 - BUR 15! 
IS 
13 
II 
1990 1992 1994 
GRAPH 13b: Nominal compensation per employee (relative to EUR 15 (EUR 15 = 100), 1980 = 100) 
1970 1975 
EUR 4 = B, DK, WD, F. 
Source: Commission services. 
1980 1985 1990 199S 
!- NL. in Dutch guilders - NL, in ccu - BUR 4 ! 
Part I - Recent developments and prospects 
GRAPH 13c: Real compensation per employee, deflator private consumption (annual percentage change, 
five-year moving average) 
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GRAPH 13d: Relative factor prices of labour and capital (1960 = 100) 
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nominal compensation per employee expressed in guilder and 
in ecu. However, this graph also shows that the remaining gain, 
expressed in common currency, is still significant, both 
compared to other comparable countries (EUR 4) and to the 
Community as a whole. A similar observation can be made on 
the evolution of real compensations per employee. Because of 
the low inflation record of the Netherlands, the difference in 
real wages with other Member States is smaller than the 
difference in nominal wages. Nevertheless, real wages have 
been increasing consistently slower than the EU average, which 
generated an important accumulated competitive advantage. 
As a consequence of the real wage moderation in the early 
1980s, the declining trend of capital profitability was stopped 
and the net return on net capital stock started to increase 
slightly again. The flattening of the real wage evolution and the 
improvement of capital profitability also put an end to the 
deteriorating trend of the relative factor price of labour 
compared to capital (see Graph 13d), which limited the 
substitution of labour by capital considerably. Consequently, 
labour productivity growth slowed down and the required 
increase of the capital stock for a given economic growth was 
reduced, which led to a higher employment content of growth.' 
During this period of high employment combined with low 
labour productivity growth, approximately three quarters of 
economic growth in the Netherlands was associated with 
employment creation, while the remaining part consisted of 
productivity growth. Even in the period ofreduced economic 
growth after 1989, employment creation remained high as 
compared to GDP growth. This break compared to the previous 
period of very low employment creation (l 97 4-84) can be 
attributed to the changed emphasis towards wage moderation. 
However, this aggregate evolution masks the sectoral changes 
which occurred. In broad terms, two major subsectors can be 
Matthes (1989). 
Table 3 
identified. The open sector competes on international markets 
and has to be highly competitive, which implies that 
employment growth tends to be lower. The services sector, on 
the other hand, which operates mainly in the domestic market, 
is relatively sheltered from outside competition. In this latter 
sector, productivity typically is much lower and the growth of 
employment higher.2 
Although Table 3 suggests the existence of a trade-off between 
employment creation and productivity growth, this apparent 
opposition between productivity and jobs creation is mainly the 
consequence of the ongoing specialization of the Dutch 
economy in the services sector. Since the productivity in the 
services sector is lower, the average productivity growth is 
slowing down. However, this does not imply that to create 
more jobs, microeconomic productivity needs to go down. On 
the contrary, high productivity growth will lead to a stronger 
international competitive position, which should generate 
higher output and higher employment. Therefore, 
macroeconomic policies to promote growth and employment 
need to be complemented by microeconomic measures to 
improve the productive potential of the economy. Such 
measures comprise promoting competitive business behaviour 
and reducing unnecessary regulation in product markets (see 
also Chapter 3 of Part II and Annex 1 ); but also improvements 
in the education system, public infrastructure and investment in 
research and development can raise the productive potential of 
an economy. 
Although the number of persons employed has risen 
significantly, employment in man-years has grown at a much 
slower pace because job creation was heavily concentrated on 
part-time working. The proportion of part-time workers 
increased from an already relatively high level of 21, 1 % in 
1983 to 35,0% in 1993, compared to a change for the European 
De Vries (1994), Van Ark (1994). 
Distribution of real growth over employment creation and labour productivity 
1961-73 1974-90 1974-84 1985-90 1991-94 
GDP 4,8 2,2 1,7 3,0 1,6 
Employment 0,9 1,1 0,5 2,2 1,1 
Productivity 3,9 1,1 1,2 0,8 0,5 
Employment/growth 18,8% 50,0% 29,4% 73,3% 68,8% 
Productivity/growth 80,5% 49,5% 70,2% 26,1% 30,9% 
Source: Commission services. 
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GRAPH 14a: Employment (as a % of the population aged 15-64) 
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GRAPH 14b: Employment: persons in employment, full-time (ft) and part-time (pt) 
(as a % of the population aged 15-64) 
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Union from 12, I to 16,4% in the same period. As a 
consequence, the improvement of the participation rate in full-
time equivalents has been less outspoken than the progress of 
the participation rate in terms of persons. Especially women 
who entered the labour market in the 1980s mainly went for 
part-time jobs. Consequently, the favourable employment 
evolution in the last decade is, to a large extent, due to a 
voluntary redistribution of the available work. Still, a 
significant minority only accepted a part-time job because of 
the unavailability of a full-time job or because of a lack of 
child-care facilities. 
4.3. Recovery produces new jobs with a time lag 
The slowing-down of economic growth in the 1990s gradually 
brought employment growth to a standstill in the trough of the 
recession in 1993. Yet, the unexpectedly rapid recovery in 1994 
did not generate new jobs, which spurred the fears that the 
Dutch economy might be shifting away from a high 
employment-low productivity model to a phase of jobless 
growth. However, this concern seems somewhat premature for 
a number of reasons. The lagging employment creation is 
mainly the counterpart of the lagging employment destruction 
(labour hoarding) in the downward phase of the cycle. Initially, 
additional production can still be covered with the existing 
employment. In a later phase, first temporary employment 
increases, which was already observed in 1994, and only 
afterwards new permanent posts are created. This evolution 
was also observed after recessions in the past, such as in 1982, 
when employment continued to decrease significantly in 1983 
while GDP growth rebounded from a contraction of -1,4% in 
1982 to a growth of 1,5% in 1983. The stagnation of 
employment over the whole year 1994 also masked an 
improvement during the year. After a further contraction in the 
first quarter, compared to the same period of the previous year, 
employment started growing again from the second quarter 
onwards. 
Furthermore, there are no new specific arguments to warrant a 
more pessimistic view of the ability of the Dutch economy to 
create new jobs in the current recovery. The profitability of the 
enterprises has been significantly improved in recent years and 
has not suffered markedly from the economic downturn. As a 
consequence, profitability is now much better than it was at the 
time of the 1982 recession, although it remains lower than at 
the end of the 1980s, when job growth was booming. Besides, 
the evolution of nominal wage costs also remains subdued, 
compared to the major European competitors, which should 
continue to promote employment creation. Although there 
remains a lack of flexibility in both the labour market (see Part 
II) and the product markets (see Annex 1 ), the awareness about 
these problems has increased and measures are being taken. 
Therefore, the dampening effect of these structural issues on 
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employment creation should certainly not be more important 
than in the past, on the contrary. 
Therefore, it can be expected that employment will recover 
significantly in the near future. However, as in the past. an 
important part of this additional employment will go to new 
entrants into the labour market. The reduction of the number of 
registered unemployed is also dampened by reforms in the 
social security system (for example in the disability scheme -
see Part II), which reduce the hidden unemployment and 
increase the labour force. Consequently, unemployment will 
react with an even bigger time lag and is expected to stabilize 
this year and to start falling only in 1996. However, given the 
expansion of the labour force, the stabilization of the number of 
unemployed will already reduce the unemployment rate in 1995. 
Nevertheless, to reduce the unacceptably high level of (long-
term) unemployment, additional measures will be necessary to 
increase labour market flexibility and reduce labour costs, which 
are the subject of Chapter 2 of Part II of this study. 
Chapter 5. Financial markets: Reform of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange to maintain 
competitiveness 
The Dutch financial system has, as compared to other 
continental financial markets. been traditionally based on 
securitization of financial assets. This has allowed Amsterdam 
to develop a securities market which is relatively large 
compared to the size of its economy. 
However, Amsterdam's position as one of the largest medium-
sized markets for securities trading has been effectively 
challenged in the past years by increasing competition from 
foreign exchanges, attracting considerable parts of Dutch 
securities' trading. 
The vulnerability of Amsterdam to London's (and to a minor 
degree Frankfurt's) competition is particularly elevated for a 
number of structural reasons; the market is relatively small, the 
concentration of securities trading on a few highly liquid blue 
chips is very high, which allows foreign exchanges, by trading 
these few stocks abroad, to capture a sizeable share of overall 
trading in Dutch securities. Furthermore Dutch demand for 
securities is driven by large institutional investors (a few large 
pension funds and insurance companies), which tend to be 
quite sensitive to overall trading costs and often engage in very 
large transactions off the official exchanges. 
The shift in institutional investors' portfolios from loans to 
securities, having occurred over the past few years, is an 
element of support for the development of Dutch securities 
markets. Nevertheless, trading on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange (ASE) and the European Options Exchange (EOE), 
the exchange for Dutch financial derivatives, grew less than in 
other European financial centres. This threatened to prevent 
Amsterdam from maintaining the 'critical mass' for large-
volume transactions in blue chips and government bonds and 
thus the overall position of Amsterdam as a financial centre. 
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange completely overhauled its 
trading system for government bonds in 1993 and introduced 
for the other traded securities (shares and non-government 
bonds), on 30 September 1994, sweeping reforms of its trading 
system, in order to increase its attractiveness, particularly for 
the large institutional investors trading in Dutch securities. 
From this date, the exchange has been divided into two distinct 
segments, one for wholesale and the other for retail business. 
The retail segment will build on the former general system of 
an order-driven floor screen. 
The new element is the wholesale market segment, fully 
computerized and based on two systems: 
1. The 'automatic interprofessional dealing system' (AIDA) 
serves as the system for dealer-to-dealer-transactions, that 
means transactions between members of the exchange 
which form the inner core of the professional market, 
allowing the dealers to enter into arbitrage transactions or 
book balancing operations in a very efficient manner. 
2. The 'Amsterdam Stock Exchange trading system' (ASSET) 
is open to non-dealers as well, as it allows the dealers to 
look via this system for clients and make the respective 
deals. It only covers a small list of internationally traded 
government bonds and stocks, which account, however, for 
the vast majority of tlt:als in Dutch securities. It is, unlike 
the retail-segment, quote-driven. 
This introduction of a separate wholesale market with new and 
distinct trading systems and trading rules is meant to challenge 
the role of the international segment of the London Stock 
Exchange which had attracted an increasing share of Dutch 
securities trading (according to estimates, up to around 45% of 
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share transactions and 80% of bond transactions were done via 
the London SEAQ). 
This reform demonstrates the determination of the participants 
in the Amsterdam financial markets to fight the erosion of 
Amsterdam as a financial centre. It is certainly a useful step for 
keeping wholesale business in the country and it will end the 
situation where the SEAQ was the only market ready for Dutch 
securities' wholesale transactions. 
If it is able to stop or even turn around the continuing erosion 
of market share this has to be seen and will partly depend on 
the respective overall trading costs and the progress of eventual 
supporting reforms in Amsterdam, such as the integration of 
the cash and derivatives market. The French and German 
markets, although catering for a considerably larger domestic 
client basis, have in the past succeeded implementing similar 
reforms to reverse market share losses to London. 
Preliminary figures seem to suggest a parallel development for 
the Damrak, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange; according to its 
own information, market share for Dutch securities trading 
grew in the first quarter to 65%, up from 55% two years ago. 
Furthermore, for most of the shares also traded in London, the 
'spread' between the buying and selling price has been smaller 
in Amsterdam, pointing to a more liquid and thus efficient 
market than its main competitor. 
The European Options Exchange might go a step further, 
opening its settlement facilities also to transactions off the 
floor. It considers such a strategy to be crucial for keeping 
large-volume business, in particular transactions initiated by 
institutional investors. 
However, Amsterdam's structural features, such as the 
relatively small volume when compared to London, Frankfurt 
or Paris, its high concentration and the already achieved high 
level of securitization, will remain and might, in the medium 
term, weigh on the future development of Amsterdam's 
securities trading. 
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Introduction 
At the time of the approval of the Treaty on European Union, 
there remained a considerable gap between the Dutch 
Government deficit and debt situation and the convergence 
criteria on public finance that were laid out in the Treaty, even 
though the Netherlands had already started its fiscal 
consolidation policy in the early 1980s. In 1992, when the first 
Dutch convergence programme was submitted, the general 
government deficit stood at approximately 4% of GDP, one 
percentage point above the EMU reference value, and the debt 
ratio had run up to around 80% of GDP, considerably above the 
60% reference value. Given the achieved monetary stability, 
which placed the Netherlands as an actual candidate for EMU, 
the improvement of the public finance situation should get first 
priority. 
However, the problems were not limited to the public finance 
field. The inactivity rate in the labour market was among the 
highest in the Union, with high degrees of disability, early 
retirement, absence for sickness and part-time working. The 
social security outlays that were associated with the high 
inactivity rate put a heavy burden on the budget, especially 
since not only the number of people in the various social 
security schemes was elevated, but also the level of the social 
benefits was very generous. This high social benefit level was a 
disincentive for low-skilled workers to try to enter the labour 
market, since the difference between the social benefits and the 
wage level was too small. Furthermore, since some social 
benefits and subsidies are income-related, the average marginal 
tax pressure for the lowest income groups has a very steep 
profile. To be able to finance the high social expenditures, taxes 
and social security contributions had to be increased to elevated 
levels, given the narrow tax base provoked by the low 
participation rate. The high tax burden further reduced the 
incentives to participate in the Jabour market and increased 
pressure on wages, since employees try to shift the higher tax 
burden to employers during wage negotiations. 
The first two chapters of this second part of the study evaluate 
the two main economic policy objectives of the government: 
reducing the government deficit and debt to comply with the 
EMU criteria, and lowering taxes and social security charges to 
promote Jabour market participation. However, given the 
multiple interactions between the two objectives, few policies 
are targeted at only one of these two objectives. Therefore, the 
strict separation of the objectives in two different chapters will 
be complemented, when appropriate, by cross-references to 
indicate the relation with the other objective. 
However, the creation of a more dynamic labour market needs 
to be supplemented by more dynamic product markets. 
Collusive behaviour and protection from outsiders are 
widespread in some sectors of the Dutch economy. 
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Subsequently, the Dutch authorities intend to accelerate 
legislative reforms to increase the competition level and reduce 
overly protective regulations. Annex l describes the current 
situation and tries to determine some possible macroeconomic 
consequences. Chapter 3 of this part takes a closer look at 
recent policy measures and proposals. 
Chapter 1. Curbing the public finance situation to 
comply with EMU convergence criteria 
1.1. The first convergence programme (1992-94) 
In March 1992, the Dutcb. authorities presented a first 
convergence programme, which described and explained the 
medium-term policies for fiscal consolidation in the period 
1989-94 that were agreed when the previous government 
coalition came to office at the end of 1989. The objective was 
to lower the central government deficit ratio by approximately 
t percentage point of GDP yearly, which would be translated 
in a similar reduction of general government net borrowing. 1 
As a consequence, the general government deficit would fall 
below the 3% EMU threshold already in 1993, while from the 
same year onwards the debt ratio would be set on a downward 
path. The government also intended to keep the burden of taxes 
and social security contributions below its 1990 level and 
wished to maintain the purchasing power of social security 
benefits, which implied a sharp decrease of the public 
expenditure ratio to attain the desired deficit reduction. 
The achievement of the programme's targets was considerably 
hampered by a much worse than expected economic situation. 
Especially in 1993, economic growth was considerably lower 
than foreseen in the programme. As a consequence, the 
anticipated unemployment stabilization was not realized and 
the unemployment rate rose by more than two percentage 
points between 1992 and 1994. Moreover, the inflow into the 
sickness and disability schemes continued at a high pace, 
instead of the envisaged stabilization at the 1989 level, which 
put additional pressure on the budget. 
Consequently, in 1992 and 1993 the government had to adopt 
several important additional savings packages to keep the 
deficit in line with the intended path. Measures included 
abandoning the automatic indexation of social security benefits, 
further cuts in subsidies, not correcting tax brackets for 
inflation and a number of one-off measures. As a result of the 
additional savings packages, the original central government 
In fact the target for the central government ratio was set in relation to net 
natjonal income (NNI) instead of GDP; a reduction of the deficit ratio by 
0,5% of NNI corresponds to a reduction of 0,45% of GDP. To avoid 
unnecessary complications, all ratios in this study are calculated in relation 
to GDP. 
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Table 4 
Assumptions and objectives (A/0)1 of the first Dutch convergence programme and the realizations (R)2 
GDP 3 
Unemployment 4.6 
Total tax burden s.6 
Public expenditure 5 
Government deficit 5 
Central government 
(national definition) 
General government 
(EMU definition) 
General government gross debt s 
' According to first convergence programme. 
2 According to Commission services. 
3 Annual % change. 
4 Percentage of total labour supply. 
' Percentage of GDP. 
1992 
NO R 
1,4 1,3 
7,6 5,6 
47,5 52.4 
56,3 56.3 
3,8 3.8 
3,5 3,9 
80,1 79,9 
1993 1994 
A/0 R NO R 
2,6 0,3 2,6 2.4 
7,5 6,7 7,5 7,7 
46,7 53,5 46,5 52.2 
54,2 56,8 53,3 55.2 
3,3 3,2 2,9 1,9 
2,9 3,3 2,4 3, l 
78,0 81,4 76,5 78,2 
6 The difference in levels between A/0 and R is caused by a different definition; only changes over time can be compared. 
deficit targets were met, which was a remarkable performance 
given the economic downturn. In contrast to the original 
intentions, this favourable outcome was realized thanks to 
higher tax receipts and not because of lower government 
expenditure; particularly expenditure in the social security 
sector proved hard to reduce. 
Box 1: Differences between the national deficit concept 
and the EMU deficit and their relation to EMU debt 
The assessment of the budgetary situation in the Netherlands is 
often cumbersome and confusing because of the many different and 
often changing terms and definitions that are used for public deficit. 
All definitions for domestic use are based on the balance to be 
financed by the State. The balance to be financed is calculated on a 
cash basis and takes account of current, capital and financial 
transactions. Over time, the various governments have applied 
numerous corrections to the balance to be financed to obtain a 
deficit concept that has more economic relevance, mainly by 
including off-budget operations and disregarding a number of one-
off financial operations. The current government has introduced 
such a concept in last year's coalition agreement and another one, 
the balance to be financed corrected for incidental factors, in the 
1995 budget. 
Obviously, such changing definitions cannot be used for 
international comparison of budget deficits. Therefore, to evaluate 
the deficit performance of the Member States during the preparatory 
phases of EMU, general government net borrowing was selected as 
a more stable standard deficit concept. The main differences with 
the balance to be financed by the State are: 
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In contrast to the evolution of the central government deficit, 
the outcome of general government net borrowing and of 
general government gross debt was worse than hoped for. The 
less satisfactory evolution of net borrowing is explained by the 
use of certain one-off measures that are not included in the 
calculation of net borrowing, and by the cyclical deterioration 
• general government net borrowing covers the deficit of the total 
government sector: the central government, local authorities and 
the social security system; 
• net borrowing excludes all financial transactions, such as 
privatization receipts and changes in the outstanding amount of 
housing and student loans; 
• net borrowing is calculated on an accruals base instead of a cash 
base. 
Graph 7b illustrates the diverging evolution of the balance to be 
financed by the State and general government net borrowing, 
resulting from these different definitions. 
The general government gross debt concept was selected as the debt 
target for the EMU debt criterion. This debt definition mixes some 
of the characteristics of the two previously discussed deficit 
definitions. Similarly to the general government net borrowing, it 
covers the total government, but in analogy to the balance to be 
financed, it is calculated on a cash base and includes financial 
transactions. 
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GRAPH 15: General government deficit and debt (as a% of GDP) 
Deficil Debt 
10 ~------------------------,-------.-100 
~------...;.----------------~- 80 
- 60 
---./ 6 '-/ '-
/ '-
./ 
----
40 
----
,/ 
'-
'-
4 
- 20 
,/ 
/ 
./ 
/ 
/ 
2 0 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
-Deficit NL (left scale) Deficit EUR 14 (left scale) 
-Debt NL (right scale) Debt EUR 15+ (right scale) 
of soc ial sec urity sec tor net borrowing. However, given the 
economic environment, a reduction of the general government 
deficit to only 3,3% of GDP in 1993 was not a bad result. 
Graph 15 shows that this result also compared favourably with 
the other Member States. While in 1989 the Dutch deficit was 
2-!- % of GDP higher than the EU average, it was 1 + % lower in 
1994. Although the Dutch authorities managed to compensate 
the negative effects of the recession on the evolution of the 
deficit ratio with new measures, the effect of low nominal 
economic growth on the debt ratio was more dramatic: the ratio 
continued to rise to 81 ,4% of GDP in 1993 , instead of the 
planned decrease. However, the mere stabilization of the debt 
ratio in the Netherlands was a significantly better result than the 
evolution of the average debt ratio of the European Union, 
which increased by 15% of GDP between 1991 and 1995. 
In the course of 1993, the official view on the required pace of 
fiscal consolidation began to change. Because of the continued 
deterioration of the economic outlook, a continuation of the 
deficit reduction at the planned speed (approximately + % of 
GDP yearly) was judged to be inappropriate. Furthermore, in 
December 1992, the European Council in Edinburgh called for 
action by the Member States to promote the economic recovery 
in Europe, within the limited avai lable budgetary margin s. 
Consequently, the original targe t for the 1994 central 
government deficit was relaxed to a mere stabilization at the 
1993 level. However, by the end of 1993, it became clear that, 
despite the economic downturn, the 1993 central government 
budget target would be easily met, due to significantly higher 
than expected tax receipts. But, because of the rapidly 
increasing unemployment and the overshooting of the targeted 
tax burden ceiling, the government was not inclined to allocate 
these additional revenues to faster deficit reduction. Therefore, 
in February 1994, it was decided to relieve the tax burden to 
promote employment, by reducing employers ' social security 
contributions. 
As a consequence of this loosening of the fiscal consolidation 
path, net borrowing stabilized in 1994 approximately at its 
1993 level, which is higher than originally expected in the first 
convergence programme. However, at 1,9% of GDP, the 
central government deficit was considerably lower than the 
relaxed target of 3-!- %. This strikingly divergent evolution of 
the central and general government deficits is mainly explained 
by different accounting rules for privatization receipts and 
cash-accrual differences . 1 Because of these privatization 
receipts and the early redemption of loans by the public 
building corporations to the Government, the debt ratio 
declined in 1994, to reach 78,2% of GDP. 
For more detail, see Box I in this chapter. 
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1.2. Towards a more structural budgetary policy 
Despite the adverse economic circumstances during the period 
of the first convergence programme , the deficit ratio was 
reduced to a level close to the EMU reference value of 3% of 
GDP. However, the debt ratio continued rising until 1993 and 
the reduction in 1994 was mainly due to one-off financial 
operations. Consequently, to comply with the EMU 
convergence criteria by 1996 - the earliest date for a decision 
on the start of the monetary union - the new government that 
came into power after the May 1994 general elections had to 
continue the reduction uf the deficit ratio even below 3% of 
GDP, to be able to put the debt ratio on a sustained downward 
path in the direction of the 60% EMU benchmark. 
In the first convergence programme, the previous government 
had set out a time-path for the reduction of the deficit; the 
deficit ratio had to be reduced by 0 ,5 % of GDP each year. 
Although this approach was probably a good method to put the 
emphasis on the need to reduce the deficit from its excessive 
level, experience also showed that it has a number of 
drawbacks . 
Firstly , it has a procyclical impact on domestic demand. When 
economic growth is slowing down, the government has to take 
add itio nal restrictive measures to keep the deficit on the 
predetermined timepath, while it can take expansionary 
measures (e.g. tax reductions) during a recovery period without 
putting at risk the realization of the deficit objective. Graph 16 
shows indeed that structural improvements of the deficit were 
mostly realized in periods with a cyc lical deterioration and 
structural deteriorations in periods with a cyc lica l 
impro vement. In Chapter 3 of Part I, it is noted that the 
evolution of current receipts was clearly procyclical; receipts 
had to be increased to keep the deficit under con tro l when 
growth decelerated and they were lowered again when the 
economic cycle created some budgetary room. However. the 
evolution of the expenditure ratio was in general opposed to the 
cycle. This different behaviour of revenue and expenditure 
illu strates that ex pe nditures can be better planned and 
controll ed by the government, while revenues depend largely 
on the economic cycle and are hard to predict. 
The second disadvantage of a policy based on a timcpath is that 
it makes budgetary policy unpred ictable and very unstable. The 
government had to react to every cha nge in economic 
conditions with new measures to keep the deficit in line with 
the objective, which disturbed the smooth budgetary process. 
This was espec iall y true in the early 1990s when eco nomic 
growth was systematica ll y overestimated in the origi nal budget. 
GRAPH 16: Structural and cyclical changes of the deficit 
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Thirdly, the continuous attention of the government to realize 
its (domestic) deficit objective often led to the use of one-off 
measures and financial operations like privatizations. At the 
end of each year, there was also a complicated operation where 
some expenditures and revenues were shifted from one year to 
another to attain the desired deficit objective. These yearly 
shifts were merely cosmetic without economic substance and 
blurred the evolution of the fiscal stance. A final negative 
implication is that the composition of expenditure became 
distorted since expenditure categories that are under direct 
government control, such as public investment and 
consumption, were cut more than other harder to correct 
categories, such as social security outlays. 
Because of the mentioned deficiencies of a budgetary policy 
based on a strict deficit timepath, in February 1993 the Minister 
of Finance requested the Study group on the budget margin' to 
propose a guideline for budgetary policy for the next 
government period. The Study group suggested to switch from 
a strict deficit objective with a ceiling on tax pressure to a more 
structural approach by setting a timepath for real expenditure 
combined with a ceiling on the deficit. The multi-annual real 
expenditure path should be set to be compatible with a cautious 
growth scenario and a predetermined envisaged evolution of 
tax pressure and deficit. 
During the execution of this budget plan, economic growth 
will, in some years, be higher than in the cautious scenario, 
while other years will have a more negative performance. To 
prevent procyclical effects, revenues should be allowed to 
fluctuate with the economic cycle, while the initially planned 
tax cuts are further executed. However, the real expenditure 
ceiling should be scrupulously observed. As a consequence the 
deficit will also fluctuate with the cycle, but will continue to 
follow the underlying predetermined path. However, to avoid 
an extreme deficit evolution that would endanger the fulfilment 
of the EMU convergence criteria, the group on the budget 
margin also proposed to put a ceiling of less than 3% of GDP 
on the deficit ratio. If the economic cycle turned negative to 
such an extent that the deficit became higher than this ceiling, 
the structural budgetary policy would be replaced temporarily 
by a timepath policy again. This 3% ceiling also implies that 
the underlying 'structural' value for the deficit should be 
considerably lower (the Study group proposed a general 
government structural deficit of It% of GDP), to allow 
sufficient room to let the automatic stabilizers play their role in 
a recession. 
The Study group on the budget margin (Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte) is 
an advisory body with high-ranking public servants from different 
ministries, the Central Bank, the Central Planning Bureau and the Social 
and Cultural Planning Bureau. 
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To prevent that such a new budgetary policy would endanger 
the necessary further deficit reduction to put the debt ratio on a 
sustainable downward trend, a few prerequisites should be 
observed. Firstly, when such a policy is started the deficit 
should obviously already be below the 3 % of GDP ceiling, 
which was not the case when the new government was formed 
in 1994. Secondly, it is extremely important to start from a 
cautious scenario. If the basic growth assumptions are too 
optimistic, the deficit will reach its ceiling very fast, which 
would necessitate a policy switch. The Study group proposed 
an average yearly growth of 1 i %, which corresponded to the 
cautious medium-term scenario of the Central P_lanning Bureau 
at that time. Finally, such a structural budgetary policy should 
be applied to the total government sector, which implies that 
social security expenditures are not allowed to fluctuate with 
the cycle. 
1.3. The second convergence programme 
(1995-98): An even-handed approach 
At the centre of the new coalition agreement that was 
concluded between the socialist party (PvdA), the liberal party 
(VVD) and the social liberal party (D66) in August 1994 was a 
large-scale compromise on future budgetary policy. This 
compromise is also the central part of the new convergence 
programme for the period 1995-98 that was presented in 
October 1994 and examined by the Ecofin Council in 
December. 
Following the proposal of the Study group on the budget 
margin, the government will no longer set targets for the central 
government deficit, but will observe a ceiling on its real 
expenditure. The planned reduction of real expenditure by, on 
average, 0,7% yearly is a considerable effort compared to the 
average increase of 1,7% in the period 1990-94. On the other 
hand, the agreement also contains a substantial package (1,5% 
of GDP) of tax and social security premiums reductions to 
promote employment. However, to ensure that the EMU deficit 
requirement is met, a slightly declining central government 
deficit ceiling has been set (from 3,3% of GDP in 1995 to 2,9% 
in 1998), which should result in a general government deficit of 
less than 3% of GDP from 1996 onwards.2 This deficit path is 
compatible with the planned expenditure reductions and the 
envisaged tax cuts, in combination with a growth scenario of 
2% average growth. Although this growth assumption is 
The figures for general government deficit in the convergence programme 
are no real targets or ceilings. The government commits itself only to 
respect a ceiling on the central government deficit, while the general 
government deficit is considered as a derived result. Although it is true that, 
on average, the general government deficit is highly influenced by the 
central government deficit, in some years there may be important 
differences because of financial operations or a different evolution of the 
deficit of the social security funds or the local authorities. 
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Table 5 
Convergence programme 1995-98: Base scenario 
GDP growth 
1995 
3,0 
-0,9 Real expenditure growth 
Central government 
Social security 
-0,3 
Health care 
Central government ceiling (% GDP) 
Estimated general government deficit (% GDP) 
Estimated general government gross debt (% GDP) 
Sources: Convergence programme 1995-98; 1995 Budget (Miljoenennota). 
slightly more optimistic than the proposition of the Study 
group, it is certainly cautious given the current growth outlook. 
A partial shift of priorities can be observed between the first 
and the second convergence programme. The first programme's 
main objective was to reduce the government deficit, which 
was to be realized by observing a timepath for the deficit. The 
stabilization of the collective tax burden was only a secondary 
restriction, which could not be realized because of the 
economic downturn. By contrast, in the new programme, the 
reduction of the deficit and of the collective burden receive 
equal attention: over the four-year coalition period, taxes will 
be cut by at least 1,5% of GDP, while the general government 
deficit will be reduced by approximately 2% ofGDP. 1 This 
even-handed approach has become possible because of the 
successful reduction of the deficit during the first convergence 
programme. The tax reductions should promote employment 
and economic growth (see Chapter 2), which will facilitate 
further deficit reduction. 
However, the planned deficit reduction could be insufficient to 
guarantee a continued reduction of the debt ratio. Indeed, in the 
base scenario, the debt ratio continues to rise until 1996, 
followed by only a slight decrease in 1998. This illustrates the 
difficulties the Netherlands faces to reduce its debt ratio in a 
substantial way. Because oflow nominal economic growth, 
caused by the consistently low inflation rate, and the relatively 
low debt ratio compared to some other highly indebted Member 
States, the Netherlands cannot count on the erosion of the debt 
3.6 
When the second convergence programme was submitted, expected general 
government deficit for 1994 was 4,2% of GDP. Given an estimated deficit 
of 2% in 1998 (see Table 5), the planned reduction over the coalition period 
was 2,2% of GDP. 
-2,1 
3,3 
3,7 
79,7 
1996 
1,2 
-1,8 
0,3 
-2,5 
-6,8 
3,3 
2f 
81 
1997 
1,8 
0,3 
0,6 
-0,9 
2,1 
3,0 
2-!-
81 
1998 
1,9 
-0,3 
0,8 
-2,8 
2,1 
2,9 
2 
so+ 
(%) 
Average 1995-98 
2,0 
-0,7 
0,3 
-2,1 
-0,7 
ratio once the deficit ratio approaches 3% of GDP. Table 6 
shows that the Netherlands would have to reduce permanently 
its deficit to only 1,3% of GDP to be able to reduce its debt 
ratio from the current level of approximately 80% of GDP to 
60% over a 10-year period, if a nominal economic growth rate 
of 5% is assumed. Even with higher nominal growth, a 
permanent reduction of the deficit ratio to 3% would be 
insufficient to attain such a quick debt reduction. The solution 
to this problem is clearly not to increase nominal growth by 
generating inflation, since this would push up interest rate 
levels, which would generate higher interest payments on the 
government debt. Therefore, the only possibilities are to reduce 
the deficit further and to promote real economic growth. 
Table 6 also illustrates that a reduction of the debt ratio by 20 
percentage points is much easier to accomplish for countries 
with a high initial debt. For a country like Belgium with a debt 
ratio of around 140% of GDP, a deficit reduction to 4,2% of 
GDP is already sufficient to realize this goal when nominal 
economic growth is 5%. Of course the distance to cover for 
these countries to reach the 60% target is also bigger. However, 
Graph 17a shows that with an equal sustained deficit ratio, the 
initial debt ratio is in fact almost irrelevant for the moment 
when the target is reached. Therefore, it is apparently easier for 
highly indebted countries to realize fast debt reductions. 
However, an equal deficit ratio implies a lower primary deficit 
(or most probably a higher primary surplus) for highly indebted 
countries, since the interest charges that have to be paid on the 
higher debt are of course also higher. Consequently, the 
necessary cuts in primary expenditure will be significantly 
higher in countries with a high debt ratio; or stated differently, 
when less indebted countries would be willing to realize the 
same primary surplus as the heavily indebted countries, they 
would be able to bring down their debt ratio to the 60% of GDP 
threshold much faster (Graph 17b). 
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Table 6 
Deficit ratios that generate a reduction of the debt ratio by 20 percentage points over a 10-year period, for different 
combinations of the initial debt ratio and economic growth 1 
Initia l debt ra tio(%) Nominal economic growth(% ) 
3 4 5 6 
140 - 1,8 - 3,0 -4,2 - 5,4 
120 - 1,2 - 2,2 - 3,3 -4,2 
100 - 0,6 - 1,5 -2,3 -3,1 
80 - 0, l - 0,7 - 1,3 - 2,0 
60 +0,5 +0,1 - 0,4 - 0,8 
40 + 1, 1 +0,8 +0,6 +0,3 
20 +1 ,7 +1 ,6 +1 ,5 +1,4 
I A minus sign indicates a de fi cit. 
GRAPH 17a: Evolution of the debt ratio for different initial values with 5% nominal economic growth 
and a deficit of 3% of GDP 
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GRAPH 17b: Evolution of the debt ratio for different initial values with 5% nominal economic growth, 
8% interest rate and a primary surplus of 5% of GDP 
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However, it would be somewhat unjust to judge the new policy 
intentions of the Dutch Government on the results of the base 
scenario. Since it is very probable that economic growth will be 
significantly higher than assumed, certainly in 1995 and 1996, 
the revenues will also be higher than expected. The coal ition 
agreement specifies that in such a case the additional budgetary 
room will be allocated first to reduce the central government 
Table 7 
2035 2045 2055 
defi cit to 2,7% of GDP in l 998, which corresponds to a general 
government deficit of 1,9% of GDP. For the use of possible 
further growth windfalls, a choice will be made between further 
reducing the budget defic it and eas in g the total tax burden, 
whereby the necess ity to s trengthen the eco nomic structure 
(e.g. phys ical and technologica l infrastru c ture, ed uca ti o n) 
requires a separate consideration. 
Convergence programme 1995-98: Alternative scenarios with 2 t % average real growth 1 
Government deficit 
Central government 1 
General government 2 
General government gross debt 
I National definition. 
' 
EMU definition. 
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Scenario I -
Budgetary room applied to 
deficit 
1996 1997 1998 
2+ I t I t 
I} I I T 
78 t 76 -t 74+ 
Scenario 2-
Budgetary room applied to 
laxation 
1996 1997 1998 
2,7 2.7 2,7 
2 2 2 
n+ 77 t 77 
Scenario 3 -
Budgelary room app li ed to 
deficit and taxa1ion 
1996 
78+ 
1997 
2t 
I t 
77 + 
1998 
2 
1+ 
Therefore, the convergence programme presents three different 
scenarios, based on a more optimistic average growth 
assumption of 2t %. Although this growth certainly seems 
realistic for the first two years of the coalition period, it could 
prove to be too optimistic for 1997 and 1998, given the current 
uncertainty about the further continuation of the present 
recovery. In the first scenario, the additional budgetary room is 
used completely to reduce the deficit. As a result, general 
government net borrowing falls to + % of GDP in 1998 and the 
debt ratio shows a downward trend to 74 + % of GDP. In the 
opposite scenario where the additional room is fully used to 
lower taxation, the deficit remains 1,9% of GDP, 1 while the 
debt ratio only drops to 77% of GDP. The third intermediate 
scenario divides the budgetary room on a fifty-fifty basis over 
deficit and taxation reduction and results in a general 
government deficit of I :I-% and a debt ratio of 75 t % in the 
final year. Consequently, in these optimistic scenarios the 
deficit would not exceed 1,9% of GDP from 1996 onwards and 
the desired downward trend of the debt ratio would start in the 
same year, irrespective of the chosen allocation of the 
additional budgetary room. 
The success of the convergence programme to reduce the 
deficit and debt ratios will firstly depend upon the ability of the 
central government to follow strictly the planned path for real 
expenditure reduction. Although the coalition agreement 
contains detailed plans and figures by government department, 
some of these plans might prove to be hard to implement. The 
envisaged considerable cuts in education, defence and the 
public sector wage bill are some examples of savings that could 
be difficult to realize. There is also a danger that the far-
reaching reform of the social security system might take more 
time than is currently envisaged or might be only partially 
implemented. However, because of the government's firm 
commitment to compensate unrealized savings by other 
additional expenditure cuts, it can be expected that the real 
expenditure ceiling will be observed. 
A second uncertainty in the programme relates to the 
magnitude of the available budgetary room because of higher 
than expected growth, and the way this will be divided between 
deficit reduction and lowering the collective burden. Over the 
four-year coalition period, 1996 will probably be the year with 
the highest unplanned additional revenues, because of the big 
difference between the current growth expectation of 2 t % and 
the assumed growth of only 1,2% in the base scenario. Since 
the convergence programme already assumed 3% growth in 
1995, 1,8% in 1997 and 1,9% in 1998, it seems unlikely that in 
these years realized growth would surpass the assumed growth 
to the same extent as in 1996. In the recently published 1996 
budget, the government has strictly continued the planned path 
of real expenditure reduction, as announced in the convergence 
programme. This policy will lead to a decline in real 
Rounded to 2'7c in Table 7. 
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expenditure by approximately 1 % in 1996. According to 
government estimates, this decline creates room for a deficit 
reduction from 3,7% of GDP in 1995 to 2,8% in 1996, and a 
tax reduction by more than a half the percentage of GDP. The 
1996 tax reduction will be financed by expenditure savings and 
additional (growth) revenues in the social security sector. The 
State budget savings and additional revenues will be used for 
deficit reduction. 
The Dutch authorities expect that the debt ratio will decline 
moderately from 78,7% of GDP in 1995 to 78,4% in 1996. This 
slow reduction is mainly the effect of the low expected 
inflation, ·which reduces forecast nominal GDP growth to less 
than 4% in 1996. The concern about the slow pace of debt 
reduction is recognized in the 1996 budget, where it is stated 
that in 1997 further reduction of the deficit should be realized 
in order to induce the necessary decreasing trend in the debt 
ratio. 
1.4. Future pension obligations and the need for 
debt reduction 
The reduction of the debt ratio is not only required to increase 
the sustainability of budgetary policy to be able to participate in 
the economic and monetary union. It is also essential to 
alleviate the pressure from interest charges on the budget in 
general and on other spending categories in particular. This 
internal crowding-out seriously limits the possibilities to 
engage or extend new policies, such as fighting unemployment 
and protecting the environment. 
On a somewhat longer time scale, the debt ratio should also be 
lowered to create the necessary budgetary breathing space to be 
able to cope with the costs of an ageing population. As in most 
European countries, the Dutch population will be getting older 
over the next decades as a consequence of a lower birth rate and 
higher life expectancy. According to Eurostat' s population 
forecast, the old-age dependency ratio2 is expected to rise from 
around 19% in 1995 to almost 28% in 2020, with a faster increase 
towards the end of this period. However, Graph 18 illustrates that 
in the considered period the Dutch situation is less dramatic than 
in most other Member States, because of the relatively high birth 
rate and the high immigration of young people. 
These demographic changes will have important effects on the 
public finance situation, mainly through higher pension and 
health care expenditure, which will not be fully compensated 
by lower expenditure for young people. A number of studies 
have tried to quantify these effects,3 with varying results 
This is the number of people who are over 65 years old, divided by the 
number of people at working age (15-64). 
For example Centraal Planbureau ( 1992), Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid ( 1993). 
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GRAPH 18: Old-age dependency ratios 
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because of different time scales and different assumptions of 
eco_nomic growth, labour market participation and budgetary 
policy. However, they all agree that with an unchanged policy , 
the old-age expenditures will increase significantly. 
How the additional costs of an ageing population will be 
covered depends on the financing system of the social security 
schemes concerned. In a 'pay-as-you-go' scheme, the active 
population contributes to pay the benefits for the part of the 
population that is inactive at that time. If the ratio of the 
number of active persons to the number of inactive persons 
declines , the contribution rate has to rise . Therefore, pay-as-
you-go schemes necessarily generate intergenerational 
transfers. Although the height of the benefits in this scheme is 
normally adjusted to inflation and changes in the standard of 
living, benefit levels are clearly subject to (yet uncertain) 
government decisions . On the other hand, in a funded scheme 
everyone pays contributions during his or her active life to 
build up sufficient capital to finance their own future benefits. 
The main disadvantage of this scheme is that it has normally no 
protection against inflation and is not adjusted for pos sible 
changes in the standard of living. 
Acc~mulation of assets apparently seems to give a higher 
certamty on the payment of future benefits than a pay-as-you-
go system that is dependent upon the willingness of future 
40 
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generations to pay the higher contributions. However, both 
systems merely put a claim on a part of the future production. If 
the production level is sufficient to guarantee both active and 
inactive persons the desired income, there will be no 
distributive problems, even not under a pay-as-you-go system. 
If however the future output level turns out to be insufficient, 
the di_stributive problem betwee n genera tion s will generate 
mflat1on. In general, the ac tive part of the population will be 
able to better protect its income against inflati on, which will 
generate a redistribution towards the active generation.1 
The Dutch pension sc heme consists of three layers: a tax-
fina~ced basic pension (AOW and A WW), a supplementary 
pens10n by sector, and individual pension contracts. The basic 
pension scheme guarantees a flat-rate pension , based on the 
minimum wage, to everyone who liv es in the Netherlands, 
including people who never worked, and is a pay-as -you-go 
system. The benefit level in the supplementary occupational 
pension schemes is related to the final pay and covered by 
accumulated assets in pension funds, which are financed by 
contributions from employers and employees. In 1991, about 
two thirds of the total pension benefits was paid by the basic 
For a funhcr elaboration. sec De Kam ( I 992) and Kunc ( I 994). 
Box 2: The civil servants' pension fund ABP and the 
EMU debt criterion 
Can the existence of the ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk 
Pensioenfonds - General Civil Pension Fund), a funded scheme 
for the supplementary pensions of public servants, be considered a 
relevant factor when the evolution of the Dutch public debt ratio 
is discussed? The ABP covers the pensions of all public servants 
and is one of the largest pension funds in the world, with 
accumulated reserves amounting to HFL 177,2 bn in 1993, more 
than 30% of GDP. The Netherlands hold a relative unique 
position in this respect, since in most other European countries 
supplementary pensions of civil servants are not funded. 
Consolidation of the ABP in the government accounts would 
reduce the government debt ratio by around 15% of GDP, since 
about 45% of the assets of the ABP is government related (see 
also Graph 7 in Annex 3). However, such a consolidation is not 
warranted since the ABP is classified in the insurance sector and 
not in the general government sector (national accounts 
definition). The independence of the management of the fund is 
currently being increased in a so-called 'privatization' operation. 
This does not involve a sale of assets, but merely implies that the 
role of the government in the ABP is further reduced to become 
the same as any other employer in a private sector pension fund. 
At the end of the privatisation operation, which should be finished 
on I January 1996, the ABP will be a private institution that has to 
comply with the same rules as other private sector pension funds 
and will be managed jointly by the government and the 
representatives of the civil servants. Consequently, the obligation 
for the Netherlands to put the debt ratio on a sustainable path in 
the direction of 60% of GDP as the EMU reference value remains, 
despite the existence of the ABP. 
However, since the other uncovered future pension obligations are 
in line with those of other Member States, the existence of a 
funded supplementary pension scheme for civil servants could be 
considered in the evaluation of the downward trend of the debt 
ratio. 
pension scheme, while occupational schemes accounted for 
32% and the individual contracts for about 2%. 1 Given the 
continuing build-up of the second layer, the importance of the 
pay-as-you-go system will gradually reduce in the future. 
Although the Dutch population is ageing slower than in most of 
the other Member States and despite the fact that a substantial 
part of future pension obligations is covered by pension funds, 
a study by Kune et al. (1993) calculated that the Netherlands 
have the second largest uncovered basic pension liabilities in 
the EU, amounting to 137% of GDP in 1990 (only Luxembourg 
has slightly higher liabilities). The unfavourable Dutch position 
in this study results from a fairly high benefit level that is 
applied to the whole population, with or without working 
history. However, this study does not take into account that 
Petersen and Eikelboom (1993). 
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other countries would also have to provide some income to 
people without a working history. 2 Furthermore, the tax claim 
on fufore pension benefits is also relatively high, which reduces 
the net cost of pensions. When the results of the study would be 
corrected for these two factors, the uncovered Dutch pension 
liabilities would be in line with results for other Member States. 
However, as in most of the Member States, the uncovered 
pension liabilities will pose a major redistributive problem for 
future generations. Therefore, in order not to burden future 
generations with additional difficulties, and to be able to meet 
its base pension commitments also in the next century, it is of 
crucial importance that the Netherlands reduces as fast as 
possible its debt ratio to a more sustainable level. 
Chapter 2. Promoting employment 
Despite the relatively strong employment creation in the 
Netherlands, unemployment remains unacceptably high, 
certainly if other forms of non-employment such as high 
disability and early retirement are taken into account. 
Furthermore, for demographical reasons the unemployment 
outlook continues to be burdened by a relatively high labour 
supply growth, compared to other Member States. There is no 
single cause for the unemployment problem, but rather a range 
of explanations concerning both labour demand and labour 
supply. On the demand side, the main factor seems to be the 
high cost of labour, especially at the low end of the market. The 
high labour cost is heavily determined by the expensive social 
security system. All kinds of institutional rigidities such as high 
firing costs, short probation periods and limits on temporary 
contracts, also restrict the demand for labour. On the supply 
side, the generous social security system has reduced the 
financial incentives to work or to accept a job at a low wage, 
since the difference between the level of social benefits and the 
wage level became too small. Again, these negative effects are 
concentrated at the lower end of the labour market. 
Furthermore, since a number of social benefits and subsidies 
are income-related, the total average marginal tax pressure for 
this group has a very steep profile and is for a number of 
special cases even above 80%. 3 
Consequently, creating more jobs and fighting unemployment 
became the central theme of the coalition agreement of the 
current government. Firstly, the government wants to promote 
economic growth by improving the structure of the economy, 
increasing competition on the product markets and promoting 
entrepreneurship. This general policy will be supplemented by 
various measures to remove the abovementioned obstacles to 
This correction is made in Herd and Van den Noord (1993) for the major 
OECD countries. However, this study does not treat the Netherlands. 
Hui gen (1994 ). 
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employment creation. Four different fields of action can be 
distinguished: general reduction of labour costs, specific 
measures for the low end of the labour market, removing 
institutional rigidities and increasing incentives to work. 
2.1. General reduction of the costs of labour 
2.1.1. Wage moderation 
From the early 1980s onwards, there has been a broad 
agreement in the Netherlands to limit wage increases to support 
employment growth. Despite the apparent success of wage 
moderation in the past (see Section 4.2 of Part I), this policy 
has been questioned frequently in recent years. One argument 
is that because of the continued policy of low wage growth, the 
Dutch economy will specialize more and more in activities with 
low value-added and relatively high labour content, while the 
Netherlands should specialize in high productivity, high 
technology jobs to exploit its competitive advantage of a highly 
educated population. However, until now, wage moderation did 
not have negative effects on productivity (expressed as GDP 
per working hour), which remains among the highest in the 
Union. 
The low wage policy might also remove the incentives to 
rationalize the production process, invest in research and 
development and engage the necessary structural changes of 
the economy; it removes the symptoms of the disease, without 
curing the disease. Den Butter and Broersma (1993) concluded 
that wage moderation can be important to avoid or delay the 
destruction of existing jobs, but the creation of new jobs is 
mainly determined by investment and the flexibility of the 
labour supply. 
The moderate wage evolution could also squeeze the available 
room for domestic consumption growth. However, this is 
compensated by higher exports because of the improvement of 
the competitive position and, in the long term, by higher 
growth as a consequence of the increased investment 
possibilities. Nevertheless, part of the competitive advantage 
can be lost again through an appreciation of the exchange rate 
as a consequence of the low wage cost development and the 
consequent weak inflation. 
However, since wage moderation has clearly been one of the 
determining factors behind the favourable employment growth, 
the intention of the present government to continue it in the 
following years is a good choice, 1 certainly to preserve existing 
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A modest wage developmenl in the private sector has not only positive 
employment effects. bul is also beneficial to the public finance situation. 
since it has a moderating influence on the wage evolution in the public 
sector. 
employment. In 1995, the government induced workers to limit 
their wage demands by reducing the burden of taxes and social 
security premiums on labour income. These measures also 
supported disposable income and the private consumption 
level, and compensated for the previously mentioned possible 
negative effect of wage moderation on consumption. However, 
wage moderation is not the answer to all problems, and needs 
to be supplemented with more structural reforms. 
2.1.2. Social security reform: Making the system less 
expensive 
In the Dutch social security system, premium levels are set 
annually to cover for the expected expenditures and keep the 
system in equilibrium. Consequently, cost-reducing measures 
automatically decrease the contributions rates, assuming a 
constant government subsidy to the system. Therefore, making 
the social security system cheaper creates the possibility to 
lower the wage cost for employers by reducing their social 
security contributions, which should promote employment. In 
the years ahead, the government intends to use this direct form 
of wage cost reduction, instead of the more indirect way of 
promoting wage moderation through tax reductions for 
employees. 
In trying to achieve a reduction of social security expenditure, 
the Dutch authorities are more concentrating on reducing the 
number of people in the system (mainly in the sickness and 
disability schemes) than on decreasing the level of the benefits. 
This choice is not only determined by political preferences, but 
also by the past negative experience in trying to reduce the 
benefit level in the 'disability' scheme (WAO). In 1993, after 
two years of discussions in the previous cabinet and just 
avoiding a breakdown of the coalition, it was agreed to make 
the benefits for new entrants into the system depend upon the 
number of years they had worked before becoming too disabled 
to work. However, in the collective wage agreements, almost 
all sectors decided to compensate this loss (mostly referred to 
as filling the WAO-hole) by private insurance. As a 
consequence, in the private sector the average W AO benefit 
only receded from 75 to 73%. Although the measure reduced 
the direct cost of the W AO, the benefit level did not drop 
significantly and as a result the effect on the number of disabled 
was negligible. 
Nevertheless, some attempts to reduce the volume of benefit 
receivers also failed. The 'bonus-malus' system, which was 
introduced in 1992, tried to reduce the number of disabled by 
giving a subsidy (bonus) to employers who hired someone who 
was previously disabled, and by imposing a fine (malus) on 
employers when an employee became disabled. However, the 
'bonus-malus' system proved to be hard to implement and 
because of a number of legal objections, the present 
government has decided to abandon the system. The 
government intends to replace the bonus part of the system by a 
number of incentives for the partially disabled to return to the 
labour market. 
However, not all efforts of the previous government to reduce 
the number of disabled have been fruitless. A new more severe 
definition of the disability concept1 has been introduced and is 
now clearly reducing the number of disabled. The application 
of the new definition has, together with other restrictive 
measures, diminished the number of new disabled in 1994 by 
some 15 OOO persons. Furthermore, all currently disabled 
people, starting with the youngest, are gradually being screened 
against the new definition. As a consequence, 29% of the 
persons screened so far have lost all rights to a disability 
benefit, while the benefit is reduced for 18% of them.2 People 
who have to leave the scheme can fall back on the 
unemployment insurance, which has a similar benefit level. 
However, contrary to the disability scheme, the unemployment 
insurance is limited in time. 
The present government has also tightened the conditions to 
receive unemployment benefit. Besides higher requirements on 
the preliminary working period, it is no longer possible to enter 
the unemployment system after leaving a job on own initiative. 
The sanctioning system and the obligation to look for 
employment will also be tightened. 
More fundamental changes are envisaged in the execution of 
the various social security schemes. The unemployment, 
disability and sickness schemes are administered under the 
responsibility of the sectoral insurance boards 
(bedrijfsverenigingen), which are jointly managed by unions 
and employers' organizations. In 1993, a parliamentary 
commission of inquiry (Commissie Buurmeijer) analysed and 
investigated the proper working of the sectoral insurance 
boards. Its conclusion was that the administration of the 
systems was mainly aimed at paying the benefits accurately and 
timely, but that little or no attention was paid to prevention, 
control and reintegration in the labour market, although this 
was clearly one of their tasks. New government regulations to 
reduce the number of benefit receivers were not fully 
implemented, since the insurance boards had no financial 
incentive to execute such policies. The control of the boards by 
the Social Insurance Council (Sociale Verzekeringsraad) was 
Since l 987. disability was defined as the inability to continue the work one 
was trained for, independent of the availability of such employment. Under 
the new definition someone is considered to be disabled if he or she is 
unable to take up any paid job, independent of the person's previous 
experience and training. If a person is found to be able to perform a certain 
job (this can be a very theoretical possibility such as bonzai grower) with a 
lower wage than the previous job, he or she is considered to be partially 
disabled to the extent of the income difference. 
Commissie Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen (1995). 
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also found to be insufficient, which is not surprising since the 
majority in the Council was held by the unions and the 
employers. 
Therefore, a reorganization of the administration of the social 
security schemes is being implemented. To separate execution 
and control, the Social Insurance Council has been abolished 
and is replaced by a Supervisory Board for Social Insurance 
(College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen), appointed by 
the government. In the future, the execution will be open to 
competition and organized by region, instead of by sector. 
The sickness scheme, which guarantees payment of 70% of the 
wage during periods of sickness, will be abolished in 1996.3 It 
will be replaced by an obligation for the employer to continue 
paying 70% of the wage for a maximum period of one year. 
The employer will be free to choose whether or not he will 
insure this risk. This measure is an extension of the successful 
introduction of an own risk period (two weeks for small firms 
and six weeks for firms with more than 15 employees) for 
employers in 1994. As a consequence, the sickness absence 
declined from 6,8% in 1993 to 5,7% in 1994. In an evaluation 
survey by the Supervisory Board for Social Insurance, 60% of 
the enterprises reported that this reduction was due to the 
introduction of the own risk period. 
Furthermore, despite the unanimous objections of employers 
and unions in the SER,4 the government has decided that, from 
1996 onwards, the premium level will be linked to the 
disability risk of each sector, in order to motivate employers to 
create safer working conditions. Employers will also be given 
an opting-out possibility, which implies that they can decide to 
leave the current pay-as-you-go scheme and take out private 
insurance, which is based on capitalization, against future 
disability risks. Although the private insurance companies will 
have to maintain the same level and duration of the benefits, the 
authorities hope to reduce the operational costs by introducing 
competition and increasing incentives to prevent disability. 
However, the employer will continue to have to pay 
contributions to cover the payments of the existing pay-as-you-
go system to people who are already disabled. Given this set-
up, the SER judges that opting out will be too expensive for 
most firms, certainly if premium levels are sufficiently 
diversified in the pay-as-you-go system. However, for firms 
with a lower than average disability risk and a young labour 
force, it could be almost immediately profitable to leave the 
The system will be maintained for people with short-term contracts, 
unemployed, maternity payments and in cases of bankruptcy of the 
employer. 
Sociaal-Economische Raad or Social Economic Council: an advisory board 
with representatives of employers and unions and some independent 
experts. 
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current system. 1 Since the firms with the lowest degree of 
disability will leave first, the average degree of disability for 
the remaining firms will rise, which will have to be financed by 
a higher premium. As a result, it will become interesting for 
other firms to opt out and eventually only the firms with a very 
elevated degree of disability will remain in the old system, 
paying very high premiums. 
Consequently, the proposed organization of the disability 
scheme apparently has no stable situation where both the 
private sector and the existing system hold part of the market. 
Either the private sector is too expensive and everyone stays in 
the pay-as-you-go system or some firms opt out with the 
consequence that gradually everyone leaves the present system. 
In the first case, the whole reform would be useless, while in 
the second case the total immediate cost would be much higher 
than the present system because of the required capital 
accumulation for the new cases. However, the height of the 
premium is not the only factor for an employer to consider in 
choosing between the two systems; the quality, extensiveness 
and flexibility of the new services will also play a determining 
role. Therefore, the risk that everyone will stay in the present 
system seems to be limited. On the other hand, the possibility 
of a massive exit from the present pay-as-you-go system will 
be reduced by the introduction of a ceiling on the premium. 
Consequently, the (threat of) enhanced competition2 could 
force the operators of the present system to increase their 
efficiency and reduce costs. 
Besides the attempts to tackle the main problem areas of 
sickness and disability, the government also plans a number of 
savings in other parts of the social security system, like child 
allowances, social assistance and pensions. It is also decided 
that due to higher female labour market participation, the 
income scheme for widows and orphans (A WW) can be 
progressively phased out. 
The commitment of the present government to attain its 
targeted expenditure cuts in the social security system is 
illustrated by the fact that in the summer of 1996 the 
effectiveness of all measures will be evaluated and reoriented if 
necessary. 
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Euverman ( 1995). When, in a sector, an important company defaults or has 
to reduce its labour force significantly, the same situation might arise. 
Since, in such a case, the disability cost from the sector would have to be 
divided over fewer remaining workers, the premium level would increase 
significantly and it would become interesting for some firms to opt out 
(Bekkering (l 995)). 
It is not guaranteed that competition will lead to lower operation costs since 
the market will be divided over more operators and there will be less 
standardization. 
2.2. Specific measures for the low end of the labour 
market 
In Part I of this study, it was observed that long-term 
unemployment was mainly concentrated at the low end of the 
labour market. Hence, the government is supplementing the 
previously described measures to reduce the general wage co~t, 
with more specific measures to create employment for this 
section of the labour market. Since such measures can be more 
accurately targeted at the problem areas, the overall cost can be 
lower than with general measures. As an example, a wage 
subsidy for the creation of a new job at a low wage can create 
jobs where they are most urgently needed at a lower cost than 
with a similar subsidy for all wage levels. However, because of 
the general lack of labour demand, people with higher 
qualifications might compete for these new low paid jobs with 
the less educated. Research has shown that in the 1980s the low 
paid jobs were filled mainly by people with a general 
education, while the number of low paid jobs for people with 
only basic education decreased.~ To avoid this, employment 
opportunities at all levels need to be created by the general 
measures described previously. 
The Dutch authorities have chosen to implement a number of 
general reductions of social security contributions in such a 
way that they favour mostly the creation of low paid jobs. 
Consequently, the danger that higher educated unemployed 
crowd out the lower educated from the newly created low paid 
jobs is reduced since the measure also applies to jobs that 
require a higher qualification. In 1995, employers' social 
security contributions for the health-care system were reduced 
by a fixed amount for every employee, which reduces the 
contribution rate most for the lowest wages. For 1996, the 
government originally planned, in its coalition agreement, a 
similar reduction of the compensatory allowance, 4 which is 
paid by employers to employees, accompanied by a 
compensating tax reduction for employees. However, it was 
finally decided to replace this measure by a straightforward 
reduction of the employers' contributions by HFL 1 100 
(approximately ECU 500) yearly per employee. For employees 
who earn less than 115% of the statutory minimum wage, this 
amount is increased to HFL 2 OOO (about ECU 950), which 
represents one third of the employers' contribution at this wage 
level. 
A more direct measure of the government to generate 
additional employment for the long-term unemployed is the 
creation of 40 OOO new jobs during this legislation in child care, 
Bosch and Elsendoom (1994 ). 
When, in 1992, a number of the employers' social contributions were 
replaced by direct taxes paid by employees, this was compensated by this 
allowance (overhevelingstoeslag) from employers to employees. 
health services, security and care for the elderly. This is an 
important increase compared to the approximately 130 OOO 
people that were in various employment programmes in 1993. 
Although the cost of this additional employment creation will 
be mainly covered by the savings on social security benefits, 
this measure will probably result in permanently higher public 
employment expenditures. Furthermore, the creation of these 
subsidized jobs might prevent the creation of similar low-paid 
jobs in the private sector, which is one of the government's 
objectives. However, on the positive side, these jobs could 
fulfil existing needs and keep the unemployed in contact with 
the labour market. 
There is a close relationship between long-term unemployment 
and a low education level. For example, in 1993, 55% of the 
unemployed with only primary education was unemployed for 
more than a year. 1 Although, in general, the level and quality of 
education in the Netherlands are high by international 
standards, vocational training could be improved.2 Especially 
apprenticeships and adult vocational education should be 
extended. Therefore, the government is paying specific 
attention to vocational training and is trying to improve the link 
between education and the labour market by reducing the cost 
of apprenticeship programmes. 
Although the legal minimum wage has been reduced (or not 
indexed as in 1995) on several occasions in recent years to 
approximately 60% of the average wage, it remains on the high 
side by international standards. 3 Since the labour market is 
characterized by an excess supply situation, a lowering of the 
minimum wage should generate employment in a competitive 
market. Therefore, the authorities are planning to allow 
temporary deviations of the minimum wage for specific sectors. 
Since the exemptions would only be valid for a limited time, 
the effect of this measure will probably remain limited. 
However, the minimum wage not only determines the base of 
the wage system, but is also important for a number of social 
security benefits, whose level is linked to the minimum wage. 
Therefore, the evolution of the statutory minimum wage has a 
significant impact on total social security expenditures, and 
consequently also on the premium level. Hence, a high 
minimum wage not only has a negative direct effect on the low 
end of the labour market, but also an indirect negative effect on 
all levels of employment. 
For most sectors, the minimum wage is not the floor in the 
agreed wage scales. Collective wage agreements often set the 
lowest sectoral wage significantly above the statutory minimum 
wage (up to 30% above the minimum wage in the construction 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (1994a). 
Centraal Planbureau ( 1993 ). 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ( 1994b). However, the 
legal minimum wage is significantly lower for young people (below 23 
years). 
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sector). Since these agreements are declared legally binding for 
every company in the sector, the creation of jobs at a wage in 
the margin between the lowest sectoral wage scale and the 
minimum wage is prohibited. However, given the importance 
of this margin in several sectors, there exists significant room 
for job creation at the low end of the market without lowering 
the legal minimum wage. Therefore, the government has 
threatened to refuse to declare a collective wage agreement 
generally binding if it does not contain the possibility to create 
jobs at the minimum wage level. As a result of this announced 
policy change, some sectors decided already during the current 
round of wage negotiations to create a new lower wage scale, 
although only for a limited time. 
The possibility to create additional jobs at the low end of the 
wage scale will also increase wage differentiation, which is 
often hampered by institutional rigidities in the labour market. 
Too often, wages do not adequately reflect labour productivity, 
especially at the low end of the market. In the middle and upper 
segment of the labour market, wages should develop according 
to the market situation in these segments, which should result, 
on average, in a macroeconomic moderate wage development. 
2.3. Removing institutional rigidities 
The Netherlands has traditionally had an economy with a high 
level of regulation, both in goods and services markets and in 
the labour market. The existence of excessive regulation in 
product markets often limits competition and obstructs the 
entry of new firms and the creation of new products or services. 
As is shown in Annex 1, this lack of dynamism can have 
important negative consequences on the growth potential of an 
economy and limit the available employment. Therefore, the 
measures to intensify competition, described in the Annex, can 
have important, although hard to quantify, positive effects on 
employment. 
A reduction of the labour market regulation can obviously also 
have beneficial effects on employment. The Netherlands have a 
high degree of employment protection that can be detrimental 
to the creation of new jobs. Dismissal is, for example, very 
difficult and time-consuming since a preliminary approval by 
the regional public employment service is required. Clearly, 
high dismissal costs reduce the willingness of employers to 
engage new employees. 4 Hence, plans existed to replace the 
preceding permission rule by a system where the employee 
could appeal to a court in case of unjustified dismissal. 
Although similar dismissal rules exist in most other Member 
On the other hand, high dismissal costs reduce the chance for dismissal, 
once someone is hired. This labour hoarding effect can probably explain 
why unemployment started increasing later during the 1993 economic 
downturn. However, once it started increasing, it increased much faster than 
in other Member States. 
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States, the unions and the small and medium-sized employers 
organizations opposed it. Therefore, the government decided to 
maintain the current system. Instead, dismissal periods will be 
shortened, procedures simplified, and the possibilities for 
appeal to the court, which is now mostly used for extending the 
dismissal period, reduced. 
Other institutional rigidities put limits on the flexibility to hire 
people. There are, for example, only very short-term 
possibilities to engage people on a trial period and the use of 
short-term contracts is also limited. This makes the decision to 
hire someone a long-term commitment, certainly if the 
possibilities for dismissal are also limited, and could make 
employers hesitant to create new jobs. 
The law on the flexibility of working hours is currently under 
discussion. More possibilities to work in shifts could increase 
the use and the productivity of the capital structure 
significantly. Allowing more flexibility in the number of hours 
worked per day or per week could also improve productivity in 
sectors with seasonal production patterns. 
However, other labour market rules are more flexible than in 
other Member States. The legislation on temporary work is 
very flexible and, as a consequence, the share of temporary 
workers in total employment is the highest in the Union. Also, 
the regulations on part-time work are not very stringent; there 
is even no legal obligation to pay the same hourly wage for a 
part-time worker as for a full-time worker. 1 This resulted in a 
very high share of part-time labour, mainly for women and on 
the low end of the labour market. Research has shown that in 
the Netherlands this high degree of part-time work corresponds 
to the wishes of the workers. Only 8% of working men and 
10% of working women would like to work more hours, while 
13% of the men and almost 15% of the women would prefer to 
work even fewer hours than they currently do.2 
Although too much flexibility in the labour market can also 
have negative effects, for example on the willingness of 
employers to provide on-the-job training, the previous 
examples show that in the areas where Dutch legislation is 
flexible, the labour market reacts very positively. Therefore, 
existing protective labour market regulation should be 
reconsidered carefully to avoid all disincentives to employment 
creation. 
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However, such a requirement is part of most of the collective labour 
agreements. 
Praat and Vosse ( 1993). 
2.4. Social security reform: Increasing incentives to 
work 
Besides its effect on labour demand (see Section 2.1.2 in this 
part), the generous social security system also has a negative 
influence on labour supply. A person will not be prepared to 
accept a job if the income distance between the received social 
security benefit and the wage associated with this job is too 
small. In the Netherlands, the minimum benefit for families 
with only one income is currently as high as 98,4% of the legal 
minimum wage, and before 1982 it was even more than 100%.3 
Again, this effect clearly plays predominantly on the low side 
of the labour market. This situation is intensified further by the 
fact that most jobs created in this sector of the labour market 
are part-time jobs, which in general yield a lower wage. 
Therefore, the social security benefit will almost always be 
competitive with the wage that can be earned from such an 
employment. Although the current labour market situation is 
probably more determined by a lack of demand than by a lack 
of supply, measures to promote the labour supply should not be 
neglected. Firstly, there might be some sectors where demand 
limitations are lower than on the aggregate level, which would 
be visualized by a higher number of unfilled vacancies. In these 
sectors the promotion of labour supply could have effective 
results and generate employment. Secondly, if more people are 
prepared to enter the labour market, this will have a depressing 
effect on the general wage evolution, which is also beneficial to 
employment. 
There are two possibilities to increase the income distance 
between (low) wages and social security benefits to promote 
labour supply: increase the (net) wages or reduce the benefit 
level. 
Increasing net wages can be done in several ways. In the past 
years, the previous government has increased, on a number of 
occasions, the tax deduction for labour-related expenses 
(arbeidskostenforfait). Since this tax deduction only applies to 
people with a job, this measure can increase the motivation to 
enter the labour market. The same effect can be obtained by 
reducing the social security contributions of employees. 
However, in 1995, the government attained this as a side-effect 
of the chosen measure to reduce employers' contributions for 
the health insurance (see also Section 2.2 of this part of the 
study). Since in the Netherlands this employers' contribution is 
part of the gross taxable wage of employees, its reduction also 
reduces the taxes to be paid by employees and increases their 
net wage. 
Centraal Planbureau (1995). 
A more directly visual way to increase the gap between social 
security benefits and the lowest wages is the reduction of the 
level of the benefits. As mentioned earlier, the present 
government is paying more attention to the reduction of the 
number of people who receive benefit than to the level of it. 
However, in 1995, all benefits were frozen at their 1994 level, 
which implies a reduction of the real benefit level. Furthermore, 
the coalition agreement decided that in the following years of 
the legislation period the benefit levels would on average be 
increased by only half of the wage evolution. Nevertheless, 
during the preparation of the 1996 budget it was decided to link 
the benefits fully to the wage evolution in that year in order to 
limit the loss in purchasing power of benefit receivers. This 
decision is clearly contrary to the realization of a bigger gap 
between benefit levels and wages. So far, it is not clear if this 
implies a change in policy or if the government intends to 
freeze the benefit level again in a later year to arrive at the 
planned average half link. 
Table 8 
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2.5. The Dutch employment measures compared to 
the recommendations of the Commission's 
- White Paper 
With the publication of the White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment in 1994, the European 
Commission pointed out the need to generate more 
employment by increasing the employment content of growth. 
To achieve this, a number of priorities for action were 
identified: lifelong education and training, greater flexibility, 
more focus on decentralized actions, reduction of the relative 
cost of low-qualified work, a more active employment policy 
and, finally, efforts to create jobs to meet new needs. 
In the follow-up to the White Paper, the European Council in 
Essen in December 1994 identified five key areas where 
measures are required. In Table 8, these recommendations are 
Comparison of the recommended labour market policies by the 1994 Essen European Council and the Dutch measures 
European Council recommendations 
1. Improving vocational training 
2. Increasing employment-intensiveness of growth by: 
3. 
a. more flexible work organization 
b. wage agreements below increases in productivity 
c. local initiatives to create jobs to satisfy new needs 
(environment, social services) 
Reducing non-wage labour costs 
4. Improving the effectiveness of labour market policy by 
5. 
a. avoiding practices and measures that remove 
incentives for the individual to seek employment 
b. moving from a passive to an active labour market 
policy 
Improving measures to help groups which are 
particularly hard hit by unemployment (young people, 
long-term unemployed, etc.) 
1 The numbers refer to sections of this chapter of the study. 
2.2 
Dutch measures 1 
More apprenticeships, improved link between 
education and labour market 
2.3 Removing institutional rigidities 
2.1.1 Wage moderation 
2.2 Creation of new public sector jobs in social 
services and security 
2.1.2 Social security reform in order to reduce social 
security contribution rates 
2.4 
2.2 
Social security reform to increase incentives to 
work 
Specific measures for the low end of the labour 
market 
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contrasted with the measures discussed in this chapter. This 
comparison shows that the current Dutch employment policy 
covers a broad range of action fields and gives the necessary 
attention to both demand, supply and structural measures. 
However, the labour market policy remains mainly 
characterized by income support measures, and less by active 
employment creation policies. 
Chapter 3. Generating more dynamic and 
competitive behaviour in product markets 
Despite the openness to international competition, important 
parts of the Dutch economy have traditionally been 
characterized by collusive behaviour and high barriers to 
entry . 1 Dutch regulation is often very permissive towards 
collusive cooperation agreements. Contrary to European 
competition legislation, collusive behaviour was permitted in 
the Netherlands, as long as it had no harmful effects. On a 
number of occasions this has led to an investigation by the 
European Commission, resulting in required modifications or a 
condemnation of cooperation agreements. Although Dutch 
companies play a very active part in mergers and acquisitions, 
Dutch authorities also have no real power to oppose mergers or 
acquisitions that would generate a dominant position on the 
market for one firm. Furthermore, a web of regulations protects 
existing businesses from new entrants. Although the original 
aim of most of these regulations was not to restrict competition, 
it was very often the (undesired) result. Examples are the 
zoning regulation, the Business Establishment Act and the Law 
on shopping hours. These regulations are further supplemented 
by an important degree of tolerated self-regulation by 
professional organizations. Furthermore, the government 
intervenes, directly or through subsidies, in a number of 
important sectors, with the housing sector as the most 
prominent example. 
Microeconomic rigidities and a lack of competition normally 
lead to inefficient allocation of resources, higher prices and a 
suboptimal output level. However, it is hard to detect these 
effects on a macroeconomic level in the Netherlands, since 
economic growth has been reasonably good and inflation was 
among the lowest in Europe. However, it remains possible that 
the negative effect of too little competitive behaviour was 
compensated by other positive evolutions in the Dutch 
economy. Van Sinderen et al. (1994) calculated that the 
average yearly growth of production in the Netherlands in the 
period 1984-90 could have been 0,5 percentage point higher if 
product markets had been more flexible. Furthermore, even if 
the positive macroeconomic effects of increasing the level of 
competition and reducing excessive regulation were limited, 
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A more detailed overview of the existing situation can be found in Annex I. 
together with an assessment of the economic costs of a lack of competition. 
the beneficial effects on the quality of products and services, by 
offering more choice and flexibility, would be considerable. 
As a consequence, since the late 1980s, the awareness of the 
possible costs of insufficient competitive behaviour has grown 
considerably in the Netherlands. Therefore, a number of legal 
initiatives to remedy this situation have already been taken and 
some others are currently in preparation. 
Competition policy is gradually, but fundamentally, being 
changed in recent years. The government is trying to find a new 
balance between preventing restrictive practices on the one 
hand and protecting and stimulating productive forms of 
cooperation, such as alliances for research and development on 
the other hand. Therefore, a completely new law on economic 
competition that will be based on European competition rules is 
planned. However, since this might take some time (January 
1997 at the earliest), the Dutch authorities decided to take some 
quick corrective measures. Starting from July 1993, a ban on 
horizontal price agreements2 was introduced. Exceptions are 
made for price agreements in franchising contracts, for joint 
short-term advertising actions and between branches of the 
same firm. Other exemptions can be granted to firms who can 
prove that a price agreement is of general interest. However, 
exemptions are only granted in very exceptional cases since the 
general interest requirement is strictly interpreted according to 
the criteria of the EC Treaty. This is a clear change from the 
system where all price agreements are allowed unless an abuse 
can be proven, to a system where agreements are in principle 
forbidden unless proof is given that they are beneficial. Since 
June 1994, market sharing arrangements and collusive 
tendering are also forbidden. The existing Economic 
Competition Act has also been amended and is now also 
applicable to informal collusive agreements and covers all 
liberal professions. 
The present restrictive Business Establishment Act also comes 
under pressure from EU regulations since anyone who is 
allowed to establish a firm in another Member State and has 
sufficient experience is now automatically allowed to establish 
the same type of enterprise in the Netherlands. As a 
consequence, the establishment requirements in the 
Netherlands are often more stringent for Dutch citizens than for 
inhabitants of other EU countries. To remove this 
discrimination, to reduce market segmentation and to increase 
flexibility, the process to review the present Business 
Establishment Act was started back in 1988, but because of 
negative reactions by the branch organizations to a first 
proposal, it will only be replaced in 1996. The current proposal 
These are price agreements between members of the same sector or 
profession. Vertical price agreements, where suppliers impose a selling 
price on retailers, were already banned in 1964. 
lowers the legal barriers to entry considerably and divides 
branches into three categories. For the first category there will 
no longer be legal entrance requirements. For the second group, 
which will include bakeries and butchers, sufficient general 
business skills will be needed; and for the third group 
additional specific business skills will also be demanded. 
Establishment permissions will in principle be valid for all 
branches of a same group, with the exception of some clusters 
of branches in the third group, such as the car cluster. 
Although the barriers to entry will not disappear completely -
about 70% of the existing small and medium-sized firms 
regulated under the present Law will continue to need a licence 
- the new law will simplify entry conditions significantly. 
Research shows that the proposed relaxation will lead to more 
dynamism in the retail trade. 1 The number of businesses will 
increase, entries and withdrawals will go up and profit 
adjustments progress more swiftly. 
After long discussions in the 1980s, the Law on shopping hours 
was relaxed slightly in 1993. The maximum number of opening 
hours per week a store is allowed was increased from 52 to 55; 
and the latest closing time was extended from 6.00 to 6.30 p.m. 
on weekdays and from 5.00 to 6.00 p.m. on Saturdays. At the 
same time, a number of experiments with non-standard opening 
hours were approved in about 15 towns. However, these 
cosmetic changes have not stopped consumers' demands for 
more flexible shopping hours. Recently, a number of studies 
have also been conducted to investigate the economic effects of 
longer shopping hours.2 Although there is some disagreement 
on the extent of the effects, most studies agree that prices could 
fall slightly, while there might be a small increase in sales 
volume and positive employment consequences. Therefore, the 
government has recently submitted a proposal to further 
liberate shopping hours. On weekdays and Saturdays, shops 
would be allowed to stay open between 6.00 a.m. and 10.00 
p.m., unless the municipality where the shop is located decides 
otherwise. On Sundays the opposite rule would apply: in 
principle shops should stay closed unless the municipality 
allows them to be open. If this proposal is accepted by 
Parliament, the Netherlands would have a Law on shopping 
hours that is generally in line with practices in other Member 
States. 
Direct government intervention in some sectors is also being 
reduced. In the housing sector, for example, the legal rent 
increase has constantly been set higher than inflation.J This 
Carree et al. (1993). 
Kremers et al. (1994 ), Depla (1994 ), Nooteboom (1994 ), Grad us and 
Kremers ( 1994), Gianotten and Heeres (1995a), Centraal Planbureau 
(1995), Bernardi et al. (1995), Gianotten and Heeres (1995b), Kremers and 
Gradus (1995). 
Dieleman and Everaers (1994 ). 
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year, the subsidies to public building corporations will also be 
abolished in a large financial operation that will redress the 
balance sheet of the corporations to enable them to work under 
competitive market conditions in the future.4 For an important 
number of households, these policy changes make buying a 
house more attractive than renting. As a consequence, the 
proportion of houses bought among newly constructed houses 
has risen from 5% in 1982 to more than 40% in 1990. The 
government is also reducing its direct intervention in the 
telecommunications sector (partial privatization of postal and 
telecommunications service, second telecommunications 
operator) and public transportation (other railway operators will 
be able to use the existing infrastructure, private exploitation of 
local and regional public transport). 
At the end of 1994, the government also presented a plan to 
promote efficient markets. deregulation and the quality of law. 
The objective of this plan is to limit regulations and the 
administrative burden for businesses to a minimum, to 
strengthen competition, and to improve the quality of 
legislation and regulations. The whole operation is politically 
guided by a special Ministerial Commission, which is chaired 
by the Prime Minister. Working groups, consisting of experts 
with policy or practical experience, will be created to 
investigate specific problem areas and to make firm reform 
proposals, upon which the cabinet will decide. Each year, a 
number of specific subjects will be treated and decided. The 
subjects will be proposed by employers' organizations, trade 
unions, consumer organizations, external experts and 
government departments. This year, attention will be going to 
the monopoly of lawyers to provide legal advice, the (already 
mentioned) review of the Law on shopping hours, the removal 
of limitations on competition in the taxi sector, and 
simplification of some environmental and labour market 
regulations. 
Hence, the process of reducing harmful regulation is clearly 
underway. However, it should be speeded up and intensified; 
too often, organizations who defend vested interests continue to 
be able to slow down or weaken the reform (examples are the 
1993 minor change of the Law on shopping hours and the slow 
progress in the reform of the Business Establishment Act). 
Conclusions 
Despite the sharp recession in Europe, there have been a 
number of positive developments in the Netherlands since 
1992, when the Commission published the previous country 
The main principle of this financial operation is that the government will 
pay an amount that is equal to the present value of all future subsidies, 
while the corporations will redeem all the outstanding housing loans to the 
government (see also footnote I on p. 14 of Part I). 
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study. Economic growth was less affected by the recession than 
in most of the other Member States because of the trade 
specialization pattern, the decline of the savings ratio and 
continuing wage moderation. After a mild recession the 
recovery, driven initially by external demand and then by 
investment, came faster than expected. The disciplinary effect 
of the Dutch guilder's peg with the Deutschmark kept inflation 
and interest rate differentials relative to Germany negligible. In 
contrast to most other Member States, the Dutch authorities 
managed to reduce further the general government deficit ratio 
during the economic downturn, although at a slower pace than 
originally planned. The deficit ratio is now coming closer to the 
3% of GDP reference value and will probably be below it in 
1996. However, the debt ratio will probably show a modest 
decline in that year. Employment growth has been stronger 
than in other Member States despite low economic growth, as 
the employment intensity of growth remained high. 
However, the two major problems - the low labour market 
participation rate and the poor public finances - which were 
identified in the previous country study on the Netherlands, 
persist. The problems are closely linked by the social security 
system, where the high inactivity ratio increases the cost of the 
system and makes the fiscal consolidation more difficult. 
Furthermore, high contribution rates are needed to finance the 
social security expenditures which increases wage costs and is 
harmful to employment. 
Although the general government deficit has been reduced 
significantly over the past decade, a further reduction is 
required to put the debt ratio on a sustained downward path 
towards the 60% of GDP reference value. Because of low 
nominal economic growth, together with low inflation, and 
relatively low debt compared to other highly indebted Member 
States, the further erosion of the GDP-debt ratio progresses 
only slowly once the deficit approaches 3% of GDP. The 
further reduction of the debt ratio is not only required to 
participate in the monetary union, but also to lower the interest 
burden and to allow pension commitments to be met in the next 
century. For this to happen, the planned expenditure cuts, as 
they are described in the second convergence programme, have 
to be fully realized, and in addition the extra budgetary room 
from higher-than-planned growth must be used to a significant 
degree to lower the budget deficit further. 
Compared to European standards, the Dutch labour market 
situation is largely determined by the high growth in population 
and labour supply. As a result, the relatively high employment 
creation is mainly absorbed by new entrants to the labour 
market. Although the unemployment rate remains significantly 
below the Union average, it increased rapidly during the 
economic slowdown. In the current recovery, employment is 
recovering swiftly with an expected growth of 1,9% in 1996. 
However, with a continuous high labour supply growth, 
unemployment is declining only marginally, which is partly 
generated by the declining trend in the number of social 
security beneficiaries since 1994. As a consequence. the 
participation rate in the labour market (in full-time equivalents) 
is on an increasing trend, although it still remains among the 
lowest in the EU, with high rates of disability, early retirement 
and part-time working. 
There is no single explanation for the labour market problems 
in the Dutch economy, but rather a range covering both labour 
demand and labour supply. Labour demand appears to be 
restrained by the high labour costs, especially on the low end of 
the market, and by a number of institutional rigidities. The high 
labour cost is due in part to the expensive social security 
system, which also reduces, on the supply side, the incentives 
to work or to accept a job at a low wage. The government is 
taking a variety of measures to tackle the main obstacles to 
employment creation. Firstly, the cost of labour is being 
reduced through wage moderation and reductions of 
employers' social security contributions, which are made 
possible by cost-reducing institutional changes in the social 
security system (e.g. the introduction of competition elements 
in the disability scheme, the privatization of the sickness 
scheme). Secondly, the problems at the low end of the labour 
market will be tackled through specific reductions of the social 
security contributions, improved vocational training, and the 
possibility to create jobs at minimum wage level or even lower. 
Thirdly, institutional rigidities will be removed to facilitate jobs 
creation and encourage a more flexible labour market. Finally, 
the government will increase the incentives to work at low 
wages. Despite the policies addressing demand, supply and 
structural issues, the labour market policy continues to be 
characterized by income support measures. and to a lesser 
extent by active employment creation policies. To tackle the 
main obstacles to employment creation, it is important that the 
mentioned measures are implemented soon and that they are 
supplemented by additional measures. 
To improve the general structure and dynamism of the 
economy, the government is also working on a number of 
legislative reforms to increase competitive behaviour and 
remove unnecessary regulations on the product markets. 
Competition policy is gradually, but fundamentally, being 
enhanced, the Business Establishment Act has been changed, 
and the Law on shopping hours has been approved by the 
government. Furthermore, a plan has been presented to 
promote efficient markets, deregulation and the quality of law. 
The process of reducing harmful regulation is clearly 
underway, but it could be speeded up and intensified. 
Increasing the level of competition and reducing excessive 
regulation will not only have positive effects on growth and 
employment, it will above all increase the quality of products 
and services, by offering more choice and flexibility. 
This study was coordinated by the National Economies Directorate, and was mainly prepared by Bernard Naudts. 
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1. Introduction 
The performance of any given economy depends both on the 
macro- and microeconomic conditions that define the economic 
environment where economic agents interact. At the 
microeconomic level, the good performance of markets is 
important to improve the competitiveness of firms, to avoid 
rigidities impeding markets from clearing under smooth and 
continuous conditions and to enable consumers to pay prices 
leading to an efficient allocation of resources among producers. 
In that sense, microeconomic policies aiming at eliminating 
market imperfections, burdensome regulations and other 
rigidities in commodities, inputs and services markets play a 
key role in ensuring a good performance of the economy. 
The Dutch economy has traditionally been considered as one of 
the most open economies in Europe. Open exposure to 
competitors from other EU Member States and from the rest of 
the world has maintained effective competition in markets for 
tractable commodities. However, a substantial part of the Dutch 
economy has been strongly protected from foreign competition, 
even from other Member States. That has been the case for 
services sectors, professional activities and in general other 
activities requiring some sort of licence and some types of 
public procurement and publicly regulated markets. This has 
been widely considered as one of the traditional characteristics 
of the Dutch economy. For instance, the 1993 OECD Economic 
Survey of the Netherlands stated that: 'In the Netherlands, 
restrictions on competition have been rooted in cartelization, 
widespread barriers to entry imposed by official rules or by 
professional associations, as well as in government controls 
over various sectors in the form of subsidies, administered 
prices and public ownership.' (p. 58). 
Already in the 1980s the Dutch Government expressed 
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs resulting sometimes in 
borderline cases as far as the legality established by the 
competition rules of the Treaty was concerned. The process of 
economic integration brought about by the internal market has 
opened to competition some economic sectors affected by those 
regulations and rigidities. Public procurement and newly 
liberalized services sectors are examples of these changes. This 
new trend has spurred the internal initiatives for the 
liberalization of those sectors of the Dutch economy and for the 
alignment of national competition rules with EU rules. Some 
recent competition cases at European level have also 
contributed to these changes. 
The purpose of this Annex is to provide an overview of the 
present situation of different aspects related to the working of 
competition and regulation in the Netherlands and to review 
possible economic consequences. The next section gives some 
prototypical examples of competition cases affecting Dutch 
companies dealt with at European level. The section also 
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includes quantitative accounts of mergers and other 
concentrative activities and State aid in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, some comments about regulation in the 
Netherlands are included. The last section in this Annex 
describes possible economic costs of a lack of competition. 
Recent policy measures and proposals made by Dutch 
authorities concerning competition and regulation are 
summarized in Chapter 3 of Part II of this study. 
2. Overview of existing situation 
2.1. Competition policy 
As many other small countries, the Dutch economy has 
traditionally been more prone to solve economic problems by 
means of cooperative arrangements and self-regulatory 
solutions rather than by means of competition or the market 
mechanism. Quite often, these cooperative solutions have 
involved the conclusion of agreements within professional 
associations or groups of producers or services providers. In 
certain cases, this has resulted in non-exemptable restrictions of 
competition under Article 85 of the EC Treaty. However, this 
has not always been the case and quite a few types of 
agreements between undertakings have been cleared by the 
Commission as compatible with competition policy. 
Below, the summaries of two recent cases are presented as 
examples of what has and has not been considered by the 
Commission - and also by the Court of First Instance -
compatible or not with European competition law. 
Example 1: The building and construction industry in 
the Netherlands (1992) 
Since 1980, the Dutch Association of Cooperative Price-
regulating Organizations in the Construction Industry (SPO) 
has established and enforced a comprehensive set of 
regulations aiming at coordinating the behaviour of builders 
tendering for public and private construction contracts. In all, 
4 OOO Dutch building contractors from 28 professional 
associations were bound by these agreements. Another 3 OOO 
builders, among which 150 companies based outside the 
Netherlands, also occasionally followed the rules imposed by 
the SPO on an occasional basis. 
Basically, the agreement consisted of two parts: the price-
regulating rules and the code of honour. The former is a 
complex set of rules making the client effectively responsible 
to bear the tendering costs incurred by the contractors and 
leading to the designation between them of the lowest 
competitive tenderer, the so-called 'entitled undertaking'. This 
contractor was then protected from competition in different 
ways. The system was based on pre-tender meetings between 
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builders tendering for contracts. At those meetings, information 
on costs was exchanged between participants. In the presence 
of competition from non-members, the system allowed for a 
collective defence against outsiders. Furthermore, the bid of the 
entitled contractor was increased to cover the tender costs 
incurred by the unsuccessful contractors. 
The code of honour established penalties for breaches of 
regulations and an internal system of arbitrage to solve disputes 
between members. 
In a decision made in February 1992 (OJ L 92, 7.4.1992), the 
Commission adopted a decision condemning this agreement 
and fining the associations involved a total of ECU 22,5 
million. In the decision, the agreement was found to restrict 
competition in two different ways. Firstly, it restricted the 
client's freedom to choose among bidders as competing bids 
were not independent due to the information exchange between 
contractors. Moreover, the agreement restricted competition 
among members and non-members to the agreement, as outside 
competitors had to face a collusive response from SPO 
members. 
This decision was appealed but the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) has recently upheld the Commission's decision. Among 
other things, 1 the appeal was based on SPO' s request for an 
exemption according to Article 85(3). SPO claimed that the 
rules were introduced in order to compensate for the 
imbalances borne by the sector due to the cyclical fluctuations 
of the sector and to some Dutch legislation favouring the 
consumers in the process of competition among undertakings 
for the award of contracts. 
The CFI2 rejected these criticisms and confirmed the validity of 
the reasons argued by the Commission against the application 
of Article 85(3). According to the CFI, the Commission was 
right in denying an individual exemption on the grounds that 
consumers did not get any share of the benefits that the system 
was alleged to produce and that the agreement was not an 
indispensable way to achieve the alleged welfare gains. The 
CFI confirmed that only the microeconomic analysis of the 
conditions established in Article 85(3) for granting individual 
exemptions is relevant for that purpose. 
Example 2: Stichting Baksteen (1994) 
Stichting Baksteen notified an agreement signed by 16 Dutch 
brick manufacturers with the purpose of re-structuring this 
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intra-Community trade. 
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industrial sector. The Dutch brick industry has experienced a 
persistent decline in demand due not only to eye lical 
fluctuations but also to the progressive substitution of bricks by 
other more modern building materials. This evolution of the 
sector indicates the existence of a 'structural excess-capacity' 
which the members of the agreement estimated in 217 million 
bricks. Sixteen companies created a compensation fund that is 
managed by Stichting Baksteen with the purpose of 
compensating for the costs associated with the effective 
closing-down of productive capacity by members. Stichting 
Baksteen was also responsible for the surveillance of a social 
plan agreed with the trade unions. 
Such as it was notified, the agreement could not benefit from an 
individual exemption under Article 85(3 ), as some of the 
provisions of the agreement were not considered as 
indispensable to achieve the elimination of excess capacity. In 
particular, the Commission considered that one important 
element of the agreement - a system establishing production 
quotas distributing total production among the members - was 
not compatible with competition law. After the removal of 
these elements by Stichting Baksteen, the Commission 
considered that the new version of the agreement met the 
conditions for an individual exemption under Article 85(3 ). 
In this case, the Commission considered that after the required 
changes, the agreement fulfils all the criteria presented by the 
Commission in the Xllth Annual report on Competition ( 1982) 
for the exemption of restructuring agreements because: 
• the agreement improves production conditions by 
eliminating economically obsolete productive capacity; 
• consumers benefit from part of the gains derived from the 
restructuring, as there are no production quotas assigned to 
competitors; 
• the agreement is limited to the strictly necessary measures 
to reduce capacity without affecting prices and is limited in 
time. Furthermore, the possible entry of imports from 
neighbouring Member States limits the competition impact 
of the agreement, which ensures the persistence of 
substantial competition in the relevant market. 
2.2. Mergers and acquisitions 
The relative importance of mergers and acquisitions in a given 
country gives an indication about the propensity of firms from 
that country to use external rather than internal sources of 
growth. Takeovers, mergers, acquisitions of firms and other 
forms of external growth can help firms to grow fast or to 
acquire complementary assets that they may find necessary to 
expand their product range or to have access to certain markets. 
On the other hand, this type of growth has financial 
repercussions on firms, particularly when the operation is 
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Table 1 
The Netherlands as a bidder: Total number of mergers and acquisitions 
1989 1990 
Netherlands 236 259 
Belgium 19 15 
Denmark 4 
Ireland 1 
France 14 15 
Germany 40 48 
Greece 1 1 
Italy 2 6 
Luxembourg 1 
Portugal 
Spain 5 10 
UK 14 22 
EUR 121 97 121 
Austria 1 
Finland 
Sweden 3 
EUR 15 1 101 121 
USA 19 19 
Japan 
Others 9 9 
Total 365 408 
Excluding The Netherlands. 
Source: Amdata. 
financed with borrowed funds or when the firm has to raise 
capital in financial markets, because these operations are risky 
and the resulting corporation may have difficulties in 
coordinating the new and old activities, assets or personnel. 
Furthermore, studying the patterns of the concentrative 
activities of firms is interesting because it can help identify 
flows of foreign direct investment, which act as substitutes or 
complements to trade. 
In principle, mergers and acquisitions are perfectly legitimate 
operations. Especially in the context of processes of market 
integration like the internal market programme, they can 
contribute significantly to modify the structure of companies so 
that they can achieve a more efficient scale. However, mergers 
and other types of concentrations can be used by firms as a 
means to attain or increase dominant positions in their markets. 
For this reason, competition authorities must keep a certain 
surveillance of these activities to avoid those undesirable 
effects of concentration activities on competition. In the 
Netherlands, a 'merger code' introduced in 1975 required all 
bids to be notified. However, the authorities had no real power 
to oppose a deal in practice. The purpose of the notification 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
199 200 205 124 
13 23 13 8 
5 1 7 5 
1 1 2 2 
11 8 10 10 
37 16 40 27 
1 
4 2 2 7 
1 
1 1 
5 9 9 7 
14 7 10 10 
91 67 94 78 
1 1 1 
1 2 
6 5 2 3 
98 74 98 82 
12 13 13 25 
3 3 
15 22 23 26 
324 312 342 257 
requirement seemed to respond to social and general economic 
rather than to competition policy considerations. 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions at European level, 
the Netherlands play a very important role. The number of 
mergers involving Dutch companies increased considerably 
towards the end of the 1980s. In terms of number of 
concentrative operations registered by the Amdata database 1 
and for the 1986-94 period, the Netherlands accounted for 
approximately 10% of the total of transnational operations 
between companies of different Member States, both as buyer 
and target of mergers and acquisitions. This places the 
Netherlands as the fourth largest bidding country of the 
European Union and the fifth country more frequently chosen 
by companies from other Member States to acquire existing 
European firms. 
See European Economy No 57 for a description of this database. It must be 
said that Amdata does not provide a full coverage for the Netherlands 
before 1989. 
59 
Annexes 
Table 2 
The Netherlands as a target: Total number of mergers and acquisitions 
1989 1990 
Netherlands 236 259 
Belgium 11 9 
Denmark 7 4 
Ireland 10 5 
France 16 20 
Germany 21 11 
Greece 
Italy 2 3 
Luxembourg 1 1 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 87 47 
EUR 121 155 100 
Austria 1 1 
Finland 11 6 
Sweden 15 12 
EUR 15 1 182 119 
USA 17 18 
Japan 2 7 
Others 19 22 
Total 456 425 
Excluding The Netherlands. 
Source: Amdata. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of concentrative 
operations involving firms from the Netherlands for the period 
1989-94. Dutch firms show a particularly high frequency to bid 
for German firms. The second preferred destination of Dutch 
acquisitions abroad is Belgium, closely followed by France and 
the United Kingdom. However, the pattern in the flows of 
acquisitions of Dutch firms by foreign companies is quite 
different. The United Kingdom is by far the first source of 
funds aiming at the acquisition of Dutch companies. For 
instance in 1989, more than 50% of all Community 
concentrations having a Dutch firm as target had their origin in 
the UK. 
Concentrative operations of national dimensions in the 
Netherlands are relatively abundant in number, accounting for 
approximately twice as many operations involving firms from 
other Community countries and Dutch firms. However, these 
operations have relatively small economic importance in 
comparison with crossborder concentrations. Only in 1991, and 
to a lesser extent in 1990 and 1993, the value of national 
acquisitions was relatively important as compared to 
transnational operations. This was due to national operations 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 
199 200 205 124 
1 5 5 8 
7 3 1 1 
1 4 4 2 
10 12 10 4 
16 19 19 22 
1 2 2 2 
1 2 1 
20 27 19 25 
57 74 61 64 
1 1 
2 3 1 2 
8 7 1 2 
68 84 64 68 
13 13 21 11 
7 3 2 1 
14 29 24 16 
301 329 316 220 
taking place in the financial sector and, particularly, to the 
acquisition of an insurance company by a large financial 
institution in 1990 with a bid value close to ECU 5 billion. 
Operations involving Dutch and non-EU firms are also 
relatively frequent, especially when the Dutch company is the 
target of the operation. The USA and Sweden appear as the 
most frequent buyers of Dutch firms in the period under 
consideration. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the number of bids originating in the 
Netherlands is much higher than the number of concentrative 
operations having a Dutch firm as target. Looking at the sums 
of the values of bids having their origin in the Netherlands and 
those aiming at Dutch firms reveals a similar picture. As Graph 
1 shows, 1 the total value of bids for foreign companies made by 
It must be said that Amdata does not give the bid value for all the registered 
operations. The data presented in Graph I correspond to those operations 
for which the value of the operation is known. 
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GRAPH 1: Total value of concentrations having a Dutch firm as a bidder or target 
mioECU 
~~~----------------------------, 
J-Netherlands u • bidder - Nclherlands as a wget 
1989 1990 1991 
Source: Amdata. 
Dutch firms in the period under consideration was always 
higher than the total value of acquisitions of Dutch firms by 
foreign companies. 
The services sectors and especially the financial and wholesale 
distribution sectors present a higher frequency of concentrative 
operations than manufacturing. In manufacturing, 'paper and 
paper products ' appears as the first sector, both in number of 
operations having as origin and target Dutch firms in the period 
1986-94. Mechanical engineering is the second most often 
targeted Dutch sector, followed by food products. Dutch firms 
show high frequencies of bids for foreign firms in the 
mechanical engineering and in the electrical and electronic 
sectors. 
This characteristic of the Netherlands as a net buyer of foreign 
companies is also reflected in the substantial difference in the 
average value of both types of acquisitions. While the purchase 
of foreign companies by Dutch firms had an average bid value 
ranging from ECU 682 million in 1992 to ECU 131 million in 
1994, the average value of Dutch firms bought by foreign 
companies went from ECU 4 7 million in 1992 to ECU 189 
million in 1994. 
1992 1993 1994 
2.3. State aid 
European competition policy has always emphasized the 
importance of controlling State aid in the Union. In the context 
of the existing European economic union, the control of State 
aid is absolutely necessary to avoid distortions of competition 
introduced by Member States to give a relative advantage to 
domestic producers over competitors from other Member 
States. At the macroeconomic level, State aid, as any other 
component of public spending, contributes to budget deficit, 
which confers them importance for the assessment of 
convergence criteria for monetary union. Thus, there are both 
micro- and macroeconomic arguments to pay attention to the 
evolution of State aid. 
State aid in the Netherlands is relatively unimportant in 
comparison with the EU average. During the latest period for 
which figures are available, 1990-92, 1 State aid in the 
See Fourth Survey on State aids in the European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other sectors , Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1995. 
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GRAPH 2: Evolution of State aid to manufacturing in real terms for EUR 12 and the Netherlands, 
1988-92 (1988 = 100) 
110 ~-----------------------------
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Source: Fourth Survey on State aids in the European Union in the manufacturing and ccnain other sectors. 
Netherlands accounted for 0,9% of GDP while this percentage 
was substantially higher for the 12 countries that integrated the 
Union at that time (1,8 % ). In terms of State aid per person 
employed, there is also a substantial difference between 
ECU 338,3 per person in the Netherlands and ECU 703 in the 
whole of the Union . As a percentage of government 
expenditure, State aid in the Netherlands represented I , 7% in 
1990-92, while that percentage was 3,8% for EUR 12. 
Moreover, State aid in the Netherlands shows a declining trend. 
As Graph 2 shows, State aid for manufacturing has decreased 
in the Netherlands by approximately 30% between 1988 and 
1992 in real terms , while for EUR 12 it remains practically 
constant, with a somewhat decreasing trend. This difference in 
tendencies is more di stinctive if we use data for 1986-88 from 
the Third survey on State aids. 1 Overall State aid in the 
Netherlands accounted for 1,3% of the GDP in 1986-88, and 
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The time series fo r Stale aid for the overl apping periods of the second and 
fourth survey do not co inc ide. Thi s is due mainl y to differences in the 
ori ginal dat a suppli ed by Member States fo r those periods at different 
points in time. 
this percentage dropped to 0,9% in 1990-92. However, for the 
group of 12 Member States unde r considera tion , State aid 
maintained a practically con stant share of GDP in the two 
periods under consideration (2 ,2% in 1986-88 and 2,3 % in 
1990-92). 
The di stribution of all State aid by sec tor presents some 
peculiarities in the Netherlands with respec t to the Uni on ' s 
average. As Graph 3 shows, the manufacturing sector accounts 
for the large st share of all State aid with 43 % in the 
Netherlands and 40% in the Union. However, the tran sport 
sector absorbs almost the same percentage in the Netherl ands, 
with 41 % while thi s percentage is just 29 % in the Uni on. On 
the other hand, the coal sector, which does not receive State aid 
in the Netherl ands has an important weight in the Union with 
15% of all aid granted by the 12 Member States in the 1990-92 
period . Furthermore , the importance of aid to the tran sport 
sector has grown over time. In the Third survey on State aids, it 
was reported that State aid to transport represented 32% of all 
aid granted in that country during the 1986-88 period . Thi s 
percentage went up to 35% in 1988-90 to reac h the 4 1 % level 
in the last period for which we have figures. Thi s increasing 
importance of aid to transport has resulted in relative reductions 
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GRAPH 3: Breakdown by sector of overall State aid in the Netherlands and in EUR 12 (1990-92) 
Netherlands 
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in aid to agriculture and fisheries, which accounted for 23% in 
1986-88 and now represents just 16% of the total. 
Table 3 below gives a more detailed account of the distribution 
of State aid by sector and objective in the Netherlands for 
1990-92 . Figures in Table 3 are annual averages for the period 
expressed in million ECU. The columns indicate categories of 
aid. The codes mean the following: 
AIA gran ts, interes t subs idies directly received by the 
recipient and R&D schemes 
A2A tax credits, tax allowances, reductions in soc ial security 
contributions and other tax measures. 
CIA soft loans, participatory loans 
C2A tax deferrals 
D 1 A aid under the form of guarantees. 
As the table shows, sector-specific aid to the transport sector 
has a paramount importance in the Netherlands. Most of the aid 
is granted under Council Regulations Nos 1191/69 and 1192/69 
of 26 June 1969 on actions by Member States concerning the 
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service in 
transport by rail , road , and inland waterway and on common 
rules for the normalization of the accounts of railway 
undertakings. To a large extent, these forms of aid correspond 
to subsidies to railway infrastructure. They account for 
approximately 12% of the gross value-added of the transport 
sector, excluding sea and air transport. 
Horizontal objectives amount to 30,5% of all State aid 
registered in the Fourth survey. In this group, State aid to 
research and development activities is the most important 
horizontal objective followed by aid to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and energy savings. Aid to agriculture 
represents just 16,3% of the total registered and regional aid, 
with 7,6% practically non-existent. 
In terms of instruments, direct grants form by far the preferred 
instrument for the concession of State aid in the Netherlands, 
with 91,3% of the total. Some instruments are predominantly 
used for certain purposes. For instance, direct grants are very 
seldom used for SMEs. To transfer public funds to these firms, 
tax credits, tax allowances, reduction s in social security 
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Table 3 
Distribution by sector/objective of the annual average of State aid, 1990-92 (ECU million) 
AIA A2A CIA C2A DIA Total 
1. 1. Agriculture 355,1 0 0 0 0 355,1 
1.2. Fisheries 2,2 0 0 0 0 2,2 
2.1. Industry/services - horizontal objectives 475,7 135,7 6,3 0,1 48,3 666,0 
2.1.1. Research and development 235,0 0 6,3 0 0 241,3 
2.1.2. Environment 46,4 0 0 0,1 0 46,5 
2.1.3. Small and medium-sized enterprises 30,7 124,1 0 0 32,9 187,7 
2.1.4. Trade/exports 21,4 0 0 0 0 21,4 
2.1.5. Energy savings 117,1 11,6 0 0 0 128,6 
2.1.6. General investment 14,2 0 0 0 12,0 26,2 
2.1. 9. Other 10,9 0 0 0 3,4 14,3 
2.2. Industry/services - particular sectors 993,4 0 0 0 0 993,4 
2.2.1. Steel 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.2.2. Shipbuilding 40,9 0 0 0 0 40,9 
2.2.3. Transport 896,5 0 0 0 0 896,5 
2.2.4. Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.2.5. Other sectors 56,0 0 0 0 0 56,0 
3. Regional aid 165,7 0 0 0 0 165,7 
Total 1992, 1 135,7 6,3 0,1 48,3 2182,4 
Source: European Commission, Fourth survey on State aids in the European Union in the manufacturing and certain other sectors. 
contributions and other tax measures, as well as aid under the 
form of guarantees are the predominant instruments. Soft loans 
are also used to subsidize R&D and aid under the form of 
guarantees are frequently used for general investment purposes. 
2.4. Regulation 
Many barriers of entry and the lack of price competition are 
often the result of government regulations. Although the 
original aim of these regulations was, in most cases, not to 
restrict competition, this is very often the (undesired) result. A 
good example is the zoning regulation that was set up to protect 
existing shopping areas in city centres by restricting the 
creation of new large surface retail outlets outside of town. 
Such a policy has the justified objectives of preventing the 
degeneration of city centres, limiting the use of cars for 
shopping and carefully using the scarce open space. However, 
side effects are limiting the possibility to take advantage of 
economies of scale and restricting the entry of large foreign 
retailers to the Dutch market, which effectively limits the 
degree of competition. 
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Another example is the Business Establishment Act, which was 
originally introduced in 1954 and has recently been overhauled. 
To promote the quality of business conduct and to avoid the 
negative effects of unfair competition by unqualified firms, it 
forbids the establishment of a new business without a proper 
licence and determined minimum qualifications for the 
establishment of enterprises. The qualifications consisted of 
requirements for general business education of the management 
as well as requirements for professional or skill competence. 
The requirements, however, were based on the small-scaled 
and narrowly defined production organization of the 1950s. 
There were, for instance, separate requirements for ladies' and 
gentlemen's hairdressers; also, a bricklayer was not allowed to 
do the plastering of a building. The purchase of a new kitchen, 
for instance, implied strictly speaking contracting four different 
people to install it: one for the electrical equipment, one for the 
plumbing, one for the gas and one for installing the cupboards. 
Obviously such a fine-stitched law not only threw up enormous 
barriers to entry but also limited the flexibility between sectors 
of the economy. The Law has also promoted the development 
of numerous well-organized branch organizations that were 
responsible for training and educating the people of their 
respective branch. 
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Table 4 \ 
Distribution of shopping hours in retail trade, 1994 
Average opening hours per week Weighted 
average 
<45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-75 ~76 (hours) 
Belgium 27 15 9 
Denmark 30 27 9 
Germany 23 20 38 
Greece 20 15 15 
Spain 56 20 8 
France 47 20 9 
Italy 57 11 1 
Netherlands 16 21 48 
Portugal 55 17 4 
United Kingdom 24 18 22 
EURIO 37 18 19 
Source: EU business survey: Ad hoe labour market survey, June 1994. 
The segmentation of the market also gave rise to an important 
degree of self-regulation by professional organizations (often 
members of the liberal professions, such as notaries, lawyers, 
dentists but also hairdressers). They impose al kinds of 
qualitative as well as quantitative admission requirements that 
act as barriers to entry to new members of that profession. 
Furthermore, they also monitor the competence and ethical 
behaviour of their members. Some associations also set up 
zoning regulations for specific shopping centres, which may 
include rules stipulating, for example, that the tenants of a 
shopping centre may include only one shoe shop or one bakery 
to protect the livelihood of the sole provider of shoes or bread 
in that complex. To limit the competition to an absolute 
minimum, there are sometimes rules that declare which specific 
products each authorized shop is permitted to sell. The 
organizations consider themselves beneficial to the consumer 
because they provide a standard of quality. However, their self-
regulation often leads to collusive behaviour, market sharing 
and price fixing. 
The Law on shopping hours, which is currently being revised, 
was another example of government regulation that limited the 
possibilities for competition. This very restrictive law stemmed 
from around 1930 and was based on a traditional Dutch society 
where the men work and the women stay at home to look after 
their families and do the shopping. To protect the quality of life 
of people working in the distribution sector, the possibilities to 
compete by providing a better service by extending shopping 
hours was banned. In general, shops were allowed to sell their 
goods only from 8.30 to 18.00 on weekdays and from 8.30 to 
17 .00 on Saturdays, with a maximum of 52 hours per week. To 
buy a loaf of bread on Sunday is not possible in the 
(%) 
14 
13 
10 
1 
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9 
I 
11 
9 
4 19 11 56 
4 6 11 53 
2 1 1 50 
21 6 22 59 
2 3 3 46 
5 6 5 49 
17 1 0 47 
1 3 2 51 
2 3 18 51 
3 11 10 54 
6 5 4 50 
Netherlands. Survey results have shown that the average 
number of shopping hours per week is 51, with a narrow spread 
around this average.• Other Member States with more flexible 
shopping hours have a much higher variance in shopping hours. 
The same survey also revealed that the main reason for retailers 
not to increase their opening hours in the Netherlands is the 
existing regulation. 
Direct government regulation in the supply of goods and 
services is limited but the government intervenes, directly or 
through subsidies, in important sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, public utilities, constructions, public 
transportation, taxi services, telecommunication, insurance, 
health service). The housing sector is very regulated. The 
original aim was to provide proper housing at affordable prices. 
About three quarters of rented houses are owned by public 
housing associations or local authorities and rents are regulated 
for almost all rented dwellings. Since the legal rent increases 
used to be too low to cover for increased capital costs, an 
elaborate subsidy scheme to the public housing associations 
was set up, which has disturbed private investment in housing. 
Combined, all these laws, regulations and rules generate a web 
of barriers to entry that might limit the flexibility and 
innovative capacity of the Dutch economy. Gradus (1994) 
ranked EU Member States (excluding Luxembourg) based on 
the rigidity of their regulation of product and labour markets. 
The Netherlands turned out to have the most restrictive 
regulatory framework, especially because of the various 
legislations of product markets that are discussed earlier. 
European Commission (1994b). 
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Table 5 
Ranking of countries based on rigidity of product markets regulation1 
Law on Establishment 
shopping hours law 
Spain l l 
Portugal 1 1 
Ireland 1 l 
Greece l 6 
France 1 6 
Italy 8 6 
Belgium 6 9 
UK 7 l 
Denmark 9 l 
Germany 10 11 
Netherlands 11 9 
1 Rankings based on the specific restriction; the numbers rise with higher rigidity. 
Source: Gradus (1994). 
3. Economic costs of lack of competition 
In theory the costs of market failure are fairly easy to assess. 
The static costs of monopoly consist of a distributive and an 
allocative effect. The distributive effect contains the transfer of 
wealth from the consumer to the monopolist. The allocative 
effect is brought about by the fact that some consumers who 
would buy the product at the competitive price will no longer 
buy it under the monopoly price (non-provision). The dynamic 
costs of monopoly are more complicated to rate. Profits earned 
through the exploitation of a monopoly position will distort 
dynamic incentives and investment decisions and new product 
development might be stifled. 
Measuring the costs of market failure in the real world is much 
more complicated. If data on price and quantity were available 
for both the monopoly and the competitive outcomes of a 
particular industry, comparing total welfare in the two 
situations in order to arrive at an estimate of the static dead-
weight welfare loss would be relatively straightforward. The 
difficulty is that only observed data are available, and that the 
price and quantity distortions caused by monopolization are 
very difficult to measure. 
Moreover, it is often impossible to measure the degree of 
competitive behaviour. The abuse of a dominant market 
position might be associated with high market shares, high 
entry barriers, lack of price competition and any combination 
of high profits, poor efficiency or a low rate of technical 
progress, but none of these in itself necessarily indicates the 
existence or abuse of market power. Market failure is often 
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Law on Control of Total 
economic mergers 
competition 
l 5 l 
l 6 2 
6 3 3 
6 1 4 
1 8 5 
l 4 6 
6 2 7 
9 9 8 
9 lO 9 
l 7 9 
I I 10 11 
associated with high profits because of the theoretical link 
between monopolistic and profit-maximizing behaviour. In 
practice high profits are neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for identifying dominant firm abuse. High profits may 
be due to good competitive performance or simply good 
fortune, while low profits may merely disguise excess cost 
levels or lack of innovative activity and hidden monopoly 
abuse. The best reward for holding a dominant position might 
be the ability to live an easy life, undertaking the minimum of 
research and development and allowing costs to rise. On the 
other hand, a monopolist might be earning normal profits and 
could also be technically efficient, but in the absence of any 
competitive pressure from other firms, there would be no 
incentive to supply products to the specification required by 
consumers. Such a firm might not realize what true consumer 
preferences are, and incentives to undertake research and 
develop new products would be weakened in the absence of 
competition. 
On a macroeconomic level, a Jack of competition in an 
economy might be translated into a higher price level or lower 
output. However, these negative effects are broadly absent in 
the Netherlands, in contrast to other European countries with a 
weak competition policy, such as Sweden, Switzerland and 
Denmark. 1 In recent decades, the general growth and inflation 
performance of the Netherlands has been relatively 
satisfactory2 and does not seem to be a reason for concern on a 
OECD (1993), p. 57. 
See also Part I of this study (Recent developments and prospects). 
GRAPH 4: Composition of inflation, 1994 
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lack of competition. Although the contribution to inflation by 
the highly regulated sectors (housing, transport and 
communication) was very high in recent years, this was more 
the result of receding State intervention (lower subsidies) than 
an illustration of a lack of competition. A possible explanation 
for the absence of visible macroeconomic effects would be that 
the high degree of openness to international competition could 
have pushed Dutch companies to a more competitive conduct, 
despite the numerous restrictions and possibilities for collusive 
behaviour. It is also possible that the negative effect of too little 
competitive behaviour was compensated by other positive 
evolutions in the Dutch economy, such as the continued wage 
moderation. 
Since a lack of competitive behaviour is hard to detect on a 
macroeconomic level , a number of studies have recently been 
conducted to try to determine the degree of market inflexibility 
in various sectors. Van Bergeijk and Haffner ( 1993) used the 
'slowness indicator', based on the degree of price adjustment to 
changes in the degree of capacity utilization. In a competitive 
market, prices should adjust rapidly to changing demand and 
supply conditions, which are reflected in the degree of capacity 
utilization. They concluded that almost all Dutch product 
sectors lacked flexibility . However, Gradus (1993) pointed out 
' 
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that the slowness indicator is not relevant for sectors where 
price takership is the rule, since in this case the price evolution 
is independent of the degree of capacity utilization in the 
sector. Furthermore, there are other possible rationalizations 
besides a lack of competition to explain sticky prices. In 
another study, Thurik (1993) found no signs of inflexibility, 
measured by the extent companies can set prices above 
marginal costs (Lerner index), but this work was limited to the 
manufacturing sector. Studies using more indirect indicators 1 
were more successful in finding some evidence for inflexibility, 
particularly in the sheltered domestic sector. 
To assess the possible impact of a low degree of competition, 
Van Sinderen et al. ( 1994) constructed a general equilibrium 
model with variable degrees of competitive behaviour on both 
the product and labour market . A model version with an 
inflexible labour and product market proved to be the best 
representation of reality. By changing the parameters of the 
Van Ark et al. (I 993), Thurik (1994). 
67 
Annexes 
competitive behaviour, it was calculated that the average yearly 
growth of production in the Netherlands in the period 1984-90 
could have been 0,5 percentage point higher if product markets 
had been more flexible.' These calculations show that the 
economic cost of a lack of competition should be seen as a 
missed opportunity that could have had an additional beneficial 
influence on the already relatively satisfactory economic 
development. 
Although economic costs are hard to detect and some may even 
doubt their existence, the case for more flexible product 
markets stands because of the beneficial effects on the quality 
68 
The study also showed that employment would have grown 0,2 percentage 
points faster on average. According to other simulations, a more 
competitive labour market would not generate additional real growth, but 
employment would grow 0,9 percentage points faster. However, higher 
competition in both markets simultaneously would create a multiplicator 
effect that could result in an average I, I percentage point higher growth of 
both production and employment. which illustrates the importance of better 
functioning product markets to create employment. 
of life of the consumers. Because of the restricted shopping 
hours, the possibilities to go shopping during the working week 
are severely limited for the growing group of one-person 
households and households where both partners work. 
Therefore, their quality of life would be significantly improved 
if shopping hours were extended. Although the protection of 
product and service quality was one of the reasons to set up the 
Business Establishment Act and to put limitations on the 
number of similar shops in shopping centres, a relaxation of 
these regulations would probably be more important to promote 
quality since the competitive pressure will force the firms to 
pay more attention to quality and service. 
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Annex 2. Shocks to Dutch growth rate and interest rates - An empirical exploration 
1. Introduction 
This Annex begins by describing the behaviour of the Dutch 
term structure of interest rates since the beginning of the 1960s, 
and tests to what extent movements in the term structure 
comform to some of the time series implications of the 
expectations theory of the term structure. Within this context, it 
concludes that for the whole sample period there is a consistent 
co-movement between the long- and short-term interest rates, 
even though both the long and short rate appear to be 
nonstationary variables. If interpreted strictly within the 
confines provided by the expectations theory, this means, 
roughly, that arbitrage keeps these two rates together, and that 
there is not much room for manipulating the slope of the term 
structure of the interest rate curve, i.e. the spread by policy 
discretion or otherwise. The volatility of the term structure of 
interest does not, however, seem to have been constant through 
time, which suggests that some caution may have to be 
exercised when interpreting the results. In particular, it appears 
that there are important subperiods when the volatility of the 
short-term interest rate has increased considerably, and that this 
factor may explain the outcome that the Dutch term structure of 
interest rates does not comform that well to restrictions implied 
by the expectations hypothesis in these subperiods. Of course, 
important shocks, as such, to the Dutch term structure of 
interest rates, underlining important changes in the financial 
equilibrium of the economy, cannot be ruled out. One of these 
'shocks' - which has most probably come to play an 
important role in the Dutch economy - is the growing 
influence of Germany and German interest rates on the Dutch 
term structure of interest rates. The data show that the 
relationship between the Dutch and German interest rates is 
very tight, especially since the first half of the 19 80s. 
The Annex then continues to estimate the contribution of 
important German variables to the variability of the Dutch 
long-term interest rates. It uses variance decomposition 
methods to get an idea of the underlying shocks and their 
contribution to the Dutch long-term interest rates, so that a 
'graphical' comparison of the relative significance of the 
various factors can possibly be made. It turns out that German 
influence comes out fairly clearly in the variance 
decomposition of the Dutch long-term interest rates. 
Finally, the Annex looks at factors capable of contributing to 
the real growth of the Dutch economy. Co-integration analysis 
between the Dutch and German output growth and a measure 
of real interest rates results in an intuitively plausible long-run 
relationship between these variables. Variance decomposition 
techniques, with the three V AR variables, once again nicely 
complement the co-integration analysis. While real interest 
rates do effect Dutch real growth, the contribution from the 
German real growth must once again be emphasized. A closer 
look at the data suggests that both the nominal and real links 
between the Dutch and German economies are close indeed and 
that the convergence has gone very far. Annex 2 ends using 
non-parametric techniques to measure the symmetry of the 
shocks to the Dutch and German real economies. The graphical 
presentation of the results once again emphasizes the degree of 
real convergence materialized thus far in the Dutch economy. 
2. Interest rate determination 
The (rational) expectations theory of the term structure of 
interest rates, RETS, has become the workhorse for thinking 
about and studying the term structure of interest rates in an 
economy. 1 So the hypothesis not only has considerable 
theoretical appeal, but also seems to be the organizing principle 
in many practical (policy) discussions focusing on interest 
rates. In a general sense, RETS maintains that changes in the 
term structure of interest rates are driven or at least dominated 
by expectations effects. In a more specific form, it states that, at 
any time point, long-term interest rates are a weighted average 
of expected future short-term interest rates, so that, in effect, a 
rational present value formula can be applied to determine the 
yield on any long-term debt instrument in the economy. 
Furthermore, even allowing for the possibility of (time-
varying) risk premiums in the term structure of interest rates, 
sometimes argued to be too important in understanding 
movements in the term structure,2 one may be willing to 
preserve the interpretation that movements in the term structure 
are (mainly) caused by expectations effects. 
Often it is found that both the long- and short-term interest 
rates have long memories, meaning that the past, present and 
the future of these variables are highly correlated with each 
other. This implies that these variables are (at least, nearly) 
nonstationary, and changes in for instance long-term interest 
rates tend to have long-term effects on the level of the rate. 
RETS has implications for the comovement of jointly 
nonstationary variables, which are the result of the fact that the 
hypothesis can be equivalently represented as maintaining the 
spread, i.e. the difference between the long and short rate is a 
weighted average of expected changes of future short rates, 
which changes are stationary when the level of short rates is 
nonstationary. Hence, we should observe a stationary spread, 
although long and short rates are nonstationary. 
The actual dynamics of the spread reflect the underlying 
dynamic adjustment of long and short rates generated by 
arbitrage activities in the market; in general both the long and 
short rates change in response to changes in arbitrage 
The literature on RETS is huge, but an excellent and accessible survey on it 
is Shiller ( 1990). Lessons from the yield curve are nicely documented, on 
the other hand, in Campbell (1995). 
On an approach to modelling risk (and other) premiums empirically and 
evaluating their significance, see for instance Engle & Ng (1991). 
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opportunities, so that both of these rates are, in equilibrium, 
endogenously determined by arbitrage. An important question 
is, however, whether one of the rates (e.g. short rate) is in fact 
exogenously determined (e.g. by policy decisions). If this is the 
case, then the burden of adjustment in the term structure is 
shifted to those rates still endogenously adjusting to arbitrage. 
Hence, a set of empirical hypotheses about the Dutch term 
structure of interest rates will be tested using quarterly data 
from 1961: 1-1994: I on long- and short-term interest rates 
(yield on outstanding government bonds and three-month 
money market rate respectively). 1 It will be seen that the key 
implication, the spread being stationary, breaks down 
especially in the 1980s, the most plausible explanation being 
the growing influence of the German economy on the Dutch 
economy (not downplaying, of course, the effects due to the 
creation of the ERM in 1979, the changes in the US Central 
Bank's operating procedures in 1979 and increasing 
international mobility of capital as well improvements in the 
functioning of international financial markets). Estimates of the 
quantitative importance of the German interest rates to the 
corresponding Dutch rates after 1979 are thus provided. 
2.1. Non-stationary interest rates, stationary spread 
and growing German influence 
Table 1 presents results from unit root tests for the whole 
sample from 1961: 1-1994:4 and for the two subsamples 
1961: 1-1979:3 and 1979:4-1994:4. 2 The table is extended to 
include results for the Dutch and German industrial output and 
inflation respectively, since these will be needed later. The 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at conventional 
significance levels only in two cases (Dutch short rate and 
German industrial in the whole sample). 
In these particular cases the results are somewhat sensitive to 
the lag length, and, in the case of Dutch short rates, by 
increasing the lag length the maintained null of a unit root 
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. 
Furthermore, a closer look at the residuals from these tests 
reveals that some of the lags beyond four (which is the 
maintained number of lags) are significant, and that these 
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As noted by Engsted & Tanggaard ( 1995), the most efficient approach to 
testing these implications of the RETS takes all the yields of the whole 
yield curve and not just two of them. Such a data set was not, however, 
available in the present application. 
The exact cut-off of the whole sample is, of course, somewhat arbitrary, but 
1979:4 is chosen mainly for two reasons: the ERM was created in 1979 and 
there was a major change in the US Central Bank's operating procedures in 
October 1979. when it started to target monetary aggregates instead of 
continuing to pursue the policy of interest rate smoothing. More emphasis is 
put on the latter one. 
further lags either reduce the autocorrelation in or the 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. Hence, we tentatively do not 
reject the hypothesis that also the short rate has a unit root in its 
autoregressive polynomial in the whole sample. As regards 
German output, lags beyond four are clearly needed to filter out 
residual autocorrelation present in tests where the maintained 
null is that German output follows an AR(p) with pat most 4. 
In fact a unit root test based on eight lags seems to produce 
reasonable residuals. The numerical value of the ADF statistics 
for German output in Table 1 (-2,97) specifically refers to this 
case of maintained null of AR(p) with p = 8. Bearing this in 
mind and conditional on not rejecting the unit root in Dutch 
short-term interest rates the next hypothesis to be tested is that 
of co-integration between the Dutch long and short rate. The 
results are presented in Table 2. 
Clearly, in the whole sample, the evidence seems to favour the 
hypothesis that the spread is stationary, so that relative to the 
time span of the whole sample changes in the slope of the 
Dutch term structure of interest rate curve seem to have been 
transitory (stationary) or, to put it in more technical terms, 
mean reverting. One way to interpret this evidence is to strictly 
adhere to the expectations theory and note that under it, debt 
instruments of different maturities are 'perfect' substitutes so 
that differences in yields are arbitraged away in the market (by, 
Table 1 
Unit root (ADF) tests for the Dutch long and short rates as 
well as industrial output and inflation 
Period 
Variable 1961: 1-1994:4 1961:1-1979:3 
NLTIR 
NSTIR 
NEIOT 
NINFL 
GEIOT 
GINFL 
GLTIR 
-2,604 
-3,332 * 
-2,801 
-1,561 
-2.970 * 
Critical value, CV(5%) = -2,884 
CV( I%) = -3,482 
-1,544 
-2,790 
-2,129 
-1,937 
1979:4- 1994:4 
-2,251 
-2,004 
-2,868 
-1,201 
-1,353 
-2,252 
NL TIR = Dutch long rates, NSTIR = Dutch short rates, NEIOT = Dutch 
industrial output, GEIOT = German industrial output. NINFL = Dutch 
(consumer price) inflation, GINFL = German (consumer price) inflation. The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is based on four lags, and the number of 
lags k was chosen by the rule of thumb k = inl[4(T/l 00) 114 ) (int[ ) is the integer 
part of the argument [ )). Except for the Dutch short rates, German industrial 
output in the whole sample, and, perhaps, Dutch output in the latler subsample 
results are fairly robust to the choice of the lag length between 4 and 6 or 7. 
Critical value is the asymptotic critical value of the ADF test and * denotes 
significant at 5% level. 
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Table 2 
Test for the stationarity of the Dutch spread and exogeneity 
of the long rate 
Co-integration and exogeneity 
Period Unrestricted ci-vector Stationarity of exogeneity 
13 = <131, 132> x2(2) 
1961: 1-1994:4 
1961: 1-1979:3 
1979:4-1994:4 
(1, -0,9979)** 
(1, -1,0830)** 
No co-integration 
0,0091 (0,9954) 
0,5980 (0,7416) 
NB: 
**· 
Unrestricted ci-vector is the unrestricted co-integration vector 
estimated by the Johansen's ( 1991) ECM procedure. The first and 
second components of the vector correspond to short and long rates 
respectively. Stationarity and exogeneity test the joint null hypothesis 
of a stationary spread and exogeneity of long rates. The implied Wald 
statistic is distributed as x2 with two degrees of freedom. The numbers 
in parentheses in the third column are the marginal significance levels, 
i.e. perceived probabilities, under the null, of rejecting the correct 
null. 
Significant at I% level. 
typically, risk neutral investors). This implies that for instance a 
policy of changing the relative supplies of different debt 
instruments (along the term structure) cannot systematically 
'twist' the term structure of interest rates. 
The evidence tends to favour the stationarity of the spread also 
in the former subsample (1961: 1-1979:3), but it should be 
noted that the probable loss in finite sample efficiency of the 
test procedure, due mainly to the heteroscedasticity of the 
short-term interest rate process, should be felt more strongly in 
this subsample than in the whole sample, since there are fewer 
observations in the former. Further tests of the time series 
properties of the spread in this subsample reveal, however, that 
null of a unit root is decisively rejected and that the residuals 
from the unit root test have a flat spectrum (no autocorrelation), 
but are heteroscedastic (with possibly an ARCH structure) and 
leptokurtic. 
After 1979:3, however, the simple one-to-one relationship 
between the Dutch long and short rates breaks down. In this 
context, the evidence is decisive in the sense that cointegration 
of long and short rates (stationarity of the spread) does not re-
emerge by changing (within reasonable limits) the lag length of 
the time series model (V AR) used to test it or the length of the 
subsample. It just seems to be the case that the Dutch term 
structure of interest rates has undergone, since the beginning of 
the 1980s, a number of shocks with the end result that it is 
driven by factors other than or in addition to arbitrage in 
domestic financial markets. To check one such possibility, we 
take up the (growing) influence of the German term structure 
on the corresponding Dutch one. But before going into the 
details, note further that Table 2 suggests that the Dutch long-
Table 3 
Co-integration between the Dutch interest rate and corre-
sponding German rate and weak exogeneity of the German 
rate 
Interest rates 
(NL TIR, GL TIR) 
(NSTIR, GSTIR) 
Co-integration and stationarity 
Unrestricted ci-vector Exogeneity of GLTIR, x2(2) 
(1, -1,4750)* 
(1, -0,7074)** 
2,0599 (0,3570) 
3,9744 (0,1577) 
L TIR and STIR refer to long and short rates respectively; N: Netherlands, 
G: Germany. 
*(**):Significant at 5% (I%) level. 
term interest rates are exogenous to the 'equilibrium' 
relationship between the Dutch long and short rates. This 
suggests two things. Firstly, long-term interest rates may have 
been the main source of (exogenous) shocks to and, hence, of 
the non-stationary behaviour of the term structure of Dutch 
interest rates. Secondly, adjustment to shocks to the level of 
interest rates seems to have taken place mainly via changes in 
the short-term interest rates. Hence, in a sense, (temporary) 
changes in the slope of the term structure of Dutch interest rates 
directly indicate changes in (future) short rates. Long rates 
change indirectly via short rates, since the latter certainly help 
to forecast future long rates. 
Table 3 reports the results from the co-integration analysis 
between the Dutch and German long rates and short rates 
respectively. 1 Hence, Table 3 asks (as the null) whether the 
Dutch and German long rates (short rates) are co-integrated. It 
gives, first of all, the unrestricted estimate of the co-integration 
vector (first column) and, in the second column, results on the 
exogeneity of the corresponding German rate to this co-
integration or long-run 'equilibrium' relationship between the 
Dutch and corresponding German rate. In this latter test, a 
sequence of restrictions on the co-integration vector was 
imposed, in addition to the exogeneity of the German rate, 
mainly to see whether the joint hypothesis of a stationary 
interest rate differential and exogeneity of the corresponding 
German rate is rejected. 
In the case of short-term interest rates, the Wald test for 
exogeneity of the GSTIR is the joint hypothesis; the co-
integration vector is (I, -0,80) and GSTIR is weakly 
exogenous. The reason for this highly specific (and, admittedly, 
arbitrary) joint null is that the starting point was that the short 
Unit root tests for the German long and short rates are not reported, but, for 
the subsample 1979:3-1994:4, the null of a unit root could not be rejected in 
either of the cases. 
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differential is stationary and the German short rate exogenous. 
This was rejected at conventional significant levels. The 
restricted co-integration vector (1, -0,80) roughly represents 
that vector where the component corresponding to the German 
short rate (0,80) is as large as can be maintained under a non-
rejected joint null. 1 
As they stand the results are fairly encouraging and as one 
would have expected. The Dutch long rates are co-integrated 
with the corresponding German ones and, further more, the 
latter are weakly exogenous to the long-run 'equilibrium' 
relationship between the two rates. Moreover, according to the 
third column of Table 3, the restrictions on the co-integration 
vector implies that the long differential between the 
Netherlands and Germany is stationary,2 and that shocks to the 
level of German long-term interest rates are an important 
source of shocks to the level of Dutch long rates. As for the 
Dutch and German short-term interest rates, similar reasoning 
applies, but with the qualification that the short differential 
itself does not seem to be stationary. Formal unit root tests on 
the short differential also support this conclusion as does plain 
graphical analysis; the highly autocorrelated Dutch-German 
short-term interest rate differential reflects the fact that from 
1985 the Dutch short-term interest rates were persistently 
higher than the German ones up to the end of 1991; between 
1992:1 and 1993:4, after German unification, the German short 
rate was persistently higher than the Dutch one; finally, since 
the beginning of 1994 the short rates have been roughly 
equal.3.4 
Finally, the error-correction models implied by the (fourth-
order) V AR used in testing for co-integration between the 
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It should be noted that there need not exist any widely accepted formal 
theory of statistical inference sustaining such a sequential testing procedure. 
Nevertheless, the results are given in Table 3. 
If (uncovered) interest parity sufficiently accurately represents the open 
economy financial equilibrium in the Netherlands, then the results in Table 
3 are consistent with stationary(, zero-mean) expectations of the long-run 
rate of depreciation of the Dutch guilder. Note that this not only seems to 
suggest that the target-zone for the Dutch guilder is long-run credible, but 
also that (albeit small) persistent rates of changes of the guilder within the 
(narrow) band are excluded (on the decomposition of the expected rate of 
depreciation of a currency into expected rate of realignment and expected 
rate of depreciation within the band and suggestions for measuring the two 
components - see Bertola & Svensson ( 1990) and Lindberg et al. ( 1991 )). 
The period 1979:4-1984:4 is characterized by the high overall level and 
volatility of short-term interest rates, which necessarily qualifies any 
conclusion about the relative magnitudes of the two interest rates in this 
period. 
The exact nature of the joint hypothesis of restrictions on the co-integration 
vector and weak exogeneity of the German short rate varies somewhat 
according to the maintained lag length of the VAR. Most notably the 'non-
rejected' component of the co-integration vector associated with the 
German rate increases for shorter lag length, but remains 'significantly' 
below unity. This only strengthens the view that there have been 
quantitatively (perhaps also substantially) important deviations between the 
short rates. 
interest rates above in Table 3 most interestingly suggest that 
the adjustment of the Dutch short rates to shocks to the level of 
the German (and, hence, Dutch) short rates is relatively fast; 
60% of the adjustment takes place within one quarter. So the 
rate of convergence of the Dutch short rates towards the 
equilibrium relationship (as represented by the estimated co-
integration vector) is fairly high. Furthermore, the error-
correction model is capable of explaining on average 70% of 
the observed change in the Dutch short-term interest rates. The 
error-correction model for the Dutch long rates suggest, on the 
other hand, that about 15% of the adjustment in the long rates 
towards the equilibrium takes place within one quarter, and that 
the model is capable of explaining on average 80% of the 
observed change in the Dutch long rates. Hence, the rate of 
convergence of the Dutch long rates is considerably lower than 
of the Dutch short rates. 
In summary then, one particularly interesting interpretation of 
the expression Dutch term structure of interest rate over the 
period from 1961 to the present is that arbitrage by forward-
looking investors in the Dutch financial markets has kept the 
interest rates from not deviating too much from each other. The 
non-explosive behaviour of the Dutch spread can be interpreted 
as the result of this arbitrage behaviour. Furthermore, long rates 
seem to have the main driving force of the Dutch term 
structure, so that there seems to be non-trivial feedback from 
the dynamics of deviations from the term structure equilibrium, 
i.e. from the dynamics of the spread, to changes in the short-
term interest rates. Long rates respond more indirectly, to 
lagged changes in short rates and long rates themselves. The 
1980s seem to have witnessed a major change in the 
determinants of the Dutch term structure of interest rates; one 
possible source of growing influence is the German term 
structure.5 The evidence presented in this section indicates that 
the Dutch long and short rates and the corresponding German 
ones are closely related both in levels and changes. To further 
examine the effects of various factors to the variability of the 
Dutch long-term interest rates, the next section extends the 
previous analysis based on V ARs and presents, in graphical 
form, estimates of the decomposition of the forecast error 
variance of the Dutch long-term interest rates into the variance 
components associated with shocks to the underlying factors. 
Another, possibly highly relevant and certainly very interesting, 
interpretation of the idea of the Dutch term structure being driven by the 
German term strucuture is related to literature on perceived policy regimes 
and expected or perceived changes thereof (see especially Balduzzi et al. 
(1993) and McCallum (1994)); in the 1980s the Dutch authorities more 
consciously pursued a policy of pegging the guilder to the Deutschmark. As 
the very notion of expectations theory of the term structure suggests, such a 
policy rule should be an integral part of the modelling or an important 
determinant of the Dutch term structure (since the current term structure is 
conditional on future short rates, and hence on future monetary policy). 
Without explicitly incorporating such a rule into the model of the Dutch 
term structure, we take a short cut; we simply let the Dutch rates be 
determined by the corresponding German rates. 
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2.2. Variance decomposition of the Dutch long- and 
short-term interest rates 
This sec tion uses a V AR framework to determine a set of 
possible factors that could affect the variati~n in Dut~h long-
and short-term interest rates .• In the prev10us sect10n, we 
concluded that, since the beginning of the 1980s, the Dutch 
long rate has been relatively well explained by the 
corresponding German rates. A similar conclusion holds for the 
Dutch short-term interest rate; the major factor driving it is the 
German short rate. This section extends the previous one in that 
'the German influence' is expanded to include, in addition to 
German long rates, German short rates (3M), growth of 
industrial output (proxy for growth potential of the Dutch 
economy) and inflation rate, in the case of Dutch long rates, 
and German long and short rates, inflation and growth of 
industrial output in the case of Dutch short rates. An estimate 
of the effects these factors have on the variation of the Dutch 
Jong and short rates is presented in graphical form in Graphs la 
and lb. 
For a simi lar exerci se on US interest rates, see for instance Lee & Prasad 
( 1994). 
Indeed, variance decompositions based on a five-dimensional 
(and fourth-order) V AR estimated from 1979:4 to 1994:4 were 
used to further evaluate the degree of forecastability of the 
Dutch Jong-term interest rates. The V AR model ma~es it 
possible to decompose the forecast error over an arbitrary 
forecast horizon and to apportion the variance in the errors at 
any point among a set of explanatory factors . The k period-
ahead forecast error, i.e. the difference between the actual long-
term interest rate and V AR forecast as of k periods earlier, is 
attributable to unanticipated disturbances over the last k periods 
in all of the variables included in the VAR. Such a variance 
decomposition is useful in assessing the relative contribution of 
each factor, at a given forecast horizon, for explaining the 
forecast error in long-term interest rates. Consequently, the 
V AR framework can be used to determine a set of variables 
with the greatest potential for improving the forecasting 
properties of models of Jong-term interest rates.2 
The use of the VAR model in the pre se nt context raises an interes ting 
question related to non-stationarit ies on co-integration; the variables in the 
VAR seem to be non-stationary and , according to the result presented m the 
previous section, co-integration relationships may exist among the variables 
in th e VAR. In s uch a case the use of the unrestricte d V AR as the 
forecasting model may imply efficiency losses , s ince the information in the 
res trictions implied by co-integration are not used in the unrestricted V AR 
forecasts (see for instance Engle & Yoo (1991)). On an analysis ofa related 
problem within an explicit ly common tre nds framework (co- integrated 
system), see Blix ( 1995), and also Warne ( 1993). 
GRAPH la: Variance decomposition of the Dutch long-term interest rate 
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GRAPH lb: Variance decomposition of the Dutch short-term interest rate 
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Graph 1 seems to suggest that the influence of German long 
rates (GLTIR) on the variability of Dutch long rates is large; in 
fact (at least until the eighth quarter) their contribution may 
even be larger than that of the Dutch long rates (NL TIR). 1 In 
quantitative terms, the influence of the German long rates on 
the variability of the Dutch long rates seems to stabilize, after 
24 quarters (six years) at around 20%. Also the influence from 
German inflation2 (GINF) seems to rise considerably as the 
forecast horizon increases. In fact the influence from shocks on 
inflation seems to rise to as high as 30% over the 24-quarter 
forecast hori zon. This is well in accordance with Mi shkin 's 
( 1992) analysis of the va lidity of the Fisher hypothesis; 
empirical evidence finds no support for a short-run Fisher-
effect in which a change in expected inflation is associated with 
a change in interest rates, but supports the existence of a long-
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h should be noted that the contribu tion of various fac tors may depend on 
the order wh ich is used to decompose the vari ance. In Graph 2 the order is 
output (GEIOT). inOation (GINF). short rate (GSTIR), German long rate 
and Dutch long rate. The inOuence of the German long rate vis-a-l' is th e 
Dutch long rate is fairly robust across orderings; the influence of others vis-
ii -vis these long rates is more sensitive. 
Infl a ti on is measured as a four-quarter change in the CPI, i.e . as a 
pe rcen tage change in the quarterly CPI from the co rresponding quarter in 
the previous year. A qualitatively simi lar conclusion holds. if the Dutch 
inflation rate is used instead of the German one. 
run Fisher-effect in which inflati on and in terest rates have a 
common stochastic trend when they exhibit trends. Hence, real 
interest rates tend to correlate strongly with infl ation over the 
short run , but in the long run this corre lation van ishes so that 
the long-run nominal interest rate full y reflects the underlying 
inflation (expectations) resulting in a more stable real interest 
rate.3 It is an interesting fact that the variance decomposition of 
the Dutch short rates (Graph lb) also seems to support such an 
interpretation; the influence of inflation on the variab il ity of 
short-term interest rates is moderate. Though to a lesser extent, 
real growth also seems to contribute to the variab ility of 
nomin al long ra tes in the Netherlands; at maximum, the 
influence is 10-12%. An explanation for this contribution along 
the lines suggested by for in stance Lee & Prasad (p . 16), 
according to which this particular contribution may arise from 
it s effective ness as a proxy for the path of future monetary 
policy or for changes in inflationary expectations, is not fully 
convincing in the present context in that monetary policy in the 
Netherlands is tightly anc hored to maintaining the external 
value of the Dutch guilder in terms of the Deutschmark. A 
simpler explanatio n for the contributi on from the growth 
Abstracting. of course. from other poss ibl y important sources of ri sks li ke 
default ri sks and nontrivial liquid ity risks. 
Annex 2. Shocks to Dutch growth rate and interest rates - An empirical exploration 
variable argues that it is a proxy for 'the' real return in the 
economy. 1 On the other hand, the influence of real growth to 
the variability of short rates is relatively small; in fact most of 
the variability of the Dutch short-term interest rates is 
accounted for by the Dutch short-term interest rate itself, 
although the influence from the German short rate may amount 
to as high as 23%. Further, given the shape of the curve 
describing the contribution of the German short rate relative to 
the Dutch rate, one may perhaps conclude that this is mainly a 
reflection of the close link between monetary policies in 
Germany and the Netherlands (with Germany being the 
'leader'). 
3. Real shocks and real convergence 
Whereas the previous section analyses the determination of the 
term structure of interest rates in the Netherlands and, 
ultimately, the extent to which the term structure can be said to 
be determined by the German term structure, this section 
discusses the question of real convergence of the Dutch 
economy. Specifically we shall focus on two sets of questions; 
first of all, we shall construct nonparametric measures to 
evaluate the degree of symmetry of shocks to the Dutch and 
German output (and employment). Symmetry, or actually 
asymmetry, of these shocks is an extremely critical element 
when it comes to judging the need for exchange rate flexibility 
as an instrument for shock absorption under short-run nominal 
price stickiness. In fact, one of the basic propositions of the 
literature on optimal currency areas is that under short-run 
nominal wage stickiness, adjustment to asymmetric real 
demand shocks between regions takes place via employment 
variations unless sufficiently flexible exchange rates provide 
the needed buffer to counter these shocks.2 Secondly, we shall 
construct a small dynamic time series model (V AR) and 
present its long-run solution to explicitly account for the 
determinant of the Dutch output growth (or a proxy for it). A 
variance decomposition, similar to the one used in the previous 
section, complements the time series analysis in order to check 
for other possible factors capable of contributing to the 
variability of the Dutch output growth. 
This is most easily seen by noting that the nominal interest rate can be seen 
as the sum of two components, the expected real return on the underlying 
instrument (bond) and the expected (average) inflation rate (to the relevant 
maturity). The expected real return can, in turn, be seen as consisting of an 
expected safe real return, a possible default premium, a possible liquidity 
premium, and an inflation risk premium. In the case of the Netherlands, one 
can quite safely argue that at least the first and last premium, perhaps also 
the second one, is almost nonexistent at present. 
From the huge literature on optimal currency areas (OCAs), see the original 
contributions by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969); on 
the more recent literature, see Masson & Taylor ( 1992); for a formal model 
on OCAs, see Bayoumi ( 1994); for a critical analysis on OCAs, Bofinger 
(1994). 
3.1. Symmetry of shocks 
A simple non-parametric measure of the symmetry of shocks to 
the Dutch and German real economies builds on the variability 
of the difference and sum of those Dutch and German variables 
thought to represent the real economies. Graphs 2 and 3 present 
two such variability measures, 16-quarter moving standard 
deviations, based on two sets of real variables; Dutch and 
German industrial output (Graph 2) and employment (Graph 3). 
The reasoning behind these measures is the following; consider 
two 1fndom variables, X and Y, say, and denote their variances 
b2. u X and u 2 Y respectively, the covariance between them by 
u 
2
x,Yand, finally, the variance of their sum and difference by 
u 
2
x+ Y and u 2X-Y respectively. It is then well known that 
u X + Y = u 2 X + u 2 Y + 2u2 X, Y and u2 X - Y = u2 X + u2 Y -
2u2x, Y, from which it follows that the variance of the sum is 
larger (smaller) than the variance of the difference if the 
rafdom variables are positively (negatively) correlated, i.e. if 
u X. Y > 0 ( < 0). By their very nature, symmetric underlying 
shocks or factors driving both X and Y generate positive 
correlation between the two, whereas asymmetric shocks 
generate negative correlation between X and Y. 
Two things are immediately clear from the graphs; first, the 
volatilities are not time-invariant suggesting that the relative 
importance of symmetric shocks to the Dutch and German 
economies has varied during the course of the last 30 years. 
This does not go against the original reasoning, since, in 
general, observed shocks are combinations of symmetric and 
asymmetric shocks and the question at this general level boils 
down to the relative magnitude, in any given time span, of the 
symmetric shocks. Secondly, the variability of the sum of the 
(log industrial) outputs is generally higher than their difference. 
The same holds for (log industrial) employment. Hence, 
symmetric shocks to the Dutch and German output and 
employment have generally been the dominant source of 
variability. A further interesting observation from Graphs 2 and 
3 is the surprising stability of the (log of the) relative output 
level in the Netherlands, except, perhaps, immediately after the 
first oil-price crisis. Moreover, the variability of the Dutch 
employment relative to Germany halved in the first half of the 
1980s from the previous levels in the 1960s and 1970s and has 
retained its relative stability, except for shocks due to German 
unification and the subsequent recession in the world economy. 
3 .2. Dynamics of the Dutch real growth 
In order to be more specific about the importance of the 
German real growth to the Dutch economy, a three-
dimensional, fourth-order V AR (with the possibility of co-
integration) was used as a parametric workhorse to quantify the 
correlations of interest. The variables in the three-dimensional 
V AR were: growth of the Dutch and German (industrial) 
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GRAPH 2: Symmetry of shocks; variability of the difference and sum of outputs 
0,14 - ,--------------------------------------, 
0,12 
O,J 
0,08 
0,06 
0,04 
0 
1965 1970 
I 
1975 
Sum of (Jog) outpulS 
1980 1985 1990 
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Table 4 
Co-integration analysis between growth of Dutch and German output and real interest rate, 1961:1 -1994:4 
Null hypothe sis, r 
0 versus I 
I versus 2 
2 versus 3 
Trace tes t 
73,70** 
33,89** 
2,795 
Tes l type 
URE c i-vector 
(I , - 0,8383 , 0,4700) 
(0,1251 , 1, 0,4886) 
Restricted and exogeneity 
x2(4) 
2,823 (0,5479) 
Hypothesis, r signifies a null of r co-integration vectors against the alternati ve of r + I, r = 0, l , 2. 
••: Signi ficant at I% level. URE: Unrestricted co- integration vector, while the last column tests four restrictions imposed on the system; the composite null is that the 
co-integration space is spanned by the set of vectors {( I , - 1, 0,6), (0, I, 0,4)} and that the space of factor loadings is spanned by the set of vectors { ( I, 0, I), (0,8, 0,7, 
0.4)) , i.e. German output is not error-correcting with respect 10 the first co- integration vector. 
output as well as a measure of real interest rate. Since there 
seems to be no single, acceptable measure of the real interest 
rate, a couple of alternatives, ranging from a measure of long 
rea l rates to short ones, were ' tested' . It turned out that the 
short-term nominal money market interes t rates adjusted for 
inflation performed better than the other ones maintained, so 
thi s was the measure chosen. After not rejecting the null of unit 
root processes for the three variables, 1 a co-integration analysis 
was undertaken to see (a) the dimension of the co-integration 
space and (b) whether plausible restrictions, albeit ad hoe in 
A unit root in short-term rea l inte rest rates is consis tent with Mishkin ' s 
(1992) in that both nominal short-term interes t rates and inflation rate (of 
corresponding maturity) are unit rooters but not co-integrated. 
GRAPH 4: Growth of the Dutch industrial output 1961:1-94:4; actual and fitted 
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GRAPH 5: Variance decomposition of the Dutch industrial output 
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the present context, where no theoretical construct is presented 
to support them, of the co-integration space (and factor 
loadings), are supported by the data. The results are presented 
in Table 4. 
The results strongly suggest the existence of two co-integration 
vectors or lon g-run relationships between the Dutch and 
German growth rates and real interest rates. We shall focus on 
the first of these, i.e. on (1, -1, 0,6). 1 Hence, the results suggest 
that the long-run or 'steady-state ' relationship between the 
Dutch and German growth rates and real interest rates is given 
by 
Dutch growth rate - German growth rate + 0,6*[real interest 
rate] = 0. 
The implied error-correction model (not shown) is capable of 
explaining 50% of the observed changes in growth rate of the 
Dutch (industrial) output. Furthermore, Dutch output adjusts, 
according to the factor loading coefficient, at the rate of 20% 
per quarter to shocks to the above long-run equilibrium 
relationship, i.e. a fairly reasonable rate of convergence or 'rate 
of error-correction ' of Dutch output towards the above long-run 
82 
The o th er o ne. which describes th e long- run re lati ons hip between the 
German output and rea l interest rates, docs not perform as \Vei l as the fir st 
one. though the relati onship itself clearly is significant. 
relationship. Graph 4 gives an idea of the goodness-of-fit of the 
model; except for the end of 1960s, mid- I 970s and beginning 
of 1990s (German unificatio n shock) , the fit of the model is 
perhaps surprisingly good.~ 
To conclude this section, the results clearly complement those 
of the previous sect ion in that a major driving-force behind the 
Dutch real growth seems to be growth in Germany. To put the 
conclusion in these terms may substantiate the ear li er 
conclusion that, for a major part, the shocks to the Dutch and 
German economies are symmetri c. The contribution coming 
from the real interest rate variable , on the other hand, may 
explain at least part of the observed (time -)variability of the 
(log) difference of the (industrial) output alluded to earlier. 
Finally, just to look at the contributions of the components of 
the above three-dimensional VAR to the variability of the 
Dutch output, Graph 5 presents the variance decomposition of 
the Dutch output into it s components. As it s tand s, the 
contribution from the German output growth is, after six 
quarters, comparable to the Dutch output growth itself, whereas 
the real interest rate measure gai ns in importance as the 
forecast hori zon increases. 
To control for these la rge dev iatio ns. throu gh impul se dummies. docs no t 
qualitati ve ly change the resu lt as far as the co- integratio n space and fac tor 
loadings arc concerned. It mainl y affects the German eq uati on in the three-
dimensional VAR. 
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1. Introduction 
The Dutch financial sys tem, as compared with other continental 
countries, has for quite some time considerably built on is suing 
of shares as a means of providing company financing and share 
trading as fee business for the financial institutions involved. 
Furthermore the financing needs of the government provided 
the basis for an active bond market. Trading in Dutch securities 
has bee n tradi t ionall y concentrated on the floor of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange, one of the oldest exchanges in the 
world. 
During the past I O years the role of Amsterdam as a trading 
place in Dutch sec urities was increasingly challenged, in 
particular by competition from London trading facilities. 
The reasons for these challenges consist of a mix of general 
features facing a relatively small country in an international 
financial e nvironment of increased capital movement and 
competition on the one hand, and some factors specific to 
Du tc h fi nancial markets which translated into stronger 
competition from abroad than other comparable markets faced. 
Furthermore, with a relatively well-developed securities and 
derivatives trading culture, the Netherlands might be closer to 
certain saturation levels of activity in these segments. 
Annex 3. Reform of the securities markets 
After several years of de liberalization the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange reacted to this challenge by profoundly overhauling 
its trading system, in order to provide trading facilities 
designed particularly for large institutional traders and clients. 
These measures could not alleviate the mentioned structural 
di sadvantages as such, but rather tried to establish trading 
facilities which would retain Amsterdam 's competitiveness 
despite the fierce competition. 
The degree of success of these measures, to be eva luated over 
the coming years, will also give a more general indication of 
the likely structure of securities-trading in the European Union 
in the longer run , when financial integration and cross-border 
financing will further increase and reduce the remaining 
barriers between the EU Member States' financial markets. 
2. Market size 
Medium-sized exchange ... 
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE), the only Dutch 
exchange, is medium-sized by international standards: it is, in 
GRAPH 1: EU stock exchanges: Market capitalization, end 1994 
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terms of market capitalization or trading volume, far behind the 
three big European (London, Paris, Frankfurt) or other, 
overseas exchanges in North America and East Asia. 
In particular, relative to its domestic economy, Amsterdam is 
one of the leading 'second-tier' markets, in Europe along with 
Zurich and Milan (see Graph 1). Stock market capitalization 
shows Amsterdam as the fourth exchange in Europe. 
... with relatively low turnover 
However, trading activity on the Amsterdam Exchange, as 
compared to other exchanges in Europe, is smaller, not only 
smaller than on the three big markets but also smaller than in 
Italy or Spain. 
This demonstrates that market liquidity, measured by turnover 
per market capitalization, is much thinner in Amsterdam than 
on most other larger European exchanges. 
Bond trading growing faster 
The exchange trades a vast range of domestic and foreign 
securities. At the end of June 1994, 252 domestic and 215 
GRAPH 2: Amsterdam Stock Exchange: Turnover 
Billion HFl. 
1989 1990 1991 
Soun:,: De Ncderlandschc Banlc. ASE. 
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foreign companies had a share listing on the ASE. However. in 
particular during the past five years, bond trading was the solid 
basis of the ASE and accounted for around 70% of total 
turnover (see Graph 2). 
Domestic institutional and UK inv estors are particularly 
important in this segment; domestic retail investors amo unted 
in 1993 to just 6% of total turnover. 
Securities trading important business for 
larger banks 
Securities underwriting and trading plays a relatively large role 
for the domestic banks. Total non-interest income of Dutch 
banks amounted to 0,91 % of the average balance sheet size in 
1993. 1 This compares to just 0,67 % for German or 0,65 % for 
Belgian banks. 
It was in particular the few large comme rcial banks (ABN 
AMRO, Rabo, lnt. Ned. Bank) (see Table I) that played an 
important role. 
1992 
OECD - bank profitability. financial s tateme nts o f hanks. Thi s fi gures 
comprises all fee income. of whi ch sec uriti es business- related income plays 
a dominant ro le. 
1993 (994 j 1995 
Table 1 
Banks' net non-interest income (1993) (percentage of total 
balance sheet) 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Source: OECD. 
0,91 
0,65 
0,67 
0,50 
3. Structure of securities traded 
Trading concentrated on a small range of 
securities ... 
The Dutch securities markets are, as compared with other 
international markets, very highly concentrated on all levels: on 
the issuer side, the investor side and the trader side. This high 
Table 2 
Major Dutch shares: Market capitalization and turnover 
Market Market Turnover 
capitalization capitalization shares 
(% of total) ASE 
Royal Dutch Shell 109,4 32,2 34,6 
Unilever 36,0 10,6 19, 1 
ING 24,7 7,3 13,3 
ABN AMRO 21,0 6,2 13,6 
Robeco 14,5 4,3 1,8 
Polygram 13,9 4,1 3,0 
Philips 13,0 3,8 12,3 
Elsevier 11,9 3,5 8,6 
Aegon 10,8 3,2 5, 1 
Rorento 10,6 3,1 3,5 
Top5 205,6 60,6 82,3 
Top 10 265,8 78,3 114,8 
Total 339,4 100,0 246,3 
Source: ASE, EOE (European Options Exchange), own calculations. 
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concentration is due to certain structural features of Dutch 
financial markets and adds to their efficiency. However, this 
high concentration makes Amsterdam much more vulnerable to 
serious competition from larger markets abroad. 
... with heavy emphasis on a few blue chips ... 
The Dutch stock exchange is, compared with other 
international exchanges of similar size, very heavily 
concentrated on a few international stocks. The three largest 
shares, Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever and lnternationale 
Nederlanden Group (ING), account for around 50% of total 
stock market capitalization on the ASE, and for about 27% of 
the trading volume. 
The I O largest companies make up nearly 80% of total market 
capitalization of Dutch shares (see Table 2). 
... and government bonds 
The bond segment is completely dominated by trading in Dutch 
government bonds, accounting for 93% of total bond turnover 
and 70% for total securities turnover in 1993. Mostly traded 
(HFlbillion) 
Turnover Turnover/ Turnover Turnover 
shares market options EOE options/ 
ASE capitalization (underlying shares 
volume) EOEin % of 
ASE 
14,1 0,3 16,3 47,0 
7,8 0,5 11,1 58,0 
5,4 0,5 5,0 38,0 
5,5 0,7 4,3 32,0 
0,7 0,1 
1,2 0,2 0,2 5,0 
5,0 0,9 5,3 43,0 
3,5 0,7 1,4 16,0 
2,1 0,5 0,9 18,0 
1,4 0,3 
33,4 0,4 
46,6 0,4 
100,0 0,7 
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GRAPH 3: Stock exchanges: Price/earnings ratios 
(1989-94 highs and lows and 1994 value) 
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are JO-year bonds. Government bond trading has exploded over 
the recent years; from 1991 to 1993 it grew by not less than 
140%. However, government bond issuing and trading is 
typically low-fee business which cannot replace share trading 
neither for the exchange nor for the banks . 
Underrepresentation of industrial and financial 
compames ... 
The large weight of Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever gives the 
ASE a very distinct industry structure. Shares of the financial 
services sector, and of cyclical industrial and so-called 'growth ' 
stocks, are underrepresented. Basic producer goods stocks and 
consumer goods are overrepresented. 
... causes lower volatility and prices 
Consequently , Dutch shares are less cyclical than other 
European exchanges. This translates into a lower price-earnings 
ratio and normally lower vo la tility than on most other 
international exchanges. However, in the last two years, Dutch 
shares showed a higher degree of volatility than those on other 
European markets (see Graphs 3 and 4). 
90 
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4. Institutional investors 
Few dominant players on the Dutch fi nancial 
markets ... 
As on the supply side - the number of different availabl e 
securities - the demand for Dutc h shares is equall y 
concentrated on relatively few potential investors. The presence 
of large institutional investors on the finan cial markets o f the 
Netherlands is much more pronounced than in most other EU 
Member States (see Table 3). 
These are in particular large pension fund s,1 including the c ivil 
servants' Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP), and large 
insurance companies ,2 such as ING 3 or Aegon . 
Dutch company and public-seclo r old-age pens ion enti1lcmcn1 s arc . unli ke 
in other coumric,. ac !Ually fund ed and managed either by company or by 
sec1oral pension funds. 
Direc t pre mium in come o f Dut ch life insurance acco unted fo r 4.28% o f 
GDP in 1992. compared lo an EU average of just 3. 16%. 
More prec ise ly. thi s is a financial conglomerate consistin g of large ba nking 
and insurance operations. 
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GRAPH 4: Volatility of share prices, monthly values, moving averages 
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The combined balance sheet of Dutch institutional investors is, 
as a percentage of GDP (128,7% in 1992), much larger than 
that in other Member States or in the USA. 
.. . increasingly investing in securities 
Furthermore, these institutional investors have in the past 
considerably switched their portfolio structure away from direct 
loans into securiti es ' holdings. Thus, the amount of securities 
grew much faster than underlying asset volume (see Graph 5). 
Table 3 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
However, the proportion of securities held to total assets 
continues to amount to only around 30% (see Graph 6). 
Thus , Dutch institutional investors have recently been a main 
driving-force in the demand for Dutch securities. The bulk of 
these securities are invested in domestic securities, and in 
particular government bonds (around 30%). 
However, portfolios of domestic shares (around 25%) and 
foreign sec urities (around 33%) are also considerable and 
growing further, both absolutely and relatively (see Graph 5). 
Institutional investors: Balance sheet structure (as a % of GDP, 1992) 
Germany Spain France Italy Nether- Finland Sweden Japan USA 
lands (1991) 
Long-term loans 7,7 0,6 0,2 63,2 28,2 4,4 15,8 5,6 
Bonds 7,9 4,5 13,7 5,5 26,5 4,6 19,2 6,1 36,8 
Shares 3, l 0,9 6,4 2, 1 21,7 7,9 5,2 7,9 29,7 
Others 11 ,0 5,6 5,6 0,4 22,8 8,0 10,5 7,6 13,3 
Total 29,6 11 ,7 25 ,6 8,2 134,2 48,8 39,3 37,3 85 ,3 
Source: OECD, financial accounts; DG II. 
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GRAPH 5: Dutch institutional investors: Asset volume (1989 = 100) 
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GRAPH 6: Securities held by Dutch institutional investors (end 1994, in per cent of total securities) 
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24,491, 
Source: De Nederlandsche Banlc, own calculations. 
Government bonds 
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Box: The Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds 
The Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP) is the Dutch civil 
servants' pension fund. Its primary task is to provide, to its nearly 
one milli on affiliates , old-age, survivors, early retirement and 
invalidity pensions. 
Table 4 
Main figures on ABP 
1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (billion HFL) 171 ,2 177,16 185,23 
(% of GDP) 30,40 30,85 30,86 
Gross investment (billion HFL) 23,45 24,54 34,02 
Net investment( % of total 
supply on capital markets) 9,7 4,6 7,2 
Investment yield (billion HFL) 12,46 13,44 13,50 
(% of GDP) 2,21 2,34 2,25 
Source: ABP, De Nederlandsche Bank, own calculations. 
This large number of the affiliates makes ABP the largest biggest 
institutional investor on the Dutch capital markets, with around 26% 
of total assets of Dutch institutional investors. 
As funding of States' liabilities vis-a-vis pensioners is not the rule in 
other European countries, respective counterparts do not exist in 
Annex 3. Reform of the securities markets 
these other countries, and, consequently, ABP' s size makes this fund 
quite a unique player on the European capital markets. On the basis 
of these figures it is the largest pension fund and one of the top I 0 
overall institutional investors. 
ABP' s total invested assets amounted, at the end of 1993, to around 
HFL 177 billion. 
ABP has traditionally strongly invested in domestic fixed-income 
financial assets , mostly in loans, and increasingly in bonds. The 
most important debtor is the Dutch Government. 
Investment in foreign securities is at present quite low (see Graph 6). 
Foreign securities accounted, at the end of 1993, only for little more 
than 5% of total investment, as compared to around 18% of total 
industry average (without ABP). Of these ABP foreign securities, 
most are shares, allocated in Europe and in the USA (each around 
40%), and Japan. 
Privatization will affect asset allocation ... 
At present, ABP is a separate and independent fund, but continues to 
be in public ownership and under public control with special rules. 
In February 1993 the government took the decision to fully privatize 
ABP, and to submit it to existing regulations' governing other Dutch 
pension funds . This decision will be effective from 1 January 1996. 
This privatization will mean that present restrictions on the asset 
allocation within ABP will cease to exist. In particular, the 
restrictions on investment in shares and in foreign securities will 
cease to exist. 
Pensioen- en Spaarfondsenwet (Pension Fund and Savings Fund Act). 
GRAPH 7: ABP, asset allocation (in per cent of total assets (1993)) 
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ABP has announced its intention to change its geographical mix of 
share holdings. For this reason it intends' to invest around two 
thirds in foreign and one third in Dutch shares in the coming years. 
... and increase holdings especially in 
foreign securities 
Were ABP to change its asset allocation structure after its 
privatization and adjust it to the present industry average, then quite 
large volumes of financial assets would have to be reallocated. In 
As indicated in its 1993 annual report. 
5. Foreign investors increasingly dominating 
Fast growth ... 
As the Dutch economy and financial markets have traditionally 
been very open and relatively small, foreign demand is strong 
on Dutch securities markets, and has further grown in recent 
years. 
... fuelled by institutional investors and 
tax-avoiders ... 
Major international investors in Dutch shares mainly come 
from the USA and the UK, foreign investors in Dutch bonds 
from Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland (see Graph 8). 
These are mostly large foreign institutional investors and tax-
evading Dutch residents investing via Belgium and 
Luxembourg. 
... increasing competitive pressure on 
Dutch securities markets 
In 1993 trading in bonds originated for more than two thirds 
already abroad, in shares for more than 55%. 1 Such a share of 
foreign investors is much higher than on average in the 
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Respective shares in gross turnover of these securities on the ASE. The 
effective net purchases of Dutch securities are different from shown, 
particularly for foreigners there are large swings; after three years of net 
selling (1990-92: HFL-10 billion), in 1993 foreigners were strong net 
purchasers (HFL + 6,4 billion) of Dutch shares; net demand for Dutch 
bonds increased sharply in 1993 (to HFL 16,6 billion) from the previous 
year's level (HR. 9,9 billion). 
particular, the increase of foreign securities to industry standards2 
would mean that ABP would be a net buyer of foreign shares and 
bonds to the value of more than HFL 21 billion. Domestic securities 
would, although to a lesser extent, be added to the ABP portfolio. 
This reallocation would be exclusively at the expense of loans to the 
Dutch Government. If ABP had invested less in government 
securities (especially direct loans to government, of which it has 
around 64% amongst Dutch institutional investors), as the average of 
other Dutch institutional investors, it would have released HFL 42 
billion from its portfolio. 
This is a conservative estimate, as over the next few years, the share of 
foreign securities held by Dutch institutional investors is expected to 
increase further. 
international markets. The amount of foreign-owned Dutch 
securities has strongly increased over the past few years, and 
with it the potential competition from exchanges abroad, as 
more often these investors tend to enter into transactions on 
their home market, if possible. 
6. International competition 
London as the viable alternative for 
Dutch securities trading ... 
Foreign competition for trading in Dutch securities has been 
strong and growing over the past few years, adding to the 
competitive pressure on Amsterdam's securities market. This is 
mostly due to a combination of the structural features 
mentioned: 
• The heavy focus on a few internationally traded blue chips 
made the Dutch securities exchange particularly vulnerable 
to foreign competition, as trading in foreign shares in 
London concentrates on the few internationally traded and 
liquid stocks. Thus, a good deal of trading in these big 
international companies did actually move abroad, 
particularly to London's SEAQ (Stock Exchange automatic 
quote system) and to a minor degree to Frankfurt. This is 
also reflected in the balance of payments where gross (sales 
and repurchases) securities transactions in Dutch shares 
with the UK amounted for more than 550% in Dutch 
securities with abroad in the recent years. 
• The high concentration on the demand side, within large 
domestic institutional investors and large foreign investors, 
has let the market move easily to places where the trading 
structure best matched their interest. 
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GRAPH 8: Foreign holdings of Dutch securities 
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The spec ifi cs of market organization on the ASE also 
contributed to its eroding market share: Trading on the ASE 
used to be only order-driven; 1 however, trading of large 
vo lumes (particularly between institutional inve stors) 
prompted quote-driven trading , where those market 
participants could enter their ask and bid prices and look for 
a counterparty willing to contract within this offered spread. 
Figures about trading on different exchanges have not been 
consistent, but it seems that before the changes on share trading 
on the ASE were implemented, SEAQ's share of trading in 
Dutch stocks was around 36% in 1992 and 31 % in 1993.2 
... with additional competition in the future 
Further growing competition could in the future stem from the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) . At the moment seven 
companies are traded on the NYSE, some of them only in the 
form of American depository rights (ADR). However, the 
NYSE has an nounced plans to increase the number of Dutch 
Market-clearing through ihe mn1ching of orders fo r purchases and sales at a 
derived markei-c learing price. 
According to other estimates arou nd 45 % of share transactions and 80% of 
bond transaclions were completed via SEAQ. 
Ti? 
.... ·.· : 
.-.·.· 
urn 
•:;::::: 
.:. -~: ~:~ 
B L Other EU CH Other 
shares on its exchange, and out of a list of around 20 to 30 
company shares, at least five should be introduced in New York 
over the next two to three years. 
7. Derivatives trading 
Long-established exchange ... 
Derivatives have for a relatively long time been traded on the 
European Options Exchange (EOE), which still is one of the 
largest European markets for stock options. In 1993, of the total 
I 3,5 million contracts traded , more than 90 % were directly 
options or futures contracts on Dutch individual shares (nearly 
60) or indices (EOE index). 
Trading in interest rate derivatives3 does not play a major role 
on the ASE. The high correlation between Dutch and German 
interest rates and the existence of efficient derivatives markets 
for the latter prevents the emergence of a liquid corresponding 
T ypicall y government bond and gove rnme nt note futures con tracts and 
options on these futures contracts. 
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GRAPH 9: European Options Exchange, number of contracts traded 
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1986 1987 1988 
European Options Exchange: Contracts traded 
( i11 % of to tal ) 
1992 1993 1994 
Stock options 60,5 59,5 57,9 
Stock index options 26,2 23 23,7 
Other options 
(currencies , bonds, metals) 8,2 10,4 10,2 
Stock index futures 4 ,8 6,4 8,0 
Other futures 0,3 0,7 0,2 
Total 100 100 100 
Total in million contracts L 1,26 13,51 13 ,72 
Source: EOE. 
market in Dutch interest rate derivatives . Unlike other large 
derivatives markets, such as LIFFE (London) , DTB (Frankfurt) 
or MATIF (Paris), the Amsterdam market is mainly based on 
trading in stock options. 
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. .. growing relatively slowly 
The development of the European Options Exchange has been 
in some contrast to the development of the cash market on the 
ASE . The past years were marked by con siderable gro wth of 
turnover on thi s exchange. The general world -wide trend to 
trading in derivati ves might have added to this picture, as well 
as the lack of direct foreign competition , and an advanced and 
efficient trading system on the EOE, which combined computer 
trading with floor trading. 
The result of th ese factors is that trading in stoc k optio ns 
(amount of underlying volume) has reached about 30-50% of 
the respecti ve volume on the ASE for the major international 
shares. For all EOE-noted shares thi s ratio to trading volume on 
the ASE reached 32% in 1993. 1 
How ever, the increase in tradin g vo lume on the EOE has 
clearly lacked the momentum experi enced on the other major 
This is muc h hi gher fo r the ' blue c hi ps ' , e .g . Ro yal Dutc h Shell : 47 %, 
Unilever: 58%. Philips: 43%. 
European derivatives markets. Whereas on markets such as 
DTB, LIFFE or MATIF, overall volume has already been 
considerably higher than on the EOE, 1 growth rates in trading 
continue to exceed those experienced high compared to trading 
on the ASE which seems to have reached a certain level. Thus, 
in relative terms the ASE is running the risk of losing influence 
on European derivatives trading. 
It might even be conceivable that trading in Dutch interest or 
stock index derivatives eventually switches to a larger market 
at a later stage, leaving Amsterdam with the relatively less 
dynamic segment of options on individual Dutch stocks. 
8. Measures for reform 
This combination of heavy concentration on a few 
internationally traded securities, together with an 
extraordinarily strong influence of foreign and domestic 
institutional investors, facilitated the migration of trading 
securities to larger exchanges abroad. 
The perception has grown in the Amsterdam financial 
community that without significant changes in the organization 
of stock-trading, institutional investors will continue to leave 
the ASE and thus erode the core of the Amsterdam financial 
centre. 
Consequently, with the support of the overwhelming majority 
of the financial community, significant changes took place in 
1993 and 1994: 
Modernization of the bond market ... 
Early in 1994, on the bond trading side, the 'Amsterdam 
treasury bond market' (A TM) was opened to foreign-based 
brokers. Thus, 16 foreign-based banks established electronic 
links with the ASE through ATM and can fully participate in 
the market. Market presence has been fully separated from 
physical presence. Furthermore, the uniform market was split 
up into a wholesale segment and a retail segment. Trading in 
the wholesale sector is quote-driven, as on SEAQ, while the 
retail sector remains order-driven. 
In terms of number of contracts traded in 1994, LIFFE is about 11 times 
larger, MATIF about eight times and DTB about four times. Growth rates 
1990-94: LIFFE: 303%, MATIF: 151 %, DTB: 293% and EOEjust about 
25%. 
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... later followed by an overhaul of equity trading ... 
This step was extended to the whole exchange later that year: 
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange introduced further sweeping 
reforms of its trading system by 30 September 1994. As from 
this date, stock trading and non-government bond trading is 
divided equally into two distinct segments, one for wholesale 
and another for retail business. 
The retail segment will build on the former general system of 
an order-driven floor screen, where the respective floor brokers 
attempt to match the client orders by setting the market-
clearing price for the security. Market makers ('hoekman') are 
responsible for maintaining an orderly market. 
The new element is the wholesale market segment. It is fully 
computerized and based on two systems: 
1. The automatic interprofessional dealing system Amsterdam 
(AIDA) serves as an order-driven system for dealer-to-
dealer transactions, meaning the inner core of the 
professional market, allowing qualified participants 
('hoekman', stockbrokers, clearing members) to enter into 
arbitrage transactions or book-balancing operations in a 
very efficient way. In practice, only the most active shares 
and bonds are executed via AIDA. Participants remain 
anonymous when entering into transactions. 
2. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange trading system (ASSET) 
is a fully screen-based offer display system. It is open to 
non-dealers as well, as it allows the dealers to look via this 
system for clients and make the deals. This system is 
quote-driven, i.e. it starts from a certain asking and offering 
price for a security, and looks for clients willing to enter 
into a transaction at this price. Again, quotes via ASSET 
are only given by market makers for a few very liquid 
stocks. 
The latter system only covers a small list of internationally 
traded government bonds and stocks, which account for the 
vast majority of deals in Dutch securities. 
This introduction of a separate wholesale market with new and 
distinct trading systems and trading rules is meant to challenge 
the role of the international segment of London's SEAQ which 
had attracted an increasing share of Dutch securities' trading. 
This reform demonstrates the determination of the participants 
in the Amsterdam financial markets to fight the erosion of 
Amsterdam as a financial centre. It is certainly a useful step 
towards keeping wholesale business in the Netherlands and it 
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will end the situation where SEAQ was the only market ready 
for wholesale transactions in Dutch securities. 
As a further step, ASE is seeking official recognition as an 
organized exchange in the neighbouring countries the UK, 
France, Germany and Belgium. When this recognition is 
granted, ASE intends to place screens in these countries, with 
which foreign participants can place orders directly with the 
exchange. This should further enhance turnover on the 
exchange. 
Furthei:more, in June the settlement period for bonds and 
equities settled through the Amsterdam Effectenclearing will be 
reduced from seven calendar days to three business days (T+3), 
in line with recommendations from international bodies. 1 
The separation of trading into a wholesale and retail segment 
left the latter basically unchanged, when compared with the 
previous general system. As an attempt to also improve trading 
conditions in this segment, ASE decided to start, in the summer 
of 1995, with the publication of 'best-bid' and 'best-ask' prices 
and trading volume also in this area, in order to make the retail 
sector more transparent and efficient. However, this innovation 
will make the linking of information transmission companies 
(for example Reuters, Telerate, Bloomberg) with the exchange 
necessary. 
... and some progress in derivatives trading 
The European Options Exchange (EOE) has independent plans 
to boost trading on its exchange. At present, EOE members 
have to channel all their trades via the exchange. Thus 'off-the-
floor' transactions are forbidden by this group. However this 
rule should be repealed and such off-the-floor transactions 
should even be allowed to be settled via the exchange 
settlement system. The EOE hopes to keep at least this 
settlement business linked to the increasing number of over-
the-counter transactions and to maintain the floor also as the 
reference for over-the-counter business between large 
institutional investors. 
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Such as, in 1989, the Group of Thirty or the International Federation of 
Stock Exchanges and the ISMA. 
9. Preliminary results and outlook 
Amsterdam has considerably modernized its securities markets 
and done most of what is under its control to stay competitive 
and remain a big player in international securities trading. 
Whether the reforms are able to stop, or even turn around. the 
continuing erosion of market share of ASE will have to be seen 
and will partly depend on the respective overall trading costs 
and the progress of eventual supporting reforms in Amsterdam. 
such as the integration of the cash and derivatives market. The 
French and German markets, although with a considerably 
larger domestic client basis, have in the past succeeded with 
similar reforms in reversing market share losses to London. 
According to preliminary figures provided by NatWest~ ASE 
was successful in winning back some market share. Between 
October 1994 (when the reforms became effective) and January 
1995, SEAQ's market share in trading Dutch shares dropped to 
28-31 %, from a range of 33-39% in the same period the 
previous year. 
However, the Dutch secunt1es markets will most likely 
continue to pay a price for ( l) their high concentration of 
effectively traded securities and investors, and (2) the fact that 
securities trading in Europe tends to start concentrating on a 
few big and thus liquid markets, considerably bigger than 
Amsterdam could possibly ever be . 
Two possible developments might pose further challenges to 
the Amsterdam financial community; the overcoming of some 
remaining inefficiencies in securities trading and settlement of 
its major competitors, and the introduction of a single currency, 
which would most likely enhance the concentration of at least 
bond trading on two or three European major markets. 
Thus, in the longer term, Amsterdam will probably 
complement its strategy of modernizing its market structures 
with focusing on certain European market niches and building 
on the underlying strength of its financial markets beyond 
securities trading. 
Het Financieele Dagblad, 22 February 1995, p. I. 
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Table 1 
Main economic indicators, 1961-951 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1961-73 1974-86 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
I. Gross domestic product 
at current market prices 11,2 7, 1 0,7 3,8 6,0 6,5 5,0 3,8 2,0 4,7 5,5 
at 1985 market prices 4,8 1,9 1,2 2,6 4,7 4,1 2,3 1,3 0,3 2,5 3,2 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at 
1985 prices 
total 5,3 0,3 0,9 4,5 4,9 1,6 0,2 1,1 -2,2 2,4 6,9 
construction -1,2 2,0 9,5 2,3 0,0 0,0 1,9 -3,2 3,7 4,6 
equipment 2,9 0,4 -2,5 7,9 3,7 0,6 0,4 -1,0 0,9 9,9 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at 
current prices(% of GDP) 
total 25,7 20,5 20,8 21,3 21,5 20,9 20,4 20,3 19,7 19,6 20,2 
general government 3,4 2,6 2,7 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 
other sectors 17, 1 18,2 18,6 18,9 18,3 17,7 17,6 17,0 16,9 17,5 
4. Final national uses including stocks 
at 1985 prices 4,9 1,6 1,4 1,8 4,6 3,5 1,8 1,2 -0,5 2,1 3,4 
relative against 19 competitors 0,2 -0,3 -2,0 -2,6 1,2 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,8 -0,3 0,7 
relative against other member countries 0,3 -0,1 -2,0 -2,7 1,1 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,6 -0,1 0,7 
5. Inflation 
price deft a tor pri vale consumption 5,0 5,3 0,2 0,5 1,2 2,2 3,2 3,0 2,1 2,2 1,8 
price deflator GDP 6,0 5,1 -0,5 1,2 1,2 2,3 2,7 2,6 1,6 2,1 2,2 
6. Compensation per employee 
nominal 11,4 6,3 1,4 0,9 0,7 3,2 4,5 4,8 3,3 1,9 2,3 
real, deflator private consumption 6,0 1,0 1,2 0,3 -0,5 1,0 1,2 1,7 1,2 -0,2 0,6 
real, deflator GDP 5,0 I, 1 2,0 -0,3 -0,5 0,9 1,7 2,2 1,6 -0,2 0,2 
7. GDP at 1985 market prices per 
person employed 3,9 1,9 -0,5 1,0 2,7 1,7 0,9 0,4 0,5 2,5 2,0 
8. Real unit labour costs 
1961-73 = 100 100,0 102,0 96,7 95,4 92,4 91,7 92,4 94,1 95,2 92,6 91,0 
annual % change 1,0 -0,8 2,5 -1,3 -3,1 -0,8 0,8 1,8 1,2 -2,7 -1,8 
9. Relative unit labour costs 
in common currency 
against 19 competitors 
1961-73 = 100 100,0 115,4 107,5 104,6 98,4 98,8 96,9 100,1 103,4 103,1 106,6 
annual % change 2,9 -0,9 4,0 -2,7 -5,9 0,4 -1,9 3,2 3,3 -0,3 3,4 
against other member countries 
1961-73 = 100 100,0 115,3 107,8 105,3 99,6 97,4 96,0 98,4 104,2 104,4 107,4 
annual % change 2,7 -0,7 2,3 -2,4 -5,4 -2,2 -1,4 2,5 5,9 0,2 2,9 
10. Employment 0,9 0,0 1,7 1,6 1,9 2,3 1,3 0,9 -0,1 0,0 1,3 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 1,1 7,2 8,1 7,6 6,9 6,2 5,8 5,6 6,6 7,0 6,9 
12. Current balance(% of GDP) 0,5 2,0 1,9 2,8 3,5 3,8 3,5 3, 1 3,7 4,6 4,7 
13. Net lending (+)or net borrowing (-) 
of general government(% of GDP) -0,8 -4,0 -5,9 -4,6 -4,7 -5,1 -2,9 -3,9 -3,3 -3,1 -3,2 
14. General government gross debt 
(end of period; % of GDP) 
Maastricht definition 39,3 73,5 76,1 79,2 79,2 78,8 78,9 79,9 81,4 78,1 78, 1 
15. Interest payments by general 
government(% of GDP) 4,3 6,4 6,3 6,0 6,0 6,2 6,3 6,5 6,0 5,8 
16. Money supply (end of year)2 10,3 8,3 4,1 9,8 12,0 7,7 5,2 6,3 7,7 -0,3 
17. Long-term interest rate(%) 5,9 9,2 6,4 6,3 7,2 9,0 8,7 8, 1 6,7 7,2 7,5 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 100,0 76,7 77,3 78,7 85,0 87,9 86,5 82,3 78,5 83,7 88,2 
1 1961-93: Eurostat and Commission services; 1994-95: Economic forecasts spring 1995. 
'M3. 
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Table 2 
Gross domestic product: GDP and its demand components at constant market prices•(% change over previous year) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Private consumption -1,4 0,7 0,8 2,4 2,6 2,7 0,8 3,5 4,2 3,1 2,6 0,7 1,5 2,3 
Public consumption 0,4 1,0 -0,8 1,3 3,6 2,6 1,4 1,5 1,6 1,5 1,3 0, 1 1,0 1,8 
Gross fixed capital formation -4,3 1,9 5,2 6,7 6,9 0,9 4,5 4,9 1,6 0,2 1,1 -2,2 2,4 6,9 
of which: equipment -0,3 9,8 8,8 15,5 8,8 0,4 -2,5 7,9 3,7 0,6 0,4 -1,0 0,9 9,9 
residential construction 4,2 1,6 11,3 0,7 -2,5 -5,4 3,9 -0,5 8,0 5,8 
Stockbuilding (% of GDP) 0,8 0,6 0,3 0,1 0,2 -0,9 0,2 1,0 0,2 0,3 -0,8 -0,5 0,4 0,2 
Total domestic demand -0,6 2,3 3,8 4,0 3,0 2,1 4,2 5,4 4, 1 2,9 1,8 0,3 3,5 4,1 
Exports of goods and services -0,3 3,3 7,2 5,3 1,8 3,6 9,0 6,7 5,3 4,7 2,8 1,7 5,9 5,2 
Imports of goods and services 1,1 3,9 5,0 6,5 3,5 4,2 7,6 6,7 4,2 4, 1 2,7 0,2 5,6 5,8 
GDP -1,4 1,4 3,1 2,6 2,7 1,2 2,6 4,7 4,1 2,3 1,3 0,3 2,5 3,2 
I 1990 prices. 
I 994 and 1995: Commission services forecasts spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 3 
Wages, productivity and terms of trade(% change over previous year) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Nominal wages per employee 5,8 3,2 0,2 1,4 2,1 1,4 0,9 0,7 3,2 4,5 4,8 3,3 1,9 2,3 
Private consumption prices 5,5 2,9 2,2 2,2 0,3 0,2 0,5 1,2 2,2 3,2 3,0 2,1 2,2 1,8 
Real wages (deflated by private 
consumption prices) 0,2 0,2 -1,9 -0,8 1,8 1,2 0,3 -0,5 1,0 1,2 1,7 1,2 -0,2 0,6 
Productivity (real GDP/person 
employed) 1,1 3,3 3,2 1,0 0,7 -0,5 1,0 2,7 1,7 0,9 0,4 0,5 2,5 2,0 
Unit labour costs, whole 
economy -1,3 -2,0 -4,6 -1,4 1,3 2,5 -1,3 -3,l -0,8 0,8 1,8 1,2 -2,7 -1,8 
Terms of trade (goods and 
services) 2,8 -0,3 -0,2 0,2 1,2 -1,7 1,0 -0,3 0,5 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 0,4 1,0 
Adjusted wage share -0,9 -1,3 -2,9 -0,9 0,8 1,5 -0,8 -1,9 -0,5 0,5 1,1 0,7 -1,6 -1,0 
I 994 and 1995: Commission services forecast spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 4 
Contributions to the change of the deftator of final uses 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Import prices 0,5 0,1 1,9 0,4 -6,0 -1,0 -0,1 1,6 -0,4 0,1 -0,7 -0,9 0,2 -0,2 
of which: exchange rate 1 -1,5 -0,7 0,6 0,0 -2,7 -1,6 0,2 0,4 -1,3 0,3 -0,8 -0,8 -0,1 -1,4 
Unit labour costs -0,6 -1,3 -2,1 -1,1 -0,7 -0,3 -0,7 -1,6 -1,1 -0,4 0,2 0,1 -0,2 -0,4 
Net indirect taxes 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 -0,1 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 
Gross operating surplus2 1,9 1,2 2,4 0,9 -0,8 -1,1 0,7 1,6 0,6 0,3 -0,5 -0,4 1,2 0,7 
Total: deflator of final uses, 
% change 4,4 1,4 3,2 1,6 -5,9 -1,3 0,7 2,4 1,1 1,9 1,0 0,2 1,6 1,2 
1 Influence of changes in the nominal effective exchange rate vis-a-vis 19 partners, double weighted for exports. 
2 Enterprises profits and income of the self-employed. 
1994 and 1995: Commission services forecast spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table S 
Saving and investment in some EC countries (1993, as a % of GDP) 
Pri vale sector Private sector Difference Public Public 
saving investment sector saving sector investment 
Belgium 27,1 16,3 10,8 -4,8 1,5 
West Germany 19,6 17,1 2,5 0,8 2,2 
France 20,8 15,2 5,6 -2,6 3,4 
Italy 23,7 14,4 9,3 -5,7 2,6 
Netherlands 23,3 17,0 6,3 -0,1 2,7 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 6 
Balance of payments (as a % of GDP) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
1. Current account 
on transaction basis 2, 1 3,3 3,0 3,9 4,0 2,8 1,5 2.3 3,6 3,7 2,7 2.3 3.3 
2. Trade balance 2,6 3,4 3,2 4,3 4,2 4,0 2.4 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 4.2 
of which: energy balance -1,3 -0,8 -0,8 -0,7 0,2 1,4 -0.1 -0,4 -0,5 -0.2 0.2 -0.0 
3. Services 0,8 0,9 0,5 0,6 0,4 -0,3 0,1 -0,1 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 
4. Factor income -0,4 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 0,2 0,0 -0,1 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.0 0.5 
5. Transfers -1,0 -0,9 -0,7 -0,8 -0,8 -0,9 -0.9 -0.8 -0,8 -1.0 -1.4 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 
6. Current account 
on cash basis 1,5 2,9 2,0 3,1 3,3 2,4 1.0 0.8 2.6 2.6 1.5 1.8 3.5 2.5 
7. Capital movements -1,6 -2,7 -1,4 -2,9 -2,4 -5,2 -0.8 0,5 3,4 -1,7 -2,1 -6.6 -2.3 -4.9 
8. Capital transfers -0,2 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 -0,0 -0,] -0.1 -0,1 -0,2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
9. Long-term capital, 
non-banking private sector -0,7 -1,5 -0,7 -2,2 -1,5 -3,7 -0,3 1.7 3,2 -2,0 -1,7 -5.1 -1.2 -5.8 
10. Short-term capital, non-
banking private sector -0,3 -0,9 -0,5 -0,4 -0,7 -1,0 -0.3 -0.8 0,5 0,6 -0.3 -I. I -0.8 0.8 
11. Public sector -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 -0,2 -0,1 -0,3 -0,2 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 0,0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 
12. Other 0,2 -0,1 0, I 0,3 0,0 -0,8 0,5 -0.5 0,5 -0,3 0,6 2.7 2.5 -0.4 
13. Non-monetary operations 0,0 0, 1 0,8 0,4 1,0 -3,6 0.7 0,8 6.5 0,7 0,1 -2.0 3.7 -2.8 
14. Banking sector -0,6 1,1 -0.9 -0,5 -0,5 3,4 0,7 -0.1 -6.3 -0,6 -0,0 3.9 -1.6 2.9 
15. Change in official 
reserves 1 -0,5 1,3 -0,l -0,0 0,5 -0.2 1.3 0,7 0,2 0,1 0.0 1.9 2.2 0. I 
1 increase = + . 
Source: De Ncdcrlandschc Bank. 
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Table 7 
Merchandise trade by SITC sections (as a % of total) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Imports 
0. Food and live animals 11,2 11,6 11,8 11, 7 11,2 11, 1 11,7 11,8 12,7 10,8 10,2 9,9 11,0 11,4 
I. Beverage, tobacco 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 
2. Crude materials, 
excluding fuels 6,3 6,2 5,9 5,9 6,0 6,0 5,7 5,5 6,0 6,0 5,5 5,0 4,9 4,9 
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants 24,1 26,5 26,0 25,0 24,2 23,3 13,0 12,1 9,7 11, 1 11,4 10,6 9,3 9,6 
4. Oils, fats and waxes 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,4 1,2 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,7 
5. Chemicals 8,2 8,6 8,6 8,9 9,5 10,1 10,5 10,7 11,0 11,0 10,4 10,2 10,6 11,7 
6. Manufactured goods 15,9 14,4 14,4 14,0 14,4 14,4 16,7 16,4 17,3 17,1 16,9 16,3 15,9 14,8 
7. Machinery and transport 
equipment 19,8 18,8 19,3 21, 1 21,3 22,2 27,4 27,9 28,2 29,2 30,3 31,9 31,8 31,2 
8. Other manufactures 11,0 10,5 10,2 10,2 9,7 9,8 12, l 12,8 12,8 12,5 13,2 13,9 14,0 14, 1 
9. Other non-classified 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,7 1,0 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,1 
Exports 
0. Food and live animals 17, 1 18,3 18,2 17,6 16,9 16,1 17,4 18,2 18,1 17,8 17,3 17,2 17,9 18,0 
I. Beverage, tobacco 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,6 2,0 2, 1 1,9 1,8 2,1 2,4 2,5 2,6 
2. Crude materials, 
excluding fuels 5,2 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,8 5,1 5,7 6,0 6,5 6,3 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,6 
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants 22,2 24,0 23,9 23,6 23,3 24,0 15,8 11,5 8,7 9,6 9,7 9,9 8,5 9,0 
4. Oils, fats and waxes 1,0 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,5 1,3 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 
5. Chemicals 15,1 14,7 14,6 15,2 15,2 14,8 15,4 16,3 16,8 15,8 15, 1 14,6 15,9 15,9 
6. Manufactured goods 13,5 12,6 12,4 12,2 12,3 12,2 13,6 13,9 14,3 13,9 13,2 13,2 13,6 12,4 
7. Machinery and transport 
equipment 16,9 15,8 16,0 16,2 16,0 16,2 19,2 20,5 21,5 22,0 23,7 23,3 23,8 25,0 
8. Other manufactures 6,0 5,6 5,8 6,0 5,9 6,2 7,3 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,8 9,4 10,5 10,3 
9. Other non-classified 1,4 1,7 1,7 1,8 2,4 2,4 2,8 2,9 3,5 3,9 3,8 3,8 0,7 0,3 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 8 
Geographical distribution of external trade (as a % of total) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Imports 
EUR12 54,7 53,5 55,5 55,0 53,6 55,8 61,0 61,5 61,6 60,2 59,9 59,0 58,8 57,7 
of which: BLEU 11,6 11,3 11,0 10,7 10,8 11,8 13,4 13,8 14,0 13,3 13,0 13,0 12,9 11, 1 
Germany 22,2 21,4 22,2 22,0 21,4 21,4 25,2 25,5 25,1 24,1 23,9 23,5 23,0 22,1 
Spain 0,8 0,9 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,8 
France 6,7 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,3 6,4 6,8 7,0 7,5 7,7 7,6 7,0 7,2 7, 1 
Italy 3,2 3,0 3,0 3,1 2,8 2,9 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,4 3,5 3,4 3,3 3,5 
United Kingdom 8,2 8,6 9,4 8,7 8,5 9,7 7,9 7,5 7,4 7,5 7,7 8,0 7,9 9,0 
USA 8,8 9,5 9,4 9,3 9,2 8,4 8,0 7,4 7,8 8,6 8, 1 8, 1 8,2 8,8 
Japan 1,9 1,9 2,1 2,3 2,5 2,5 3,6 3,7 3,6 3,5 4,0 5,4 5,4 4,2 
OPEC 15,1 14,3 10,7 9,8 9,9 9,4 6,3 5,9 5,3 6,6 6,2 6, 1 5,6 5,7 
Other 19,5 20,8 22,4 23,6 24,9 23,9 21,1 21,5 21,6 21,1 21,8 21,5 21.9 23,6 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
as a% of GDP 44,6 45,8 44,6 45,2 50,7 53,3 44,6 44,0 45,4 48,9 47,9 47,3 46,0 37,4 
Exports 
EUR12 73,5 72,5 73,7 73,6 73,6 74,6 75,7 75,4 74,7 75,7 76,5 76,2 75,4 72,5 
of which: BLEU 15,6 14,9 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,8 15,1 15,6 15,5 15,5 16,3 16,9 17,3 12,5 
Germany 30,5 30,1 30,0 30,6 31,7 32,3 30,0 29,3 27,2 27,8 30,2 34,4 34,5 28,5 
Spain 1,0 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,7 0,8 1,1 1,5 2, 1 2,2 2,5 2,6 2,6 2,4 
France 11,0 11,5 11,2 10,7 10,8 10,7 10,6 11,0 11,4 11,3 11,9 12,1 12,1 10,4 
Italy 5,6 5,5 5,6 6,0 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,3 7,7 7,8 7,9 5,6 
United Kingdom 9,1 9,3 9,6 10,0 10,2 10,4 10,3 10,9 12,6 12,3 12,7 11,9 11,5 9,2 
USA 2,5 3,2 3,2 4,2 5,0 5, 1 4,6 4,3 4,2 4,3 3,9 3,8 4,1 4,3 
Japan 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,9 0,9 1,0 
OPEC 5,4 5,4 5,0 4,5 3,8 3,2 2,6 2,4 2,5 2,2 2,3 2,1 2,3 2,4 
Other 18,1 18,4 17,6 17,1 17,0 16,6 16,4 17,2 17,7 16,8 16,4 16,9 17,3 19,9 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
as a% of GDP 42,9 47,6 47,1 48,2 53,3 55,6 47,1 44,6 46,0 50,6 48,0 46,1 43,9 42,4 
Source: Eurostat and Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 
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Table 9 
Labour market indicators 
1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Population 
Netherlands 13 032 14 148 14488 14 567 14 664 14 760 14 846 14 947 15 068 15 182 15 290 15 387 
EUR 15 323 210 338 528 342 188 342 926 343 665 344 821 346 204 348 306 350 363 352 364 354 196 355 427 
Netherlands as a % of EUR 15 4,0 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 
of which 15-64 year-olds, % of 
total population 
Netherlands 62,6 66,2 68,5 68,8 69,0 69,0 69,0 68,9 68,8 68,7 68,6 68,5 
EUR 15 63,2 64,5 66,9 67,0 67,1 67,2 67,2 67,2 67,2 67,1 67,1 67,2 
Labour force 
Netherlands 5 211 5 861 6051 6 168 6 286 6 420 6 518 6 681 6 839 6 970 7 036 7 093 
EURl5 132 371 142 952 147 658 148 726 150 085 151 599 152 816 155 255 156 001 156 224 156 325 156 492 
Labour force, % of 
total population 
Netherlands 40,0 41,4 41,8 42,3 42,9 43,5 43,9 44,7 45,4 45,9 46,0 46,1 
EURl5 41,0 42,2 43,2 43,4 43,7 44,0 44,1 44,6 44,5 44,3 44,I 44,0 
Occupied population 
Netherlands 4 844 4945 4 730 4 828 4 911 4 989 5 084 5 203 5 273 5 318 5 311 5 309 
EURl5 133 012 137 594 135 690 136 617 138 164 140 261 142 387 144 769 144 884 143 834 141 063 140 317 
Occupied population, 
as % of total population 
Netherlands 37,2 35,0 32,6 33,1 33,5 33,8 34,2 34,8 35,0 35,0 34,7 34,5 
EURl5 41,2 40,6 39,7 39,8 40,2 40,7 41,1 41,6 41,4 40,8 39,8 39,5 
Unemployment rate 
Netherlands 1,0 6,4 8,4 8,3 8,1 7,6 6,9 6,2 5,8 5,6 6,6 7,0 
EURl5 2,3 5,8 10,0 9,9 9,6 9,0 8,2 7,6 8,1 9,0 10,6 11,1 
Wage and salary earners, 
total economy, Netherlands 4 103 4 320 4 123 4 219 4 299 4 376 4 470 4 585 4 654 4693 4 666 4 658 
Wage and salary earners, 
general government 579 723 745 750 754 750 746 743 737 732 728 
Wage and salary earners, 
private sector 3 528 3 599 3 378 3 469 3 545 3 626 3 724 3 842 3 917 3 961 3 938 
Wage and salary earners, 
manufacturing industry I 196 '166 860 872 882 88'1 '102 '120 '117 '107 874 844 
Employment, relation 
persons/man-years 118 118 119 119 120 120 121 121 122 122 
Characteristics of unemployed, 
Eurostar (harmonized) 
total 46,3 339,8 472,3 500,9 513,1 485,8 452,9 413,3 395,1 394,2 467,0 507,4 
of which: males 257,7 240,3 227,2 217,7 195,9 176,2 168,3 179,7 237,9 265,5 
females 214,6 260,6 285,9 268,1 257,0 237,1 226,8 214,5 229,1 241,9 
less than 25 years old 146,3 171,0 173,2 141,4 129,2 113,9 109,2 112,9 143,8 134,8 
long-term unemployed 330,6 272,3 279,I 254,0 233,4 208,7 165,3 202,3 
Source: Eurostat and Centraal Planbureau. 
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Table 10 
Government expenditure( billion HFL) 
Current prices Constant prices Real growth as a% of GDP 
(index 1970 = 100) 
1970 51,8 100,0 8,4 42.7 
1971 60,5 108,1 8, l 44.3 
1972 69,1 112,9 4,5 44.8 
1973 79,2 118,7 5, l 45,0 
1974 93,9 128,9 8,6 47,0 
1975 114,3 142,5 10,5 52,0 
1976 131,2 150,1 5,4 52, l 
1977 143,1 153,5 2,3 52.1 
1978 158,6 161,3 5, l 53.4 
1979 174,0 170,2 5,6 55. I 
1980 191,9 177,8 4,4 57,0 
1981 208,3 183,0 2,9 59,0 
1982 224,9 186,2 1,8 61,0 
1983 234,4 190,5 2,3 61,5 
1984 240,6 192,0 0,8 60.1 
1985 246,6 193,3 0,7 58,0 
1986 253,2 198, 1 2,5 57.9 
1987 261,9 206,0 4,0 59.4 
1988 263,6 204,9 -0,5 57,6 
1989 265,6 204,0 -0,4 54,8 
1990 283,9 213, l 4,5 55,0 
1991 301,3 220,2 3,3 55,6 
1992 317,3 226,1 2,7 56,3 
1993 326,2 228,7 1.1 56,8 
1994 331,7 227,7 -0,4 55,2 
1995 335,3 225,2 -1.1 52,9 
1994 and 1995: Commission services forecast spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 11 
Government expenditure by category as a % of GDP 
Gross capital Compensation Purchases of goods Interest Transfers to 
formation of employees and services payments households 
NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EURl2 
1970 5,1 4,1 11,0 10,l 3,4 4,9 3,0 1,8 17,2 12,l 
1971 5,3 4,1 11,5 10,6 3,5 5,1 3,0 1,8 18,3 12,4 
1972 4,7 3,9 11,8 10,9 3,1 5,0 2,8 1,7 19,4 13,0 
1973 4,2 3,7 11,8 10,8 2,8 5,0 2,9 1,7 20,0 13,1 
1974 4,0 3,8 12,3 11,3 3,0 5,3 3,1 1,9 21,3 13,7 
1975 4,3 3,9 13,0 12,1 3,3 5,6 3,2 2,1 23,7 15,5 
1976 4,1 3,6 12,8 12, 1 3,4 5,6 3,1 2,2 24,1 15,8 
1977 3,7 3,3 12,8 12, I 3,5 5,5 3, 1 2,4 24,7 16,0 
1978 3,5 3,1 12,9 12,2 3,7 5,6 3,2 2,6 25,5 16,5 
1979 3,4 3,1 13,1 12,1 4,0 5,6 3,3 2,7 26,2 16,3 
1980 3,5 3,2 13,0 12,6 3,8 5,9 3,8 3,1 26,8 16,5 
1981 3,4 3,0 12,7 13,0 4,0 6,1 4,6 3,7 27,9 17,4 
1982 3,1 2,9 12,6 13,0 4,0 6,2 5,3 4,1 29,5 18,0 
1983 2,9 2,8 12,2 12,9 4,2 6,2 5,9 4,4 30,0 18,2 
1984 3,0 2,8 11,5 12,7 4,0 6,2 6,2 4,7 28,7 17,9 
1985 2,8 2,8 11,1 12,5 3,9 6,2 6,4 4,9 27,4 18,0 
1986 2,6 2,8 10,9 12,4 3,9 6,1 6,4 4,9 27,0 17,9 
1987 2,6 2,7 11,l 12,4 4, 1 6,1 6,4 4,6 27,4 17,9 
1988 2,7 2,7 10,6 12,1 4,1 6,0 6,3 4,5 27,0 17,5 
1989 2,6 2,8 10,1 11,9 4,1 5,8 6,0 4,6 26,2 17,2 
1990 2,7 2,9 9,8 12,0 4,0 5,9 6,0 4,7 27,2 17,4 
1991 2,7 3,0 9,7 12,3 4,1 6,2 6,2 4,8 27,4 18,2 
1992 2,7 2,9 9,9 12,4 4,0 6,4 6,3 5,2 27,9 19,2 
1993 2,7 2,8 10,0 12,3 3,9 6,8 6,5 5,4 28,3 20,0 
1994 2,7 2,7 9,8 12,0 3,9 6,8 6,0 5,2 27,7 20,0 
1995 2,7 2,6 9,6 11,7 3,8 6,7 5,8 5,3 26,6 19,6 
Transfers to the Transfers to Net capital Current Total 
rest of the world enterprises transfers transfers expenditure 
NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EURl2 NL EUR 12 
1970 -0,1 0,5 1,9 1,9 1,0 0,8 18,9 14,7 42,7 36,9 
1971 0,0 0,5 1,5 1,8 0,8 0,8 19,8 15,0 44,3 37,9 
1972 0,1 0,5 1,6 2,0 0,9 0,8 21,2 15,8 44,8 38,7 
1973 -0,1 0,5 2,0 2,1 1,2 0,9 21,8 16,0 45,0 38,8 
1974 0,2 0,6 2,0 2,3 0,9 0,8 23,4 16,8 47,0 40,6 
1975 0,6 0,6 2,0 2,5 1,5 1,0 26,3 19,0 52,0 44,3 
1976 0,3 0,6 2,7 2,5 1,3 1,0 27,0 19,2 52,1 44,3 
1977 0,4 0,6 2,8 2,6 0,8 1,0 27,7 19,5 52,1 44,5 
1978 0,5 0,7 2,9 2,7 0,9 1,0 28,8 20,1 53,4 45,2 
1979 0,2 0,6 3,1 2,7 1,5 1,0 29,5 20,0 55,1 45,2 
1980 0,4 0,6 3,1 2,7 2,3 1,0 30,2 20,1 57,0 46,5 
1981 0,7 0,6 2,8 2,7 2,6 1,2 31,4 21,2 59,0 48,8 
1982 0,7 0,7 3,1 2,7 2,5 1,0 33,2 21,8 61,0 49,6 
1983 0,5 0,6 3,3 2,7 2,3 0,9 33,8 22,0 61,5 49,8 
1984 0,6 0,6 3,6 2,9 2,4 1,0 32,7 21,9 60,1 49,8 
1985 0,4 0,7 3,6 2,8 2,2 1,0 31,4 21,9 58,0 49,9 
1986 0,6 0,6 3,6 2.8 2,7 1,0 31,2 21,8 57,9 49,4 
1987 0,4 0,6 4,4 2,7 2,9 0,8 32,2 21,7 59,4 48,8 
1988 0,5 0,7 4,1 2,5 2,2 0,9 31,7 21,2 57,6 47,9 
1989 0,6 0,8 3,5 2,4 1,7 0,9 30,3 20,8 54,8 47,3 
1990 0,8 1,1 3,1 2,3 1,5 1,0 31,0 21,3 55,0 48,3 
1991 1,1 0,8 3,3 2,4 1,0 0,9 31,8 21,9 55,6 49,6 
1992 1,2 0,8 3,2 2,3 0,9 0,5 32,3 22,8 56,3 50,9 
1993 1,3 0,9 3,0 2,4 0,9 1,0 32,6 23,9 56,8 52,6 
1994 1,4 0,9 2,6 2,3 0,8 0,8 31,7 23,7 55,2 51,6 
1995 1.4 1.0 1,8 2,3 0,8 0,6 29,8 23,4 52,9 50,8 
EUR 12 = EUR 15 excluding GR, P and L; 1991-95 including D. 
1994 and 1995: Commission services forecasts spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 12 
Government receipts by category as a % of GDP 
Total Direct taxes Indirect taxes Social Other 
security current 
contributions receipts 
NL EUR12 NL EUR12 NL EUR12 NL EUR12 NL EURl2 
1970 42,3 37,3 13,4 10,2 11,4 13,5 14,0 10,7 3,3 2,9 
1971 44,1 37,6 14,3 10,4 11,6 13,3 14,8 11, l 3,2 2,9 
1972 45,2 37,5 14,8 10,2 11,9 13,1 15,0 11,4 3,3 2,8 
1973 46,7 38,1 15,0 10,6 11,7 12,9 16,3 11,9 3,4 2,8 
1974 47,7 39,0 15,4 11,3 10,9 12,4 17,2 12,3 3,9 3,0 
1975 50,1 39,9 16, 1 11,3 11,2 12,3 17,7 13,3 4,9 3, 1 
1976 50,5 41,3 15,7 11,8 11,7 12,5 17,3 13,8 5,7 3,2 
1977 51,3 41,8 15,6 12,1 12,4 12,7 17,3 14,0 5,9 3,1 
1978 51,6 41,8 15,7 12,0 12,7 12,7 17,5 14,0 5,6 3, 1 
1979 52,4 42,0 15,7 11,7 12,4 12,9 18,0 14,1 6,0 3,2 
1980 54,0 43,0 16,3 12,1 12,4 13,1 18,4 14,3 6,8 3,5 
1981 54,6 43,9 15,5 12,3 12,0 13,2 19,0 14,4 8,1 3,9 
1982 54,9 44,5 15, 1 12,5 11,8 13,3 19,9 14,8 8, 1 4,0 
1983 56,2 45,0 13,9 12,6 12,1 13,4 22,1 15, 1 8,0 3,9 
1984 54,9 45,1 13,1 12,8 12,2 13,5 21,0 15,0 8,6 3,8 
1985 54,4 45,4 12,7 12,9 12,1 13,4 20,5 15,0 9,0 4,1 
1986 52,8 45,1 13,4 12,7 12,6 13,4 19,6 15, 1 7,1 3,9 
1987 53,5 45,2 14,1 13,0 13,3 13,6 20,5 15, 1 5,6 3,5 
1988 53,0 44,6 14,4 12,9 13,2 13,6 20,5 14,9 4,8 3,3 
1989 50,1 44,9 13,9 13,3 12,5 13,4 18,8 14,7 4,8 3,4 
1990 49,9 44,7 15,5 13,0 12,3 13,4 17,0 14,8 5,0 3,5 
1991 52,7 45,1 16,9 13,0 12,4 13,5 18,0 15,2 5,3 3,5 
1992 52,4 45,6 15,9 12,9 12,8 13,4 18,6 15,6 5,0 3,7 
1993 53,5 46,2 16,9 12,9 13,0 13,6 18,7 16,0 4,9 3,7 
1994 52,1 46,0 14,2 12,5 13,1 13,8 20,4 16, 1 4,4 3,5 
1995 49,6 46,2 13,5 12,9 13,0 13,9 19,4 16, 1 3,7 3,4 
EUR 12: EUR 15 excluding GR, P and L; 1991-95 including D. 
1994 and 1995: Commission services forecasts spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 13 / 
Government net borrowing (-) or net lending ( +) and gross debt (as a % of GDP) 
Including Excluding Gross debt 
interest interest 
payments payments 
NL EURI2 NL EURI2 NL EURI5 
1970 -1,2 0,4 1,7 2,2 
1971 -1,0 -0,2 1,9 1,6 
1972 -0,4 -1,1 2,3 0,6 
1973 0,8 -0,6 3,5 1,1 
1974 -0,2 -1,6 2,7 0,4 : 
1975 -2,9 -4,3 0,2 -2,1 42,4 
1976 -2,6 -2,9 0,4 -0,7 42,0 
1977 -1,8 -2,5 1,2 -0,1 41,4 
1978 -2,8 -3,4 0,3 -0,8 42,6 
1979 -3,7 -3,2 -0,5 -0,5 44,7 
1980 -4,0 -3,4 -0,3 -0,4 47,6 
1981 -5,5 -4,9 -1,0 -1,2 51,7 
1982 -7,1 -5,1 -1,9 -1,0 57,1 
1983 -6,4 -4,8 -0,7 -0,5 63,7 
1984 -6,3 -4,6 -0,3 0,0 67,8 
1985 -3,6 -4,4 2,7 0,5 71,5 
1986 -5,1 -4,1 1,3 0,7 73,5 
1987 -5,9 -3,5 0,5 1,1 76,1 
1988 -4,6 -3,1 1,7 1,4 79,2 
1989 -4,7 -2,2 1,2 2,4 79,2 
1990 -5,1 -3,4 0,9 1,3 78,8 
1991 -2,9 -4,2 3,3 0,6 78,9 56,0 
1992 -3,9 -5,1 2,4 0,1 79,9 60,3 
1993 -3,3 -6,2 3,1 -0,8 81,4 66,2 
1994 -3,1 -5,4 3,0 -0,2 78,1 68,0 
1995 -3,2 -4,4 2,6 0,9 78,1 70,3 
EUR 12: EUR 15 excluding GR, P and L; 1991-95 including D. 
1994 and 1995: Commission services forecasts spring 1995. 
Source: Commission services. 
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